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ABSTRACT 
The aim of thesis is to address the issue of convergence versus divergence in work 
organisation in the telecommunications industry in Britain and Korea through a 
comparative case study. Convergence or divergence has been debated among 
universalists, national institution theorists and converging divergence proponents. These 
approaches suffer from respectively under-socialisation, over-socialisation, and a lack of 
dynamic interactions between variables. 
By focusing on the changing processes of national telecoms governance regimes, 
management strategies, corporate restructuring, and work organisation, the research 
explores how global forces are mediated or structured by contextual variables and how 
variables interact. It investigates three aspects of work organisation, that is, work 
control, work rationalisation and customisation, and flexibility, of field technicians and 
customer services representatives in British Telecom and Korea Telecom. 
The evidence based on interviews, documentation and observations suggests that 
there are systematic differences in patterns of work organisation between the two cases 
but small similarities. Even ostensible similarities arise from different contexts and have 
varying significance. Systematic differences are argued to result not just from varying 
phases of corporate restructuring between the two cases but also more importantly from 
such contextual factors as national systems, telecoms governance regimes, the existing 
management structure, and management and union strategies. However, the 
relationships between intermediate variables are more interactive and dynamic than 
conventional institutionalism suggests. Changes in some of the intermediate variables or 
work reorganisation may be an important source of influence on national institutions, 
leading to dynamic interactions between variables. These dynamic interactions make the 
diversification between the two cases distinct from conventional national institution 
theories which see national institutions as being constant. 
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in charge of field operations. There are 13 regional business units across the country. 
RIMS: Repair and Installation Management System in KT. 
SLMOS: Subscriber Lines Maintenance and Operation Systems in KT 
STE: Society of Telecom Executive - renamed `Connect' from Jan. 2000- junior and 
middle managers' and professionals' union. 
STs: Senior Technicians - the highest grade in field technician hierarchy who took 
charge of a range of areas in the past but who are now working at Control centres. 
TECs: Telephone Exchange Centres - telephone buildings which accommodated 
exchanges and various customer service functions in BT. 
TIMS: Telephone Installation Management System 
TIs: Technician I- middle grade between STs and TIIAs, in charge of some field work 
in the past but they are doing the same jobs as TIIAs or taking charge of cable gang. 
TIIAs: Technician IIA - low grade in field technician hierarchy in the past. 
TPMS: Telecommunications Performance Monitoring System 
WM: Work Manager. 
UCW: Union of Communications Workers - merged with NCU and created CWU in 
1995. 
UK CFS: UK Customer Field Services in BT - providing customers with installations 
and fault repair services in the field and later became Customer Service Delivery Unit. 
WITHOD: Working In The Hours Of Darkness 
WN: Worldwide Network in BT - created in 1991 and was in charge of switching and 
transmission network. 
XI 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to re-examine the relevance of convergence versus 
divergence in a new global environment through a comparative case study on the impact 
of global forces on the reorganisation of work in the telecommunications services 
industry in Britain and Korea. It will aim to establish whether or not work is 
reorganised in a similar way between British Telecom (BT) and Korea Telecom (KT) 
by looking at how global forces, a number of intermediate variables and work 
organisation interact with each other. By seeking to explain why and how convergence 
or divergence takes place in the telecommunications services industry, it is thus 
intended to revisit and contribute to the existing theories on convergence versus 
divergence. 
The spectre of globalisation is hovering over our heads. Recent examples of many 
mega mergers and acquisitions, and Internet frenzies in the world stock markets 
represent outward signs of the unprecedented degree of intensity and influence of the 
globalisation phenomenon. At the core of globalisation has been the surge in the 
information technology industry as the new engine of economic growth, supported by 
free flowing investment capital moving around the world financial market, seeking high 
returns. Developments in capital markets in industrialised economies such as Germany, 
Japan and France have led to a much greater influence of investors on their firms, which 
is often claimed to be giving birth to a trend towards "Anglo-Saxonisation". 
Globalisation as the newly emerging phenomenon thus re-ignites the decades-old debate 
on convergence versus divergence in a new perspective. 
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1.1. Research Questions and Overall Purpose of the Research 
Work or production systems in one country have generally been discussed with 
regard to their relative economic performance to those in other countries. When 
Taylorism was heralded as a new efficient production system replacing craft-based 
small production systems, especially in the USA, production or work systems issues 
attracted much attention. Braverman's labour process theory which emerged in the first 
half of the 1970s provided a critical analysis from an academic perspective of how 
Taylorism reorganises work, controls work, and increases work intensity in order to 
enhance efficiency. As superior Japanese industrial performance in manufacturing in 
the 1970s - 80s was believed to have arisen from a specific way of organising 
production, Japanese production systems have attracted significant attention from 
around the world becoming the focus of academic research as well as practitioners' 
learning. Japanese production systems were epitomised by Womack et al. (1990) as the 
`lean production' model to be emulated by others if they were to survive in increasingly 
competitive markets. The `diversified quality production' system in Germany or the 
`socio-technical model' in Sweden was also suggested as alternative production systems 
to Japanese ones (Streeck 1992a). The introduction of a wave of new technologies, 
market segmentation and competition, which demands responsiveness and flexibility 
from producers, raise work organisation issues with regard to the performance of firms. 
Important issues of work organisation, such as flexibility, teamwork and quality circles 
are recognised as a key source of competitive advantage for firms (Locke 1995a). The 
importance of production issues became much greater as restructuring came to be seen 
as the key to competitive success (Terry 1994: 230). Work systems have increasingly 
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been recognised as being crucial to performance and competitiveness of firms as well as 
countries. Production or work systems are implicitly or explicitly supposed to have 
distinct national character, what they call national systems of industrial production 
(Appelbaum and Batt. 1994; Djelic 1998). 
Traditional industrial relations research has tended to focus on procedural issues or 
institutions such as collective bargaining and trade unions rather than substantive issues. 
Despite greater efforts to look at these substantive issues as exemplified in flexibility or 
Japanisation debates, it does not seem that enough attention has been paid to these 
issues and that there have been a lot of systematic endeavours to integrate procedural 
and substantive matters into one industrial relations system. Ideally, substantive issues 
such as work organisation should be dealt with as an integral part of industrial relations 
systems in industrial relations research. In particular, changes in industrial relations 
systems have mostly been discussed in relation to procedural issues, while ignoring the 
relevance of substantial issues to the changes in industrial relations institutions 
(Millward et al. 1992; Millward et al. 2000). These substantive issues such as work 
organisation may be an important source of changes in procedural arrangements in 
industrial relations. Here these issues should also be explained in relations to those 
changes. 
Work systems have often been analysed at the sectoral level, especially focusing on 
the car assembly industry. Sectors have been the location in which new technologies 
diffuse and influence work systems and firms compete against each other nationally and 
internationally, and the level towards which public policies can be formulated. They are 
also the interface at which national systems and global forces meet. Sectors lie at the 
meso-level between the micro-level of the firm and the macro-level of the national 
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economy. Thus, they may be an appropriate location to test what kinds of change that 
globalisation brings about in the workplace. Proportionately, the service sector now 
accounts for well over half of all employment and national gross products in most 
industrialised countries. So far, however, research into work organisation has 
disproportionately focused on manufacturing, paying insufficient attention to the service 
sector. 
When we look at work organisation in the telecommunications services industry in 
the context of globalisation, a number of research questions arise with regard to the 
relationship between globalisation and work organisation. Does globalisation lead to a 
cross-national convergence of work systems in the telecommunications services 
industry? What are the similarities and differences in work reorganisation in the 
industry between the two countries? How and by what mechanisms does work 
organisation converge or diverge? How exactly do global forces interact with national 
systems to bring about work reorganisation? To what extent are global forces shaped or 
structured by national regulatory frameworks or do global pressures lead to changes in 
national systems themselves? What roles do the major institutional actors play in these 
interactive processes? How can we reconfigure the changing interactive relationships 
between global forces, national institutions, sectoral governance regimes, management 
and unions, and work organisation in order to explain convergent or divergent outcomes 
of work organisation? 
These questions will be sought to be answered in this thesis by investigating and 
comparing how work is reorganised in the two cases with reference to three key themes 
of work organisation, i. e. work control, work rationalisation and customisation, and the 
flexible use of the workforce. These themes have become core issues of work 
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organisation in the telecommunications services industry because developments in 
competition in product markets, coupled with innovation or automation capacities of 
new technologies, have required telecoms firms to provide their services at ever-cheaper 
prices and to flexibly respond to customers' diversified demands. Telecoms operators 
achieve these requirements by reorganising work: that is, by improving how work is 
designed, scheduled, performed, measured, controlled or rewarded, deciding how work 
is rationalised, standardised or customised, and how work is flexibly resourced in terms 
of skill, the number of employees, time and space. This kind of work reorganisation is 
largely driven by performance considerations (Cappelli et al. 1997: 108). By looking at 
these core issues and what kinds of change have taken place, we can uncover the main 
theme, whether or not there is any tendency towards convergence of work organisation 
as a whole. Through the test of the convergence versus divergence hypotheses, this 
research will examine `national effects' or `industry effects' on work restructuring in the 
telecommunications industry. 
1.2. The Telecommunications Services Industry 
The service sector, particularly the so-called `TMT' industries (technology, media 
and telecommunications) have been expanding rapidly and leading economic growth in 
industrialised economies, whereas the relative weight of manufacturing has been 
shrinking over the years. Since the mid-1980s the telecommunications services industry 
has shown remarkable quantitative growth and qualitative developments into new 
service areas in advanced economies. The telecommunications industry has led the 
information age by providing the infrastructure that carries voice, data and pictures, 
`virtually' linking people across national borders and to vast sources of information. 
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The developments in the telecoms industry have had a significant influence on the 
production, consumption and distribution of services and goods. Thus, the 
telecommunications industry has a strategic importance for national economies boosting 
economic growth and national competitiveness. The industry has undergone a 
transformation of its product markets and ownership structure under global forces as 
will be explained in the first section of chapter 5. The considerable changes in product 
markets and ownership make the telecoms services industry an appropriate location for 
research into the impacts of globalisation on work organization. 
This study is based on a comparative case study of the two companies, British 
Telecom and Korea Telecom, in two very different national contexts. The two countries 
differ greatly in terms of the history of their industrialisation, political institutions, 
financial systems, and industrial relations arrangements, as will be seen in chapter 4. 
The choice of the two companies in greatly differing national contexts may make the 
cross-national comparison more pertinent in the sense that it may provide a good 
opportunity to explore how globalisation influences work organisation in the telecoms 
service industry. 
1.3. The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is composed of chapters, which broadly deal with the theoretical 
framework and methodology, the intermediate variables at different levels and the main 
focus of the research, work organisation issues. Chapter 2 begins by revisiting the 
convergence versus divergence debate, which is linked with globalisation. Three 
perspectives (universalism, institutionalism, and converging divergence) are critically 
reviewed. From the analyses of these various perspectives, dynamic interactions 
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between global forces, national institutions, major actors and work organisation are 
suggested. The two possible alternative outcomes of convergence or divergence are 
hypothesised in the processes of dynamic interactions. The next chapter addresses 
research methodology. The pertinence of qualitative, case study and cross-national 
approaches to the research is espoused and the cases for the choice of the two 
companies, BT and KT and the unit of analysis are set out. The last section of the 
chapter concerns how interviews, observations and documentation were used for data 
collection and how the analysis was undertaken. 
Chapter 4 produces a brief introduction to, and comparison of, the national 
institutions in the two countries. It summaries the main characteristics of political 
institutions, financial systems and industrial relations systems in the two countries with 
regard to industrial adjustments. It also considers how these institutions may shape and 
influence reforms in the telecoms governance regimes, management strategies, and 
corporate restructuring. Chapter 5 examines what kinds of telecoms governance 
regimes have been created in the two countries in response to global forces. The chapter 
continues to deal with how new developments in privatisation, deregulation and 
competition and regulation may constitute sectoral contexts in each country in which 
management strategies are formed and corporate restructuring takes place. It compares 
the two telecoms governance regimes and discusses what their respective influences on 
management strategies, corporate restructuring are likely to be. The following chapter 
looks into what kinds of management strategies BT has adopted in an increasingly 
competitive business environment and how KT management has pursued 
commercialism, whilst constrained by public ownership. It goes on to explore what 
dimensions of corporate restructuring have taken place under these management 
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strategies in the two companies and in which ways management strategies and corporate 
restructuring may be closely linked to work reorganisation. It then compares the two 
cases and seeks to explain why and how management strategies and corporate 
restructuring are different between them. 
Chapter 7-9 deal with three work organisation issues, that is, work control, work 
rationalisation and customisation, and flexibility in the context of national institutions, 
national telecoms governance regimes, and management strategies and corporate 
restructuring. These issues have not only been closely associated with company 
performance but have also been conspicuous in work restructuring as an essential part 
of corporate restructuring. These may be considered as important indicators of the 
extent of the reorganisation of work. Chapter 7 discusses how the two companies have 
developed work control systems, and explores the management strategies responsible 
for the kinds of control systems BT and KT have developed. Their consequences and 
implications are also considered. The comparisons are between the two cases and 
explanations for differences are sought by contextualising the cases. Chapter 8, after 
defining work rationalisation and customisation, focuses on how and to what extent 
work rationalisation and customisation have been advanced in BT and KT. It then 
discusses the consequences and implications of these work rationalisation and 
customisation for work systems, and the reasons for the differences found in work 
rationalisation and customisation between the two cases are explained. Chapter 9 looks 
at developments in the flexible use of the workforce. Four dimensions of flexibility 
(task, external, time and space) were identified, and the extent to which BT and KT 
have used these four dimensions of flexibility is investigated and the reasons for the 
differences are sought. The last chapter summarises the key findings, similarities and 
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differences between the two cases and between the access side and the clerical side. It 
goes on to examine why and by what mechanisms global forces lead to divergent work 
systems and to explain how dynamic interactions work and how institutional changes 
may be brought in. It concludes by emphasising the need to integrate institutional 
dynamism into future IR research and looking at how institutional changes may occur. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Revisiting convergence vs divergence debates 
The debate on whether a convergence or divergence of industrial relations between 
countries, sectors and firms has been an ongoing feature of industrial relations research 
for decades since Kerr et al. (1974) argued that pluralistic industrialism was a driver of 
convergence. Historically convergence theories that have so far emerged during the 
course of the debate have material contexts originating from one country but could also 
have implications for other countries. As Hyman (1989,123) suggested, Kerr et al. 's 
model of pluralist industrialism on which it was claimed other societies would 
converge, reflects the post-war dominance of American political economy based upon 
the principles of mass production. The Japanese model of `lean production', which 
Womack et al. (1990) contend other production systems would need to emulate if they 
survive in increasingly competitive markets, has also arisen from the context of surging 
Japanese economic power in contrast to declining American economic hegemony 
during the late 1970s and 1980s. In this regard it is plausible to argue that the re- 
emergence of American economic power during the 1990s based on the new 
information technology in the era of growing globalisation would encourage academics 
to revisit the debate with a new perspective. 
The scale of the globalisation of economic activities following deregulation 
measures and the opening up of markets across countries seems to have rekindled the 
debates concerning whether or not national systems have increasingly lost their 
influence on industrial relations in a different context from that of the time of Kerr et 
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al. 's research. How changes in a new global economy are connected with national 
systems, sectors and firms, and thereby employment relations including work 
organisation need to be viewed in a new way. 
By looking back at how the debate on convergence versus divergence with 
reference to employment relations, particularly work organisation has taken place, the 
theme can then be approached in a way that is appropriate for the changed 
environments. The examination of three different perspectives revolving around 
convergence and divergence debates in industrial relations will now follow. 
2.1.1. Universalist Perspective 
The universalist perspective contends that cross-national convergent tendencies are 
based upon fundamental logics, which pervade across countries. The question of how 
industrial relations systems at national, sector/industry and firm level relate to the global 
capitalist system was raised in the early 1960s by (Kerr et al 1960). Kerr et al. argued 
that the logic of industrialisation tends to drive pre-modern societies into increasingly 
industrial ones towards a form of `pluralistic industrialism'. Although the different 
strategies of ruling elites and cultural heritages may remain sources of the continuing 
diversity in those societies, the diffusion of advanced technology, trades, best practices, 
trial and error, and mutual accommodation between conflicting interests have had 
homogenising effects on social institutions including industrial relations systems (Kerr 
et al 1960: 55,264 - 9). In particular, the `iron hand of technology' is emphasised as a 
main driving force of the convergence of social institutions including industrial relations 
systems across different countries (Kerr et al.: 259 - 63). In a similar vein, neo-classical 
economics holds that social institutions interfere with the proper operation of markets 
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and hierarchies, and are therefore regarded as a deviation from efficiency until such 
institutional distortions eventually disappear. 
However, `convergence theory' attracted a great deal of criticisms from various 
scholars who maintain the view that there is a divergence of industrial relations systems 
among different countries. In essence, the convergence theory of pluralistic 
industrialism is criticised as being technologically deterministic, ethnocentric and 
functionalist (Locke 1995a; Valenzuela 1992). The fact that distinctive national 
industrial relations systems that had been formed as a result of different kinds of post- 
war settlements remained robust has been found via numerous cross-national 
comparisons (Ferner and Hyman 1992; Bamber and Lansbury 1993; Frenkel 1993), 
thereby repudiating the simple convergence theory. The pluralist industrialism theory is 
also considered as being too functionalist in the sense that it indicated that practices 
should be understood by reference to their contribution to economic efficiency and 
social stability. Reflecting the overwhelming power of the American economy over 
other parts of the world at the time, they implicitly seemed to assume that the 
institutions and practices of the USA could serve as a best practice model for other 
nations to emulate. This particular ethnocentrism has been undermined by the 
emergence of the Japanese `lean production' model and the radical changes in industrial 
relations practices in the USA in the 1980s. 
Another version of the universalist perspective is espoused by Womack et al. (1990) 
who, in their study on the world auto industry, identified a fundamental idea of `lean 
production' originating from Toyota Motor plc. The principles of `lean production', 
they argue, were regarded as being superior to the existing mass production principles in 
the increasingly competitive world car markets since lean producers have the ability to 
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reduce costs per unit and to dramatically improve quality whilst providing a wide range 
of products. Thus, 
"lean production will supplant both mass production and the remaining outposts 
of craft production in all areas of industrial endeavour to become the standard 
global production system of the twenty-first century" (Womack et al., 278). 
They also argue that lean production principles are universally applicable to all sectors 
beyond the auto industry. The message that `lean production' theory sends is very 
strong: the transition from mass production to lean production is necessary and 
inevitable in intensified competitive product markets since firms which adopt lean 
production systems will survive or otherwise be wiped out; and the convergent tendency 
towards `lean production' will change all aspects of social life including the nature of 
work and employment relations (Womack et al., 9-12). The claim is that production 
systems converge on `lean production systems'. 
More reservedly, there have been discussions concerning the transferability of best 
practice including lean production or Japanisation in the UK. In their study of Japanese 
transplants in the USA, Florida and Kennedy (1996,54) share Womack et al's view by 
stating 
these organisational techniques and practices can be lifted out of the Japanese 
context and transferred abroad... Japanese transplants have not adapted to their 
environment as existing organisational and management theory would have 
predicted but they rather have effectively transformed their environments to meet 
their needs and functional requirements. 
MacDuffie and Krafcik (1992,222) and MacDuffie (1995,1997), in their studies on 
work organisation in the auto industry, argued that `lean production is fully transferable 
to other cultural and national settings', with the direction of change in work 
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organisation converging towards a `lean or flexible production model' among countries. 
Adler et al. (1997,66-74) state that NUMMI and another Japanese transplant 
successfully adopted Toyota's production systems but adapted employment practices to 
suit local conditions. Similarly, in their study of 31 Japanese transplants in Singapore, 
Rodgers and Wong (1996) argue that work organisation in these transplants conforms 
very much to Japanese lean production methods. However their HRM practices are held 
to be similar to those of the host country. Gill and Wong (1998) confirm that the 
Japanisation of management practices has been most successful in respect of 'hard' 
practice - production practices such as JIT, Kanban and TQM, whereas there is a greater 
difficulty in reproducing 'soft' HRM practices (e. g. lifetime employment and seniority 
systems) in different cultures such as Singapore. Morris and Wilkinson (1995,727-8), 
in their analysis of Japanese transplants in the UK, maintain that `the new paradigm of 
production and work organisation does travel everywhere with the Japanese', while the 
three pillars of Japanese employment systems (life time employment, seniority and 
enterprise unionism) are unlikely to be transferred elsewhere. In most of the case studies 
above, work organisation represented by `lean production' systems is argued to have 
been successfully transferred to Japanese transplants or others in foreign locations. 
Womack et al's `lean production' model has been under heavy criticism from 
academics as much as it has attracted wide publicity and had strong influence on the 
business world. Major criticisms concerned the following two points: the 
transferability of, or convergence of, Japanese lean production systems; and whether 
lean production is one best practice. The most fundamental critique of both Womack et 
al. 's lean production model and other writers' argument for the transferability of 
Japanese work practices comes from institutionalism and the political economy 
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perspective. Streeck (1996), in his discussion of the transferability of lean production to 
the German environment, emphasises how production systems are context-bound and 
inseparably interconnected to their distinct national institutions. His conclusion is that 
lean production is so deeply rooted in Japanese social institutions that it cannot be 
transferred to Germany, whose institutions and environment are qualitatively different 
from Japanese ones. Similarly the `societal effects' school' sees lean production as a 
reflection of Japanese national peculiarities. A similar point is made by Ishida's (1997) 
emphasis on Japanese nation-specific employment systems as `reciprocal obligations' to 
support lean production, and Oliver and Wilkinson's remark concerning the 
vulnerability of Japanese production system arising from few buffers. Juergen et al. 
(1993,379-84), in their comprehensive study on changes to work organisation in the 
auto industry, find that national industrial relations institutions in the US, UK and 
Germany influence the direction of restructuring and result in cross-national differences. 
Furthermore, in a comparative study on whether there is a convergence on flexible 
manufacturing systems in Britain, the USA and Japan, Jones (1991) criticised the ideas 
of a technology-driven convergence as being intrinsically naive because there are 
`distinct national and local' restraints. 
Other critiques emanate from the political economy perspective. Eiger and Smith 
(1994) criticise the universalists including Womack et al. in that they overlook real 
variations and persistent sources of conflict in the processes of work reorganisation, 
while Japanisation is actually adopted selectively and unevenly by Japanese transplants 
in foreign locations or non-Japanese firms. Graham (1994,124) suggests that 
management practices at a Japanese transplant in the USA resulted in a range of 
individual and collective resistance among workers due to the different environment. 
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Turner and Auer (1994; 57) point out the importance of historical backdrop, which the 
universalists fail to recognise, but against which the Toyota production system was 
partly founded following the defeat of independent unionism in the 1950s. 
Subsequently, Japanese industrial relations has seen docile trade unions play an 
important part in the development of new work organisation. 
There have been some ambiguities in the discussion concerning the transferability 
or diffusion of lean production systems. Whether lean production is car industry- 
specific best practice or not is not clear in the light of other research, except Womack et 
al's argument for the universal application of lean production principles. Whether the 
supposedly successful transfer of Japanese production systems to Japanese transplants 
overseas is due to Japanese multinationals' `corporate isomorphism' (Ferner and 
Quintanilla 1998) or to the diffusion of lean production as a best practice everywhere is 
not fully spelt out. ' 
These criticisms take the view that it is quite functionalist and technologically 
deterministic to argue that there will be a convergence towards lean production or the 
transfer of Japanese production systems to other countries. Because the argument is 
built on the assumption that production systems in one country can be separated from 
national contexts such as national systems, and national specific historical conditions of 
a compromise between classes at the time when production systems were born, the main 
point of the critiques is therefore that production systems cannot be de-contextualised. 
Another range of criticisms against the lean production model centre around the 
'. `Corporate isomorphism' means that divisions, business units or subsidiaries within the 
firm, especially the multinational tend to adopt the same structures and processes not only 
within the home country but also across national borders. The corporate isomorphism is due to 
strong headquarters pressures for international comformity within the firm (Ferner and 
Quintanilla. 1998,713) 
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question of whether lean production can be seen as `one best way'. Jürgens at al. (1993) 
suggest that there are two efficient models of work organisation: the German model and 
the Japanese model. Turner and Auer (1994) argue that there are different roads to new 
forms of work organisation with distinctive outcomes and that there is no one superior 
best way in terms of productivity and quality. Appelbaum and Batt (1994) identify four 
contending models of workplace reform based on nation-specific contexts, together with 
two emerging American models, which mean that there are competing models 
associated with more or less similar levels of high performance. These criticisms are 
consistent with evidence of national variations on forms of Taylorism significantly 
modified by national skill structure and employment relations (Lane 1989: 155-6). 
Overall, convergence perspectives including Womack et al's lean production model 
are biased towards a convergence on a context-free best practice, ignoring the effects of 
national institutions. In the univeralists' view, work organisation is relatively more 
easily learned, and less embedded in a specific national, institutional context than 
employment practices are. They think that accelerated globalisation may reduce the 
influence of national institutional arrangements and increase both the importance of 
managerial strategies and the possibility of management's adoption of best practice in 
the 1990s. However, global forces and best practice such as lean production would be 
mediated by, and interact with, national institutions to be modified in a nationally 
specific form. Work within firms in a certain country may be reorganised in a 
nationally specific way under constraints or pressures of global forces, depending upon 
contingencies such as the denseness of national institutions concerned, the extent of 
competition, and sectoral characteristics. 
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2.1.2. National Institution Approaches 
Industrial relations was often regarded as the study of social institutions. Common 
features of institutional theories contain strong critiques of neo-classical analyses that 
emphasise market mechanisms, and also address the defining roles of distinctive 
national institutions in influencing the forms and character of industrial relations 
including work organisation. National institution approaches seem to have emerged as a 
reaction against `convergence theory', particularly pluralistic industrialism and 
Marxism. According to the theories, capitalist systems and market relations have a 
nationally specific nature. There are a number of different institutional perspectives on 
work organisation and industrial relations: societal effects school, national business 
systems theory, and new institutionalism. 
The `societal effects' school (Maurice, Sellier and Silverstre 1986; Maurice and 
Sellier 1979) tends to emphasise cross-national systemic differences rather than 
similarities in industrial relations systems by noting the resilience and continuity of 
organisation that is deeply rooted in a web of social relations. Stability and continuity 
are considered to be due to `interdependence' between various dimensions of social 
relations (training, worker mobility and status, hierarchical relations, the distance 
between manual and non-manual jobs, and industrial relations). According to `industrial 
order' theory (Lane 1994), cross-national differences outweigh similarities between 
countries and the `order' is held to be caused by `mutually sustaining institutional 
complexes' composed of the state, the finance system, and industrial relations systems. 
Sorge (1995) also stresses cross-national differences in HR issues and organisation that 
arise from the `reciprocal interdependence' among various constituents of national 
institutions such as organisations, human resource/education, industry, and the labour 
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market. Further evidence produced by cross-national researches of this school mostly 
into Britain, Germany and France suggests that consistent differences between these 
three countries remain even in industrial adjustment, a finding that reinforces the 
societal effects model. 
The view that there are significant variations between national business systems has 
been suggested by proponents of the `national business systems' theory (Whitley 1991, 
1992,1999). Here variations in business systems between three East Asian countries, 
namely Japan, Korea and Taiwan/Hong Kong were held to originate from differences in 
societal contexts. The distinctive business systems as a form of national institution may 
explain persistent cross-national differences in the structure and behaviour of firms 
including how work is organised. Since these business systems are based on a different 
set of interconnected institutions such as ownership, authority relations, trust and loyalty 
and political and financial systems, they are not likely to alter without concomitant 
changes in relevant national institutions. `Societal effects' theories and `national 
business systems' perspectives contribute to the understanding of the 
interconnectedness among various dimensions of national institutions and social 
relations by explaining nationally distinctive ways of organising work and corporate 
structure. However, they are not quite so clear about causal relationships and are 
criticised as being too static. 
Another national institution approach is advocated by Streeck (1992a, 1992b, 
1996). He argues that in foreign environments there is formidable institutional 
resistance to managerial-engineered production systems such as lean production 
because of `a range of large institutional arrangements rooted in the fabric of society' 
(Streeck 1996,144). Even though the production systems are technically efficient and 
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economically expedient, they will be significantly rejected or transformed in Germany 
where there are dense, formalised institutional arrangements comprising the training 
system, skill structure, the legally binding industry-wide collective bargaining, co- 
determination and works councils, and the labour market. Elsewhere Streeck shows 
how German social and industrial relations institutions have constrained a `downward 
spiral of collective irrationality driven by individually rational choice' and facilitated 
the German car manufacturers to adopt upmarket strategies (Streeck 1992a, 29,169 - 
96). 
These various national institution theories have revealed that higher economic 
efficiency in production systems and their associated work systems within one country 
does not automatically lead to the adoption of a best practice model or any simple 
emulation from other countries. In other words, market mechanisms do not operate as 
they are assumed to do, because other social mechanisms such as national institutions 
based on social relations of production have considerable influence in the processes at 
the same time. According to these national institutionalists, intra-national homogeneity 
in industrial relations which `institutional isomorphism' (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) 
would bring about is likely to be found regardless of sectors, firms, regions within 
national borders, whereas cross-national heterogeneity is supposed to persist. 2 National 
Institution theories also suggest that national institutions are robust, and demonstrate 
significant inertia in the face of any pressure for changes, due to their mutually 
interlocking linkages among their various constituent institutions. They explain how 
national institutions or `societal effects' create structural limitations upon social actors 
2. `Institutional isomorphism' refers to mechanisms identified by Dimaggio and Powell (1984) 
whereby organisational homogenisation takes place in the organisational field such as `industry' 
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and mediate or modify international pressures. Although national institutionalism 
contributed to correcting many misconceived assumptions that presuppose that 
functionally efficient regimes will be automatically emulated by others, it is commonly 
subject to a number of shortcomings. 
National institutionalist analyses are more likely to remain static or `often walk 
between institutional constraints and institutional determinism' by focusing on the 
stability and continuity of national institutions throughout significant economic and 
social changes (Thelen and Steinmo 1992,15). On the one hand national institutional 
explanations do not often capture the `more detailed picture of substantial changes' in 
workplace industrial relations such as work organisation but rather give us `the 
impression of institutional stability and continuity' (Terry 1989,198). They often look 
at procedural continuities in industrial relations, while overlooking substantive changes 
in work and employment. On the other hand they assume that national institutional 
complexes have internal integrity and coherence, whereas they disregard a conflictual, 
contested nature within national institutions that arise from the inherent nature of 
employment relationships and the global dimension of capitalism (Smith and Elger 
1997; Elger and Edwards 1999: 6). 
National institutionalism is also said to be `ahistorical' in that it often ignores the 
fact that certain national institutions or societal complexes are also largely a product of 
both economic development and a particular socio-political compromise between 
classes, for example, a post-war settlement in each nation. Moreover, little attention is 
paid to the dynamic nature of interactions between variables and the dynamism that may 
exist within institutions themselves, or which widespread industrial restructuring and 
but can be extended to the level of the society. 
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global pressures in recent years have brought about. National institutionalist views do 
not see national institutions as possessing their own dynamism in that `the same 
institutions can produce different outcomes over time'. With significant changes in 
environments in which national institutions are situated, `previously latent institutions 
may suddenly become salient, old institutions may be put in the service of different ends 
or actors' goals or strategies may shift within existing institutions' (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992,16 -8). Too much stress on the constraints of national institutional arrangements 
on social actors does not allow any room for strategic choice for industrial relations 
actors. These weaknesses lead onto the recent discussions concerning `converging 
divergence'. 
2.1.3. Converging Divergence perspective 
The debate concerning `converging divergence' is relatively undeveloped but has 
evolved from recent empirically-based research, especially into the auto industry and 
the telecommunications services industry (Katz and Darbishire 2000). First of all, the 
strongly held institutionalist belief that employment and work systems are more or less 
homogeneous across sectors and firms within national borders needs examination in 
relation to the possibilities that there may be variations in national industrial relations 
and production systems. 
The first empirically significant research evidence, which suggests that there are 
various divergent sub-national systems within a national system, was produced by 
Locke (1992). Focusing upon the industrial adjustment of the Italian auto industry, he 
found that local socio-economic factors rather than national institutions were actually 
shaping behaviour and strategies of both unions and management at firm level in two 
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Italian auto companies. Based on a more comprehensive research, Locke (1995a), by 
focusing on local firms and industries with dense networks of associations and interest 
groups mediating conflicts and diffusing information, again challenges the assumptions 
of the institutional approaches which emphasise the defining role of national institutions 
in shaping industrial relations outcomes. These local-networks suggest that there may 
be internal variations within national economies in terms of industrial relations 
institutions. The findings have some important implications for the theoretical aspects 
of comparative industrial relations. That is, there is a need to adopt an approach that 
focuses on micro-level or meso-level developments and the politics of strategic choice 
in order to explain variations within nations instead of regarding national systems as the 
only key unit of analysis. This view is echoed by Katz (1997,23,26) via research into 
the telecommunications service industry across countries. Katz argues that there is 
`increased divergence... in employment relations within countries' as well as across 
countries. The possibility of sub-national systems within countries is also suggested in 
a comparative study of industrial relations in a number of countries (Locke et al. 1995, 
380-1). Others note that cross-sectoral differences in governance regimes (including 
employment relations) within nation-states arise from specific economic and 
technological conditions (Hollingsworth et al. 1994,8). 
Contrary to the existing dominant perspectives arguing `for persistent differences 
across countries and convergence within countries and companies', MacDuffie (1995, 
72) argues that there is `more convergence across countries and divergences within 
countries in the auto industry in terms of work organisation'. Locke (1995b) suggests 
that there are considerable variations both across, and within, national IR systems, 
though some common patterns of development in employment relations across 
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countries can be seen in the following areas: the rise of an enterprise focus and the 
decentralisation of bargaining arrangements; greater flexibility in work organisation and 
labour deployment; declining union influence; and the growing importance of skills 
development. The increasingly strong influence of multinationals or `institutional 
firms' (Crouch and Streeck 1997,9) on employment and work relations is also more 
likely to bring about cross-national `corporate isomorphism' across the host countries, 
which in turn implies that there may be intra-national variations and cross-national 
similarities (Ferner 1997; Ferner and Quintanilla 1998). This line of argument is clearly 
reiterated elsewhere in that `the picture that emerges is one of increasing diversity 
within national systems but of increasing convergence between them' (Ferner and 
Hyman 1998, xiv). However, the fact that cross-national differences persist is 
emphasised in all the arguments above. 
Converging divergence theory is further developed by Katz and Darbishire's recent 
work (2000). Looking at the auto industry and the telecommunications service industry 
in seven countries, they suggest that a "growing divergence within countries and a 
convergence across countries in terms of employment relations at the same time" can be 
identified. Cross-national commonalities are suggested to involve the spread of the four 
different patterns of workplace practices as sub-employment systems, the downward 
shift in the locus of employment relations and an increase in direct communication. 
Katz and Darbishire nevertheless reject any simple international convergence or 
unidirectional changes in employment relations. The key sources of intra-country 
variations are said to be due to the different policies of implementing work practices 
such as team systems and contingent pay, a shift in bargaining power in management's 
favour, uncertainty concerning performance effects of new work practices, and 
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decentralised management structure. 
Even though converging divergence theories addressed above focus on divergence 
within national boundaries and convergence across countries in employment relations, 
they also emphasise the continuing crucial role played by national labour markets and 
industrial relations institutions. Katz and Darbishire identify cross-national differences 
in employment relations as arising from differing influences of respective national 
institutions among countries on the degree of decentralisation of bargaining, the degree 
of commonality of decentralised processes of bargaining, and employee representatives' 
ability to co-ordinate across the decentralised structure. Converging divergence 
theorists see more room for management to make a strategic choice in a more 
decentralised structure. 
Though the proponents for the converging divergence perspective demonstrate 
some empirical evidence to support their arguments, they do not appreciate how 
dynamic interactions between variables take place in the processes of changes in work 
and employment relations in a more and more turbulent era of globalisation. They do 
not establish the exact causal relationships between global forces, and work and 
employment relations outcomes, and other mechanisms of linking causes to outcomes, 
apart from the decentralisation of collective bargaining. To find such a dynamism, we 
need to contextualise the cases and to seek the sources of the differences from `dynamic 
interactions' between independent, intermediate and dependent variables in the case of 
each country. How dynamic interactions between variables take place will be 
considered throughout this thesis and discussed in-depth in the final chapter. 
2.2. Theoretical framework: Dynamic Interactions 
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The three sets of theoretical perspective cited above do not provide satisfactory 
explanations to recent significant changes in cross-national work and employment 
relations. Each perspective either focuses on `dominance effects' (convergence 
theories) or societal effects (institutional theories), or takes a rather eclectic position 
between the first two (converging divergence theories). The changes to work and 
employment relations may reflect more complex and dynamic interactions between 
global pressures as independent variables and other intermediate variables such as 
national institutions, sectoral factors and management/union strategies. 
As indicated by the title of this thesis, the subject intended to be explored and 
examined can be generally referred to as employment relations. From the various 
aspects and dimensions of work relations, we will focus our attention upon work 
organisation in the two cases. How work has been reorganised, how new work 
organisation has evolved and what kinds of changing patterns have emerged, during the 
process of restructuring in the telecommunications industry, will be analysed by 
referring to the following three aspects: work control; rationalisation and customisation; 
and flexibility. There are a number of supplementary questions which follow from this. 
How can we conceptualise the relationships between global competitive forces, national 
institutions, national telecoms governance regimes, management strategies, union 
responses and work organisation, bearing in mind the debates concerning convergence 
vs divergence above? How do variables influence one another? How and by what 
mechanisms do global pressures bring about the reorganisation of work? Are influences 
unidirectional from global forces or national institutions to other variables? How can we 
explain trends or similarities and differences emerging in comparative studies in terms 
of these relationships? How can we avoid the conventional ways of comparison? 
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Figure 2. Simplified Relationships between Global forces, Intermediate Variables 
and Work Organisation 
Global Forces (New Technologies, Competition, 
Diversified Demands, International Regulation) 
National Institutions, Sectoral 
Governance, Management, Unions 
Work Organisation 
Global competitive forces can be seen to be as a driving force, an independent 
variable that brings about changes in work organisation in the telecommunications 
services industry. Global competitive forces arise from a number of sources: the 
worldwide deregulation of the telecommunication industry and subsequently increasing 
competition among telecoms carriers; newer, more efficient technologies; globalising 
and differentiating telecoms markets; diversifying customers' demands; and the 
establishment of international regulatory frameworks. Simultaneously, the privatisation 
of the former monopolies has taken place in many countries in order to make them more 
efficient and responsive to market changes. A move to deregulate markets and to 
privatise state telecoms monopolies has become a worldwide trend. This general trend 
and recent strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions among the big telecoms 
operators are accelerating competition in a more fierce way. Intensifying competition in 
product markets has been a major driving force helping to bring about the restructuring 
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of work and employment relations. 
Technological innovations have also been instrumental in the recent restructuring of 
the telecoms industry. Digital switching and transmission technology, optic fibre, 
wireless technology, and internet technology have had a great impact upon the technical 
organisation of work and economies of scale and scope. These ever-upgrading 
technologies with worldwide technical standards have had significant implications for 
corporate structure as well as work reorganisation. The global competitive forces in the 
telecommunications services industry have tended to be led by telecoms companies in 
the USA and the UK that are believed to be more technologically advanced and operate 
in more competitive situations. Telecoms operators in the USA and the UK may have 
led to work reorganisation becoming associated with more advanced, efficient 
production systems than those in other countries. Competition in the sector might exert 
pressure on telecoms operators in other countries to emulate supposedly more efficient 
or advanced work practices evident in these two countries. 
The exact relationships between global forces, national systems, other intermediate 
variables and work organisation are not specified in the Figure 2 above. In the face of 
the growing influence of global forces, national systems may be subject to institutional 
dynamism resulting from dynamic interactions and this will be discussed in the final 
chapter. Globalisation may also alter the balance between market forces and social 
regulation, having reduced the scope for national specific social regulation during the 
1980s and 1990s (Hyman 1998). It might make the roles of other variables such as 
sectors, or firms more prominent than before in relation to national institutions. 
Especially, changes in sectoral regimes and transformation in substantive issues in 
industrial relations may be important elements of dynamic interactions which may lead 
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to institutional changes. The existence of tensions and contradictions between global 
structural forces and national institutional constraints set in motion dynamic 
interactions. These dynamic interactions between global competitive forces, national 
systems, other intermediate variables and work organisation make the current approach 
distinct from conventional ways of comparison resulting in convergence or divergence. 
The identification of those dynamic interactions will make the Figure 2 be more precise 
and complex relationships between variables. 
Bearing in mind this approach to comparisons, we can come up with two 
possibilities of convergence and divergence of work organisation in the 
telecommunications services industry across countries. Depending on how each 
variable is related to one another, the Figure will be redrawn accordingly. The two 
possibilities will be tested on the basis of case study evidence. 
2.2.1. The Possibility of Convergence 
Following the logic of Womack's lean production model and others who argue in 
support of the transferability of production systems, work organisation would be 
separated from national contexts and transferred to other countries. Accordingly, work 
organisation is argued to be less context-bound than other industrial relations issues. As 
work organisation is less likely to be subject to local institutions, it is expected that 
there will be a converging tendency of work organisation across countries over and 
above that of any other industrial relations issue. 
When applying this convergence thesis to the telecoms services industry, it may 
imply two different developments in industrial relations including work organisation at 
the same time: a convergence in the same sector across countries and a divergence 
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between different sectors in the same country. If work organisation across countries 
proves to be convergent, work organisation would be less likely to be influenced by 
national systems, even though national institutions, to an extent, shape or influence the 
process of corporate restructuring in telecoms operators. Then we could infer that 
sector-specific work organisation may be context-free, transferable to other national 
environments at least within the same sector. Womack et al. 's convergence argument 
would have validity as far as work organisation in a sector is concerned. 
2.2.2. The Possibility of Divergence 
However, there is another possibility. National institutionalists argue that global 
forces continue to be modified and structured by national institutions. Institutional 
arrangements are seen as not only shaping the state, management and unions' ends and 
strategies but also constraining their action by narrowing the scope in which they can 
adopt their strategies. Institutionalists argue that even though the scope for national 
regulation might have reduced due to global forces, national institutions still exert 
significant influence on, and to a considerable extent, constrain or facilitate 
developments in, certain aspects of work and employment relations. Old management 
structures, management practices or values and norms of both management and 
employees may show significant inertia and constrain management in one way or 
another. Important decisions made in the past still influence the current organisation or 
work organisation. This path-dependence may also be one factor which may lead to the 
divergence of work organisation. Thus global pressures may be subject to intervention 
by national institutions, which would result in quite different outcomes in work 
relations. If this divergence thesis proves to be the case, work organisation would not 
30 
be context-neutral. National institutions would continue to considerably influence the 
process of work reorganisation, despite increased global pressures. Work organisation 
would still be significantly dependent upon the paths taken before. Even if there had 
been cases for the transfer of lean production to other countries in the car industry, they 
would be viewed as car industry-specific phenomena. 
Interactions between global forces, national institutions, management and unions 
are likely to be dynamic and changeable. By contextualising work organisation issues, 
the two cases with considerable differences in national contexts can be compared. 
When we put the issues in this changing context of dynamic interaction, why and how 
similarities and differences in work organisation occur can be examined more closely. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Qualitative research 
Given the research questions raised, the analytical framework and the hypothesis to 
be tested, this research aims to put into some context the multiple dynamic interactions 
among a number of variables and processes. Global structural forces such as new 
technologies, international deregulation, intensifying competition and newly emerging 
best practices are set as independent variables, whilst there are a number of intermediate 
variables at different levels such as national institutions, sectoral governance regimes, 
and both management and union strategies. The dependent variable is work organization 
as a consequence of these complex interactions. What we are seeking to establish is not 
a simple correlation between the two or a number of variables with the direction of 
causal relationships left unknown. The thesis will attempt to show both how and 
through what mechanisms independent variables affect the dependent variable, given 
the fact that the relationships between the independent, intermediate and dependent 
variable are not clear cut but often ambiguous, interactive and changing. The outcomes 
may not be clearly differentiated from their various contexts and certain intermediate 
variables may have significant influences on other intermediate or the dependent 
variable and vice versa. Relationships between these variables at different levels and 
the processes are not unidirectional as in mathematical functions but interactive and 
dynamic in multiple ways over time. In particular, the relationships between 
intermediate variables themselves may be more interactive and mutually interlocking or 
reinforcing. As Eiger suggests (1990: 71), research tasks to probe `changes in multi- 
faceted and conceptually contested features of work organization' cannot be addressed 
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by quantitative methods such as social surveys or workplace surveys. 
Appreciating what these relationships and processes are like and how they work 
involves looking into what is going on within the `black box'. Moreover, the tracking 
of changing patterns in the relationships and work organisation rather than simple snap- 
shot description of the current situation, and the knowledge of what has brought about 
such changes, require a historical approach. These interactive, changing, and multiple 
levels of interrelations and processes cannot be easily quantified. The research into 
these un-quantifiable social processes and relationships requires qualitative analysis. 
Changing intertwined relationships between each variable and the multi-faceted nature 
of work organization can only be understood through analytical inferences based on 
more informed and in-depth research methods. Any significant differences between 
ostensibly similar phenomena in the different contexts may then be appreciated. The 
appropriate research strategies for examining them justify adopting a qualitative 
approach. The qualitative research strategies will be implemented by adopting a 
comparative case study approach. 
The next section will aim to identify the research strategies, given the research 
aims. The unit of analysis and case selection are also dealt with in the following section. 
The last section will consider methods of data collection and analysis. 
3.2. Research Strategies 
3.2.1. Case Study Approach 
The case study is an appropriate approach to this research because its usefulness is 
in attempting to `understand or explain the phenomena by placing them in their wider 
context' (Kitay and Callus 1998: 103). Given the research questions and the analytical 
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framework suggested earlier, questions of `how' and `why' work is reorganised, over 
which the research has little or no control can be best addressed by case studies which 
examine the social processes and causal relationships between a number of variables 
(Yin 1994: 9). The case study approach helps us understand complex and dynamic 
interactions between national arrangements, sectoral regimes, management strategies 
and work reorganisation in a holistic perspective. This approach also enables us to 
explore the processes of changes in corporate structure and work organisation and to 
examine the dynamics involved in those interactions above. Differing from outcome- 
centred research, this process-led approach may reveal various mechanisms whereby 
work reorganisation is influenced. 
That is, changes in work organisation cannot be properly appreciated without being 
based on external environments and contexts. As Elger (1990: 71) stated, a longitudinal 
study on work reorganisation would be impossible without case studies through in- 
depth interviews since work reorganisation may be influenced by different dimensions 
of organisational restructuring, new technologies, the interrelatedness of various aspects 
of work organisation and sectoral governance regimes. 
Abundant data and in-depth knowledge obtained through case studies may actually 
enable us to look beneath the surface and thereby enhance the reliability and validity of 
data (Kitay and Callus 1998: 111). Rich data may also provide sound foundations upon 
which new ideas and theory development can be grounded. 
3.2.2. Cross-national Comparative Study 
Despite the increasing forces of globalisation, national systems may still play 
significant roles in shaping and affecting work and employment relations through 
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national institutions such as the political systems, financial systems and industrial 
relations systems. Since the research aims to test convergence versus divergence of 
work organisation, it is essential to take a cross-national comparative approach. 
However, this comparative study is different from simple comparisons of national 
institutions or functions between countries (Hyman 1998). It centres on work 
organisation issues in the telecommunications services industry, in particular work 
control, reforms of work processes and procedures, and flexibility in the two countries. 
Similar sets of broad questions were asked of the same or similar groups of workers and 
managers in the two cases in anticipation of any similar or different problems and 
patterns of work organisation that may occur. This parallel comparison aims to identify 
similarities and differences between the two cases in terms of work organisation. It also 
seeks to examine both the underlying causes of similarities or differences and the ways 
in which those similarities and differences occur by locating the research findings into 
national contexts and sectoral governance regimes. 
This type of comparative study in the same industry between the two countries can 
be used to test `country effects' relative to `industry effects' (Strauss 1998: 179). As will 
be explained in the next section, the two cases show considerable differences in national 
institutions, sectoral regimes and relative positions in the world economy. If converging 
trends are identified between the two cases, the findings will enhance the 
generalisability of the `convergence thesis', extending it to the telecoms industry. 
Overall, this comparative approach not only tests convergence vs divergence hypotheses 
but may also enhance the explanatory power and validity of the results and analysis of 
the research. 
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3.3. Case Selection and the Unit of Analysis 
The two telecommunications operators, British Telecom (BT) and Korea Telecom 
(KT) have been chosen for their contrasting national contexts as well as for practical 
reasons in the light of the research focus and hypothesis. National contexts and the 
consequent sectoral regimes are completely different from each other, though they have 
been subject to similar competitive global pressures. The two companies were both 
former state-owned public monopolies. Both have national networks that link nearly 
every home and their operations are scattered across the respective countries. They are 
`integrated telecoms operators' which provide all kinds of telecoms services including 
fixed-line voice and data services. BT became a privatised company in 1984, while KT 
is a partly privatised public enterprise, currently on its way to being fully privatised. BT 
is recognized as a forerunner in the restructuring and remaking of nationalised industry 
in the new external environments. According to KT managers interviewed, BT is 
regarded as a model for KT to imitate and learn from. The simple comparison of the 
two companies can be reflected in chart form as follows. 
Table 3-1 The comparison of the two case comnanies 
British Telecom Korea Telecom 
ownership privatised in 1984 partly privatised, starting from 
1993, being privatised 
fixed-line services providing all kinds of services providing all kinds of services 
mobile services Cellnet division KT Freetel as a subsidiary 
market capitalisation 
FT 500 world ranking 
$ 151.55 bn (31. March 1999) 
25 
$ 47.00 bn (31. Dec. 1998) 
115 
annual turnover $ 27,750.9 m $ 9,083.4 m 
number of exchange 
lines 
28,049,000 lines (+ 4,522,000 
for mobile phones) 
20,089,000 lines 
number of 
employees 
124,700 56,599 
general market share 
in fixed line services 
67 percent 85 percent 
optical fibre 4,058,000 km 11,667 km 
Source: BT. 1999 Annual Report; KT 1999 Annual Report, Financial Times 500 (4 May. 2000) 
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The restructuring of KT and changes in work relations have happened within a 
distinct national context and sectoral regime from those of BT. The position of Britain 
as a global financial centre as well as its position in the European Union and 
Commonwealth, has enabled BT to become more sensitive to development in 
international markets, whilst the possibility for KT to expand in world markets has been 
relatively limited. Despite these contextual differences the two carriers are comparable 
in terms of being former public monopolies, their still dominant position in domestic 
fixed telecoms markets, their ownership of fixed national networks and their presence as 
providers of nearly all kinds of telecommunications services. These differences in 
national institutions, sectoral regimes and relative positions in the world economy 
provide a good opportunity for the hypotheses to be tested. 
The research revolves around work organisation issues such as work control, 
changes to work processes and procedures, and flexibility. These are basically 
workplace related issues. Therefore, the level of analysis will focus upon workplace 
level developments regarding the patterns of changes to work organisation and the 
nature of such changes. Although we place and analyse BT and KT as a whole in their 
contexts, we cannot deal with work relations in every part of these organisations but 
rather, there is a need to focus on certain parts. Some groups such as switching 
technicians and operators in the telecoms industry have been relatively well researched 
(Clark et al. 1988; McLoughlin and Clark 1994; Vallas 1993). Moreover, the number of 
switching technicians who had been crucial in the industry has dramatically reduced to 
less than one tenth over the last decade as switches became computerised and 
digitalised. 
The two main groups to be selected for investigation are: (1) field technicians in the 
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access network who maintain or fix the local loop, or install or fix telephones at 
customers premises; (2) customer service representatives (CSRs) in Customer Services 
Centres (CSCs) or front-desks in local telecoms centres who deal with calls concerning 
service orders, fault reports, billing enquiries and complaints via telephone. Other 
groups of workers such as clerical workers and operators will at times be touched upon. 
In 1998/9 BT employed around 15,000 field technicians. By contrast KT employed 
6,300 as of Dec. 1998. Numerically these field technicians are the single largest group 
of employees in both companies. CSRs in BT numbered 5,600 (+2,400 agency staff) by 
the end of 1999, whilst KT employed around 4,000 CSRs at the end of 1998, thus 
making them the second largest and increasingly important group in both firms, as 
marketing and customer services gain more weight. This latter group has been a 
popular object of research, as call centres have become a new focus of academic 
investigations. Both groups of workers can be commonly referred to as front-line 
workers who have direct contact with customers and provide key services, representing 
their companies. They are also primarily responsible for service production in the two 
companies, like factory workers in manufacturing. These features of the two groups as 
front-line workers primarily in charge of service production provide research 
advantages over looking at other groups. They enable us to investigate what service 
production systems look like and how they have evolved as a whole within the two 
firms. They also allow us to examine how relations with customers influence service 
production. 
However, the two groups of workers contrast in that the majority of CSRs have 
been exposed to radically changing new technologies. The clerical group composed of 
CSRs seems to have been heavily influenced by new technologies such as CTI 
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(Computer Telephony Integration), while the field technician group seems to still retain 
the strong elements of craft work despite the introduction of new work scheduling 
technologies. Each represents clerical functions or technical ones and possesses 
different cultures reflecting the differing occupational labour markets and the nature of 
work. These two groups of workers can be regarded as broadly representative of most 
employees in both companies. They are also compared with each other within the same 
companies. In order to investigate work organisation, the two respective CSCs (and 
local telecoms centres in KT) and the two local field technicians areas were selected in 
each company, though more extensive data collection and interviews were carried out 
beyond the investigated locations so as to get national pictures in each function. The 
research mainly covers the period ranging from the late-1980s to the late-1990s when 
the restructuring of British Telecom and Korea Telecom took place. It aimed to track 
the evolution of work organisation over these years. 
3.4. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
There is a famous saying in East Asia, `the blind touching the elephant' which 
means that the blind cannot easily figure out what the elephant looks like because what 
the blind touches is only part of the elephant. The initial period of fieldwork for data 
collection was just like `the blind touching the elephant'. To get a tangible picture from 
the data collection and data analysis processes is rather like piecing together a jig-saw 
puzzle. The processes of data collection and data analysis are not as straightforward and 
sequential as is often thought. And methods of data collection may depend upon the 
nature of data. There were interactive and "back-and-forth" processes between data 
collection and data analysis. For accuracy and clarity of factual evidence multiple 
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sources of data such as in-depth interviews, observations and documentation were used. 
3.4.1. Interviews 
The main method of data collection was through interviews. Fieldwork was 
conducted twice for each company between May 1997 and September 1999. Fieldwork 
was focused firstly on KT and then on BT. The first round of interviews was open- 
ended and flexible, which enabled new dimensions of work organization issues to be 
uncovered. On the basis of the data analysis of the first round of fieldwork, the second 
round field was semi-structured and more focused on specific issues in KT and BT such 
as corporate restructuring, work control, rationalisation of work processes, flexibility 
and the links among these. Interviews were conducted firstly at the company 
headquarters and then at the workplaces in both cases. Over this period a total of 122 
people were interviewed; 35 union officers or workers and 20 managers in BT, and 34 
union officers or workers, 31 managers in KT and two government officials in Korea. 
Three senior personnel managers at BT in charge of industrial relations and 
personnel matters at the corporate level were interviewed in order to establish how 
management has responded to changes in external environments, how management 
strategies are linked to IR strategies, how corporate restructuring took place, what its 
general manpower policies are, and what its union policies are. Four personnel 
managers of the business units responsible for the access network and CSCs were also 
interviewed with the aim of questioning how management strategies and their 
associated IR strategies were translated into concrete policies for organisation, HR and 
work organisation over the years. Interviews with two resource managers in charge of 
CSCs and one audit manager were conducted to help examine how resource 
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management and quality checks develop and are implemented. Ten line mangers 
including four FMs, three first line managers of CSCs and three second line managers 
were interviewed in order to look into how organisational changes took place and how 
they introduced and implemented work control, the reform of work processes and the 
increasing use of flexibility. On the union side, four senior union officials in the CWU 
headquarters and two union officials in the STE headquarters were interviewed to 
investigate the general industrial relations climate in BT, what were the main issues 
during corporate restructuring and how the unions coped with those issues. Three union 
officers and four CSRs at three CWU clerical branches, and four union officers and four 
field technicians at three CWU engineering branches were intensively interviewed over 
the detailed implementation of organisational changes and work reorganisation, and the 
union's response to them in CSCs and in the field respectively. Similar questions were 
asked of five union officers, four field technicians and five CSRs at other CWU 
branches in the interviews carried out at the CWU conference, held in May 1998. 
Interviews with some informed interviewees were conducted two to four times. When 
there were grey areas requiring clarification during the writing-up period, twenty short 
follow-up telephone interviews with some former interviewees were also conducted to 
help make such matters clear. 
In the KT headquarters interviews with eleven senior and middle managers in 
charge of organisational issues, personnel matters, IR and regulatory affairs were 
conducted, reflecting the relative concentrated management structure. Questions were 
asked of them to help track broad developments in the sectoral contexts, KT 
management's relationships with the government, how KT responded to the sectoral 
developments in terms of its strategies and corporate restructuring, and what kinds of 
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employment and work issues KT management focused on. T\vo senior managers in 
regional divisions, and four general managers of local telecoms centres were also 
interviewed to question what were the focuses of KT management, how KT 
management steered its organisational changes, and the extent of attention paid to work 
organisation. Seven line managers responsible for the access network and seven line 
managers in charge of CSCs or front-desks at local telecoms centres were interviewed 
to examine how management strategies and policies were implemented and what kinds 
of change took place at the workplace in terms of management structure, employment 
and working practices. On top of the interviews conducted concerning managers 
telecoms policies, regulatory matters and the relationship between KT and the 
government were asked of two government officials in the MIC. Interviews with eight 
current or former union officials in the KTTU headquarters and four regional union 
officials focused upon how corporate restructuring happened and influenced KT 
employees, and how the union responded to various management initiatives and the 
changes to labour-management relations. Six union branch officers at local telecoms 
centres, eight field technicians, five CSRs in CSCs and three CSRs at front-desks were 
interviewed in order to look into the major impacts of management initiatives on them, 
what kinds of work reorganisation took place and how work is organised and managed. 
Interviews with some managers and union officials were carried out twice in order to 
explore and clarify matters arising during first interviews. 
Work organisation issues have more multi-faceted aspects in contrast to other 
HR/IR issues. Although there was a theoretical framework to help guide the research, 
the aspects of work organisation that would be looked at, were not determined at the 
outset of the research. The research process was flexible enough to uncover certain 
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important dimensions of work organisation. While interviewing CSRs, field technicians, 
their union branch officers and managers, important work organization issues gradually 
emerged, as did the dimensions or facets that have been controversial in both cases. 
Later fieldwork focused upon those issues in order to grasp the situations in the 1980s, 
how and why they have evolved, and what issues are evident in these current forms. 
After the interviews and documentary data collection were completed, an eight month- 
long period of transcription of the interview tapes and rough reading of the data 
collected slowly revealed that the major issues arising concerning work organization are 
work control, the reform of work processes and the flexible use of the workforce. 
3.4.2. Observations and Documentation 
In addition to interviews, thirteen observations of the workplace and union 
meetings took place: two days were spent shadowing the field technicians in KT and 
BT; three half days observing CSCs (Customer Service Centres) and front-desks in KT; 
two half days observing CSCs in BT; attendance of the CWU and STE conferences 
respectively; and observance at KTTU branch meetings. Accompanying field 
technicians provided good opportunities to look at and gain a feeling about how they 
actually work in the field, how their work is controlled and organized, and to ask field 
technicians how their work has changed. Observations of BT and KT CSCs revealed 
how CSRs (Customer Service Representatives) work and use computer screens and how 
their work is measured and monitored. These observations disclosed some tangible 
feelings about their work, which led to asking more concrete questions at subsequent 
interviews. Attendance at the CWU and STE conferences in May and July in 1998 
provided good opportunities to interview a number of union officers and BT's first line 
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managers. Observation of the CWU and STE conferences and attendance at KFTU 
branch meetings helped to identify how the issues that they raised mattered and why. 
Fortunately, access to the CWU' library was unlimited, which made it possible to 
investigate masses of invaluable documentary data including a great deal of 
correspondence between the unions and BT, the unions' letters to their branches (LTBs), 
the unions' briefings sent to their branches, agreements between the two parties on 
various issues and many other data over the period between the late 1980s and the 
1990s. Various internal BT documents, BT's monthly magazines, CWU's magazine, 
and various CWU branches' monthly or quarterly magazines or various circulations 
were made available through BT, STE and CWU. Archives of the former union, the 
NCU were made available via the Modem Record Centre at the University of Warwick. 
Many internal documents including recent ones were also made available by KT but 
KTTU's documents were not very diverse thanks to their poor recording practices. All 
the above data became great sources for the research. They contained detailed 
descriptions of why and how certain policies or practices at BT were planned and 
implemented and what the consequences were as well as unions' responses to them. 
Oftel's publications, the MIC's publications, BT's official publications and internal 
documents, and KT's official publications and internal documents helped develop an 
appreciation of reforms in telecoms governance regimes and how they have impacted on 
management strategies and structure. The understanding was complemented or 
confirmed through interviews with various key actors. 
The examination of how global forces lead to pressures to reform telecoms 
governance regimes and how national political systems and business systems mediate 
global forces, influence reform in sectoral governance regimes and shape management 
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strategies, was carried out by tracking and updating many secondary sources such as 
book chapters, journal articles and newspaper articles on the relevant themes concerning 
the telecoms industry. 
The same questions were asked of a number of people in the same groups e. g. 
CSRs and field technicians and managers in order to reduce individual interviewees' 
subjective assessments or experiences. When more or less coherent answers were 
replied to the same questions, the answers were accepted as being reliable. Much 
incorrectness, many errors, or ambiguities, for example, numbers, years, or other facts 
that arose from limited memories of interviewees over the past were rectified by 
documentation. Multiple sources of data allowed triangulation to be made by 
crosschecking interviews with documentary data so as to enhance the reliability of the 
data (Yin 1994: 92). 
3.4.3. Methods of Analysis 
Furthermore, a database was created from the data collected through interviews, 
documentation and direct observations by using `Procite', a reference management 
programme. The database created was very useful for coming up with new ideas or 
categories grounded on data regarding corporate restructuring and work organisation by 
classifying or reclassifying data accordingly. Multiple data sources seem to have led to 
richer findings and deeper understandings of management strategies, the processes of 
corporate restructuring and how work has been reorganized. How the picture emerges 
from the data collection and data analysis was just like `the contour of an iceberg rising 
above the surface of the sea from below'. 
In order to grasp the direction and emerging patterns of changes in work 
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organisation, a historical approach as well as a snapshot one is taken. The research 
sought to track how the current forms of work organisation came into being by looking 
at the processes of corporate restructuring and the reform of work processes and 
procedures over the period from the late 1980s till the 1990s. The testing of the 
convergence vs divergence hypotheses makes sense only when we compare the 
evolving patterns or trends of changing work organisation rather than the simple 
comparison of the current forms of work organisation between the two cases. This is 
because it is expected that a simple comparison of the current work organisation may 
always lead to divergence. 
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CHAPTER 4. NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
4.1. Introduction 
National institutions may influence work and employment relations in two main 
ways in the telecoms industry. National institutions may shape management strategies 
and corporate restructuring by moulding sectoral governance regimes in their nation- 
specific ways and forms under certain technological and competitive conditions of the 
sector, which in turn affects work and employment relations. National institutions, 
particularly national industrial relations institutions, may directly or indirectly constrain 
or facilitate changes in work and employment relations in a nationally distinctive way. 
Above all, it is necessary to define what sectoral governance regimes are. 
Institutional arrangements that govern economic activities may differ by sector as well 
as by country. Borrowing Hollingsworth et al. 's expression (1994: 8), `sectoral 
governance regimes' can be defined as `mechanisms of governance required to 
coordinate transactions inside as well as across sector boundaries'. Sectoral governance 
systems can also be regarded as a compromise between national institutions and sectoral 
specific/technological conditions because national institutional contexts significantly 
affect and shape sectoral regimes which are also influenced and transformed by 
international competitive pressures. The influence on sectoral governance regimes of 
global structural forces may constitute an important source of institutional change 
(Hollingsworth et al. 1994: 10). 
National institutions are composed of a number of institutions such as political 
systems, industrial relations systems and business systems that interlock with each 
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other. We need to briefly look at political systems, business systems and industrial 
relations systems in the two countries because the three systems are considered to be 
factors influencing management and work relations. When sectoral governance regimes, 
`business recipes' in Whitley's words (1992a: 270), are subject to change arising from 
techno-economic pressures, national institutions constrain some changes or facilitate 
others. Sectoral regimes constitute a more specific context in a particular industry in 
which the restructuring of work and employment relations takes place. When one sector 
undergoes reforms in its governance regimes or industrial adjustment, national 
institutions tend to shape adjustment strategies or reform paths in governance regimes in 
nation-specific ways. A number of nationally distinctive types of reforming or 
adjusting governance regimes or industrial adjustment have been identified. Alterations 
in governance regimes in the telecommunications sector involve the transfer of the 
ownership from the state to private hands. 
Academic analyses differentiate between different industrial adjustment strategies: 
the American liberal ones, the Japanese statist ones, and the German corporatist ones 
(Katzenstein 1989: 347-9); radical, market-oriented changes in Britain, incremental 
coordinated ones in Germany and state-led ones in France (Lane 1995: 199-203); 
comparing paths of changes in telecoms systems, a market-led one in the UK, a state- 
led one in France and, a negotiated one in the Netherlands (Hulsink 1999). Focusing 
directly upon work and employment practices, Katz (1997) identifies three types of 
restructuring strategy: technology and market-driven ones in Anglo-Saxon countries; 
labour-mediated ones in Germany, Japan and Italy; and state-led growth and 
modernization ones in Mexico and Korea. From a separate strand of discussion about 
governance regimes, Hollingsworth et al (1994: 5 -8) suggest that there are five 
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different mechanisms of governance: markets; hierarchies; states; networks; and 
associations. Each sector or each economy has the mix of the various modes of 
governance in different contexts. The reform of governance regimes in a certain sector 
can be said to take place according to changes in the extent or mixture of various modes 
of governance. 
In light of the types shown above, the more or less similar public-monopoly model 
of the telecoms industry has differently evolved into a more `market-based' governance 
regime in the UK and a `state-guided' transitional one in Korea, as will be explained in 
chapter 5. Attention then turns to identifying the major factors that make them 
nationally distinct sectoral governance regimes. Hall (1986: 231-2) argues that patterns 
of economic policies among the European nations are determined by the distribution of 
power among the key social groups such as labour, capital, and the state as well as by 
the position of the nation within the international economy and the organization of its 
political system. With specific reference to the telecoms industry, Hulsink (1999: 292- 
300) suggests that major nation-specific institutional factors which influence the 
shaping or reform of telecoms governance regimes are the domestic ruling coalition, the 
role of the state in economy and society, the mechanism of interest intermediation, the 
economic approach and ideologies prevalent in national telecom policy and the 
individual country's particular position in the international political economy. Bearing 
in mind these institutional factors listed above, we can simply divide the major 
institutional factors into political systems, industrial relations systems and some 
elements of the business system. 
This chapter examines what British and Korean national institutions look like, how 
they may affect change over time, in terms of political systems, industrial relations 
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systems, and some relevant elements of business systems, comparing like with like. It 
also investigates how the institutions may affect changes in industrial adjustment, 
reform in sectoral governance regimes, management strategies and trade unions' 
attitude towards industrial adjustment in direct and indirect ways. 
4.2. National Institutions in Britain 
Britain has developed relatively thin national institutions in favour of a more 
market-regulated system. Business pressures on both parties have been more heavily 
weighted towards the concerns of international finance than those of industry (Hall 
1986: 63). Embedded political and economic liberalism, and the commitment to laisser- 
faire capitalism have tended to limit the state to its minimalist role. The industrial 
governance regime has relied on privately enforced negotiations and voluntary 
compliance and regulation of industry, often being flexible and informal. The Thatcher 
government encouraged fundamental shifts in the policy paradigm from Keynesianism 
to monetarism that has led the state to further retreat into a minimalist direction, and 
reducing the influence of national institutions (Hall 1993: 284 - 5). In these processes 
the Conservative governments supported by big businesses and financial capital 
represented by the City of London, pressed neo-liberal reforms in macro-economic 
management and industrial policies by reducing the interventionist role of the state in 
favour of markets. This led to the privatisation and marketisation of public enterprises 
and public services including the telecommunications sector. 
In the face of the need to raise significant capital for upgrading the network of 
British Telecom and deal with criticism of its inefficient operations, the Conservative 
governments sought solutions. Thus, inspired by a neo-liberal ideology, a practical need 
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for upgrading networks and demands for high-quality, low cost telecoms services from 
large business users in the City of London, they initiated the drastic reform 
programmes, leading to a transformation in the governance regime via the privatisation 
of BT, the full liberalization of markets, infrastructure competition, and the detailed 
regulation by an independent body. Reflecting neo-liberal ideology, the interests of the 
dominant actors and the demands of network modernisation, the state initiated the 
whole reform processes towards a more market-oriented governance regime in the 
telecommunications services industry as will be detailed in chapter 5. These processes 
of reforming the governance regime provides the backdrop against which work 
restructuring in BT has taken place. 
One important system in Britain that has contributed to shaping organizational 
structure and strategy is the financial system (Lane 1995: 199). With the stock market 
acting as the main source of financing capital the fact that the shareholders' interests are 
prioritised to other stakeholders' interests in corporate governance of British firms 
should be emphasised. As powerful institutional investors have been primarily 
interested in short-term portfolio management rather than the future viability of 
business, long-term investments in R&D and capital-intensive equipment may have 
suffered. However, paradoxically, the financial market's expectation about high rates of 
return from the booming telecoms sector has led to support for the privatisation of, and 
investment in, BT and thereby encouraged industrial restructuring of the telecoms 
services industry. The British financial system, together with the Conservative 
government's liberal policies, has helped transform the telecoms governance regime 
from a public-monopoly system towards a more market-based regime. Its short-term 
interests have forced BT to adopt more cost-cutting strategies and to carry out massive 
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corporate restructuring. 
Big firms are characterised by a high degree of dispersion of ownership and control, 
which means that shareholders have tended to identify little with the company and have 
sold shares as prices have risen, contributing to firms' short-term horizons affecting 
investment, product strategy and employment policy. This short-termism, arising from 
the ownership structure of firms, has affected management strategies towards labour 
(Lane 1997: 66). 
There are a number of characteristics of the British industrial relations system that 
may have impacts on the reform of the telecoms governance regime, management 
strategies, corporate restructuring and work organisation. However, the fact that 
industrial relations in the public sector were very different from that in the private sector 
should be taken into account because BT used to be a public enterprise up until 1983. 
First of all, there has been a strong tradition of voluntarism in regulating industrial 
relations that is closely linked to embedded liberalism (Edwards et al. 1998: 4-5). The 
state has played a largely abstentionist role in conducting industrial relations (Hyman 
1995: 28-30). When trade unions faced systematic attacks on joint regulation from the 
Thatcher government, the lack of legal protection provisions made trade unions 
vulnerable. However, the state played profound roles first, in fostering public sector 
industrial relations and later in reforming it. 
Secondly, the systems of interest intermediation have not developed significantly 
enough to aggregate interests in both parties. In parallel with the underdevelopment of 
employer associations, trade unions have often been multiple and fragmented. The 
delayed rationalisation of industry helped occupational unions survive longer, which 
was an important factor behind the fragmentation of trade unions and persistent shop 
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floor control. Although the public sector had been more centralised than the private 
sector, the former has undergone decentralisation since the Thatcher government. 
The third characteristic is the craft control tradition. The historical roots of craft 
control in Britain can be traced back to craft control for production and the slow, late 
modernisation of industry (Lazonick 1997). Joint regulations over a wide range of work 
and employment issues in the public sector, coupled with craft-based traditions, were 
claimed to lead to restrictive practices. Many of these work-related issues, together 
with other informal rules and understandings, were subject to erosion by the reassertion 
of managerial prerogatives toward control over the labour process. When management 
initiated the reorganisation of production to increase efficiency, workplace union 
organisation whose predominant interests were distributive issues has lacked the 
strategic capacity to formulate intellectually coherent responses to production issues 
(Terry 1994: 229-30,237). 
However, when we consider industrial relations in privatised enterprises such as 
BT, these general references to British industrial relations systems which largely 
predicate on the private sector, have to be revised. Industrial relations in the public 
sector has been considerably shaped by government policies such as funding, legal and 
administrative rules and formal or informal interventions in management. The good 
employer obligation encouraged high union density and fostered extensive 
arrangements of centralized formal or informal joint consultations and negotiations over 
a wide-range of issues in public enterprises. These arrangements tended to slow down 
the pace of changes and to block management attempts to remove `restrictive practices' 
(Pendleton and Winterton 1993: 10; Batstone et al. 1984: 144). 
The Thatcherite reform of industrial relations aimed at legally restricting trade 
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unions, especially in the public sector, removing statutory support for collective 
bargaining and deregulating labour markets. The reform of industrial relations in the 
public sector was undertaken through privatisation and marketisation (Colling and 
Ferner 1995) as well as decentralisation. This reform, combined with other concomitant 
measures taken, led to weakening trade unions vis-a-vis employers in terms of 
bargaining power, which means a move from joint regulation to increased unilateral 
regulation by employers (Dickens and Hall 1995: 293). The Thatcherite reform of 
industrial relations, the absence of legal institutional guarantees, the reassertion of 
managerial prerogatives and weakening workplace union organisation may have had 
significant implications for work and employment restructuring. 
4.3. National Institutions in Korea 
Modern national institutions in Korea were created in the context of the post-war 
settlement and the late industrialisation. Korea has seen the development of dense and 
homogeneous national institutions, composed of closely interconnected sub-systems 
such as the strong developmental state, chaebol-dominated economy and a labour- 
exclusionary industrial relations system. 
The state in South Korea `overgrew' and became greatly powerful vis-ä-vis society 
through the help of the USA during the Korean War in 1945-53 and the continuing 
confrontation with North Korea (Choi 1988: 308; Choi. 1994). The `overgrown' state 
was able to effectively mobilise resources for a designated purposes, industrialisation 
(Whitley 1992b: 120; Lee 1996) and to transform itself into a strong authoritarian 
developmental state in the industrialisation process (Amsden 1990: 24-5). The military 
governments took the role of orchestrating industrialisation through a more effective 
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allocation of resources secured since the early 1960s. This was achieved through 
`industrial targeting', and the fostering of national champions by granting subsidies and 
incentives to more successful companies on a selective basis (Amsden 1989; 1995: 795; 
Chang and Kozul-Wright 1994: 880). The growth of Korea Telecom was planned and 
implemented by the state as part of this state-led industrialisation until the early 1990s. 
The military governments, which legitimised their authoritarian rule through 
economic growth into the mid-1980s, were powerful enough to place under their 
control, employers and trade unions so as to serve the overarching objective of 
industrialisation. The state played a significant part in managing collective labour 
relations via legal and administrative means plus the intelligence agency (Choi 1988: 
302-3). Korean society, under 30 years of successive military governments, was 
effectively militarised (Whitley 1992b: 132). Firms tended to imitate the military 
regime in terms of hierarchical structure, centralised decision-making, autocratic 
management and the lack of horizontal coordination (Janelli 1993: 48-9,225-8). 
However, the existing means of conflict management through repression increasingly 
lost its effectiveness and faced a challenge to its legitimacy. Political liberalization after 
1987 has brought about a significant shift in the institutional framework. The role of the 
government in economic management has slowly begun to change from an 
orchestrating subsidiser to a regulator since the early 1990s (Cho 1992). 
Chaebol, diversified industrial conglomerates in Korea, were created as a means of 
realising a kind of mass production in Korea's late industrialisation (Amsden 1990: 16- 
7). Its authority hierarchies have been based on a centralised ownership structure 
through cross-shareholdings enabling owner families to control chaebol's subsidiary 
firms like `an emperor in their own group'. There has been little coordination between 
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chaebol not just in trade policies but also in employment policies. Chaebol's 
management style has been paternalistic and autocratic, though its authorities were 
sometimes challenged by trade unions. The characteristics of chaebol, including a 
vertically integrated management structure with cross-shareholding, centralised 
decision-making, a low degree of formalisation and an authoritarian management style, 
have, to varying degrees, been adopted by almost all private and public enterprises in 
Korea. 
As a consequence of the financial crisis, the government has implemented drastic 
reforms of financial systems and forced private firms and public enterprises to push 
corporate restructuring towards more market-responsive systems (MoFE 1999: 40). 
This reform of the financial system has prompted the majority of surviving firms 
including chaebol to fundamentally restructure their operations (MoFE 1999: 43). 
Since the financial crisis, over half of Korean firms have undertaken organizational 
restructuring and employment via redundancies, reorganization, refocusing on core 
businesses or switches to other businesses (Hankyore Daily News. 18 Jan. 2000). 
Prompted by the crisis and government pressures, the telecoms governance regime has 
undergone a significant transformation from a public-monopoly regime towards a more 
market-oriented one. 
The annihilation of the left forces during the Korean War and the emergence of the 
strong state were important factors in shaping `unitarist' industrial relations systems in 
the post-war formative period. During the `late industrialisation' the state's labour 
strategies continued to be based on the unitarist, repressive policies. These appeared to 
be in line with the low skills, low cost economic growth strategies based on increase in 
exports in the first phase (Kuruvilla 1995; Deyo 1989). Trade unions based on 
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enterprises were actually submissive to the state and employers until 1987, when 
political democratisation began. In such a political and economic context, the Korean 
industrial relations system has developed a number of characteristics. Above all, of 
great importance is the centrality of the state in the conduct of industrial relations at 
both national level and workplace level. Latent conflicts under the military governments 
erupted into a wave of strikes across the nation after 1987 when state intervention in 
trade unions began to decrease. 
Secondly, enterprise unionism enforced by the state has become an entrenched 
arrangement for collective bargaining in the context of no craft control tradition, the 
lack of occupational labour markets and rapid industrialisation (Park 1992: 112). 
Enterprise-based unions characterised by fragmentation, uncoordinated actions and a 
weak confederate structure (Wilkinson 1994: 354-5) tend to focus on distributive issues 
and are not well prepared to deal with production issues following industrial adjustment. 
Trade unions often oppose any industrial restructuring outright. Unlike in Japan, 
enterprise unionism in Korea tends to make labour-management relations hostile 
because of the lack of coordination between employers and very weak confederate 
structure of unions. 
Thirdly, large firms have developed organisation-based employment systems in 
order to retain and increase skilled labour during rapid industrialisation. Corporate 
employment systems were created on the basis of lifetime employment, seniority and 
corporate welfare benefits. For nearly 20 - 30 years of continuous growth, these firms 
have rarely experienced any restructuring accompanied by downsizing or redundancies. 
These employment systems helped enterprise unionism nest in their companies and 
provided the material basis for paternalism. Apart from corporate welfare arrangements, 
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there were very poor social welfare systems in Korea. As a consequence of these 
arrangements, for most employees `to lose a job would mean to lose everything'. That 
is why trade unions are so sensitive to restructuring involving job losses. 
The fourth feature is an authoritarian, paternalist management style. Most of the big 
firms have often had founders who are charismatic characters and exercised strong 
authority over their managers and employees through a hierarchical order. This 
management style was reinforced by the militarisation of the society and unitarism. It 
often unnecessarily provoked trade unions, contributing to the development of 
adversarial labour-management relationships. 
Lastly, the Korean industrial relations system has undergone a significant change 
since 1987. With the political democratisation of Korean society since 1987, strong 
`independent trade unions' that often had chaebol's big factories as an organisational 
basis began to emerge. As strong trade unions demanded a new framework for 
workplace governance, the industrial relations system has gradually moved away from 
unitarism to pluralism since 1987. Independent trade unions often collided head-on with 
authoritarian management and the existing hierarchical order as well as still lingering, if 
retreating, repressive labour policies of the state. This has contributed to the 
development of an antagonistic labour-management relationship since 1987. Trade 
unions in big firms showed that they had significant powers to block or scale down any 
attempt by management to restructure. 
These characteristics are largely applied to the public sector as well, though state 
intervention is much deeper in the conduct of industrial relations here than in the private 
sector. However, the pressing need for corporate restructuring that arose from the 
financial crisis forced the government to change labour laws so that employers are now 
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allowed to make employees redundant for the purpose of corporate restructuring. The 
new legislation has not only permitted employers to lay-off workers but has also meant 
the beginning of the collapse of established corporate employment systems. Most big 
private firms as well as public enterprises have been able to press ahead with corporate 
restructuring including downsizing in the midst of trade unions' overall resistance to 
restructuring. 
4.4. Conclusion 
We can summarise the main characteristics of national institutions in both countries 
as the following table. The national institutions of the two societies have trodden along 
completely different trajectories in the three aspects. While four global structural forces 
identified in chapter 1 have forced existing sectoral regimes to change, national 
institutions in each country are likely to shape and influence sectoral governance 
regimes, which in turn become contexts in which management and union strategies are 
formulated and work is reorganised in a certain way. Thus, despite the central role 
played by the state in reconfiguring telecoms governance regimes in both countries, the 
British institutions are likely to adopt a more market-fostering approach, while Korean 
institutions are likely to rely on state-led solutions. 
The market-oriented approach to reconfigure telecoms governance regimes in the 
face of global forces seems to correspond to political systems, financial systems and 
industrial relations systems in Britain. The Thatcher government broke the mould of 
providing infra-structural services on the monopoly basis through the public sector, 
transferred to private hands and introduced competition. Neo-liberalism and its 
emphasis on the rollback of the state were instrumental in driving this reform. Financial 
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systems and the position of the City of London in world financial markets also 
facilitated market-oriented transformation of the telecoms regime by supporting the 
privatisation of BT, the introduction of competition and its focus on short-term profits. 
For example telecoms services were heavily used by multinationals and large firms who 
wanted to see market-driven reforms. The limited legal regulation of industrial relations 
helped corporate restructuring take place without too many hurdles. 
Table 4 -1 Cmmnarisnns of British institutions with Korean ones 
British institutions Korean institutions 
political the state the state 
systems - abstentionist, at least after 1979 - interventionist, autoritarianist 
- embedded liberalism - orchestrating role in economic 
- shift in policy paradigm towards growth and industrialisation 
monetarism - entrepreneurial statism 
- market-driven industrial adjust- - state-led industrial adjustment 
ment strategies strategies 
business - development of the stock - banks as a means of financing 
systems market industrial targeting by the state 
- emphasis on short-term profits - long-term investment 
- dispersed share ownership - low - chaebols as a product of rapid 
degree of identification with firms industrialisation 
- short-term horizons - family-ownership - vertical 
- low reliance on rules - flexible integration and central control 
structure 
industrial - state-controlled unitarism 
relations - voluntarism - weak interest intermediaries - 
systems - considerable gov't influence in fragmented structure and 
the public sector enterprise unionism 
- weak interest intermediaries - - enterprise-based employment 
pluralist, fragmented structure systems 
- decentralised bargaining - move towards pluralism 
- craft tradition and inability to adversarial relationship 
address production issues 
- Thatcherite reforms 
As in its industrialisation processes, Korea has also been a late reformer in its 
telecoms governance regime. Market-oriented reforms were not easily accepted by the 
major actors until at least financial crisis in 1997. The reform of the telecoms 
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governance regime was left to the state with the capability to control and coordinate 
various interest groups and push through barriers to reform. However, the financial 
crisis has speeded up the reform processes towards a more market-oriented regime, and 
neo-liberal reform measures so far taken may have had significant implications for 
corporate restructuring and industrial adjustment strategies. The reform processes have 
been rather slow and often conflict-ridden because of two things: little tradition of 
consensus-based cooperation between labour and management; and the break-up of the 
fabric of organisation-based employment systems. 
The kinds of telecoms governance regimes that have emerged in the two countries 
following different paths of reform are unlikely to become similar to each other in the 
near future. Management strategies in the two companies that are constrained within 
the contexts of differing new governance regimes are likely to be dissimilar to each 
other. Management strategies and union policies may also be shaped in a certain way 
by national industrial relations systems. Even though globalisation forces are 
increasingly stronger, and successfully help transform sectoral governance regimes into 
more or similar ones across countries, national institutions may still affect and mediate 
industrial adjustment strategies and management strategies unless there is little 
concomitant change in other sub-systems of national institutions. However, the recent 
drastic, simultaneous, market-oriented reforms in the financial system, chaebol and 
industrial relations system as well as in the telecoms governance regime in Korea may 
lead to significant changes in national institutions and have implications for the 
relationship between national institutions and structural forces, and its associated 
management strategies. The potential of this institutional dynamism for industrial 
adjustment strategies and management strategies has yet to be fully realised. 
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Then what are new telecoms governance regimes that have emerged from global 
forces structured by national systems like in the two countries? The next chapter will 
address that question. 
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CHAPTER 5. CHANGING TELECOMS GOVERNANCE 
REGIMES 
5.1. The globalisation of the Telecommunications industry 
The telecommunications services industry has been globalised since the-mid 1980s. 
We can identify four structural forces that have driven globalisation in the 
telecommunications services industry. These forces not only challenged and forced the 
existing public monopoly regimes to change but have also tended to get telecoms 
operators in different countries to do businesses in similar ways. Generally, these are 
technological innovations, global trends of deregulation and competition, changes in 
market demands and the establishment of international regulatory framework. These 
four forces of global nature are interwoven and reinforce each other. Yet they have 
variably been structured and mediated by national institutional arrangements, tending to 
give birth to nation-specific sectoral governance regimes. The tensions between the two 
major forces of globalisation and national systems provide a backdrop against which 
convergence versus divergence tendencies take place. Let us look at what the four 
structural forces of globalisation are and their impact in more detail. 
First of all, technical innovations such as digital switching and transmission, fibre 
optic cables, and the convergence of telecoms and computers have revolutionised the 
ways in which telecoms companies operate. High-speed and high-capacity transmission 
was made possible by fibre optic cables and digital transmission. Digital switches and 
sophisticated software packages have introduced flexibility and intelligence into the 
network, which allows telecoms operators to provide various customised services. 
These technologies have not only deepened the existing telecoms markets but have also 
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challenged the existing regulatory frameworks by creating new service markets. The 
new technologies have also enabled telecoms operators to make direct savings on 
maintenance and repair work, cut prices and consolidate their operations by automating, 
rationalising and computerising service work through economies of scale. The rapidity 
of changes that technological innovations have brought about, exemplified in the 
penetration of mobile phones and the internet, has been an important factor in the extent 
and speed of industrial restructuring and work reorganisation. Thus these similar 
technologies function as a strong force of convergence across countries in terms of how 
they operate. 
The second structural force is the global trend towards product market deregulation. 
A global deregulatory wave started with the divestiture of AT&T and the privatisation of 
British Telecom in 1984, both of which were inspired by business users who demanded 
cheaper charges for long distance and international calls (Batt 1995: 88 - 90). The 
deregulatory measures in the USA and the UK have increased competitive pressures on 
telecoms operators in other countries and initiated a series of similar changes such as 
privatisation and market deregulation. Moreover, the EU's decision to impose on its 
member countries, the liberalisation of their telecoms markets by Jan. 1998, prompted 
the privatisation of the former telecoms monopolies such as Deutsche Telekom and 
France Telecom and the opening of their market to foreign competitors. The 
Telecommunications Act of the USA in Feb. 1996 which allows US telecoms carriers to 
freely enter each other's market, was another significant step towards market 
deregulation. Spurred on by these deregulations of product markets, the WTO telecoms 
pack concluded by the Group on Basic Telecommunications in Feb. 1997 is regarded as 
a breakthrough which accelerated market deregulation and globalisation at the global 
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level. During the 1990s privatisation and market opening became an irrevocably global 
trend. Increasing competition in domestic as well as world markets. This common trend 
of market deregulation has thus had great impacts on the restructuring of telecoms 
operators in most countries. 
Customers' diversified demands for services are the third structural force of global 
significance which has questioned the usefulness of the former telecoms monopoly 
regimes providing mainly simple voice services. New technologies, facilitated by 
market deregulation and business customers' demands for various services, have 
brought about alternative local access services such as mobile phone, cable TVs, fibre 
optic cables and broadband data services. These new services, made available by new 
technologies, have created new markets and stratified the telecommunications service 
markets. Customers have increasingly demanded customized services seeking 
assurances on quality, security and reliability. These demands in turn have facilitated 
further technological developments. Changes in telecoms market structure from a 
relatively simple one to a differentiated, complex one have forced incumbent telecoms 
operators to restructure their operations to meet these demands, which in turn has had 
considerable consequences for work organisation. 
The slow formation of international regulatory frameworks is the last force of 
global, structural nature. Two sets of agreements designed to open up markets to fair 
competition came into effect from 1998 (BT 1999a): firstly, the World Trade 
Organisation's Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services between 69 countries 
accounting for 90 percent of the world $ 650 bn telecoms services; and secondly the 
European Union's decision to open its members telecoms markets. These two 
agreements set the date and extent of market opening, formulated rules for fair 
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competition such as equal access and interconnection. Increasingly more, if still limited, 
rights to the regulation of the telecoms industry have moved from national regulatory 
authorities to international regulatory bodies. These international regulatory frameworks 
have prompted other countries to deregulate their markets, imposing upon them certain 
minimum requirements. This has forced relevant countries to keep the requirements 
and thereby has driven some convergence of their domestic regulatory environments 
across countries. 
In the face of these four global forces, national governments have reformed 
incumbent telecoms operators and/or have privatised them since the mid-1980s in order 
to survive in competitive markets or take advantage of opportunities given by market 
deregulation. Management has responded to market restructuring by various strategies, 
often by a different mixture of cost minimisation and customer-focus ones. Market 
restructuring has thus been followed by corporate restructuring in former public 
monopolies, which has in turn brought about subsequent changes in employment 
relations including work organisation. However, the processes might be mediated, 
modified or shaped by national systems or major actors. Newly created telecoms 
regimes may have significantly been shaped and influenced by national systems such as 
the political system, financial systems and industrial relations institutions. The 
governance regimes, market-oriented in Britain and state-guided, transitional in Korea, 
may facilitate or constrain management or trade unions to formulate their strategies and 
policies in a certain way regarding their structures, employment and work organisation 
issues. New telecoms governance frameworks broadly consist of industry ownership, 
the degree of deregulation and competition in markets, and the extent of regulation. 
The next section addresses how the British market-based regime came into being 
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through the first privatisation, deregulation and more intense competition ahead of other 
countries. It will be followed by a section explaining how the Korean state-guided 
transitional regime has encouraged partial privatisation, gradual market opening and 
competition, and regulation. Then how far the three changing dimensions of each 
governance regime (privatisation, competition and regulation), under intense structural 
pressures, have affected management strategies, corporate restructuring and 
consequently work reorganisation indirectly or directly will be examined. Finally, the 
implications of telecoms governance regimes for the overall analytical framework are 
discussed. 
5.2. Privatisation, Regulation and Competition in Britain 
5.2.1. Privatisation 
The privatisation of British Telecom represented the first serious experiment by the 
Conservative government to open up hitherto public enterprises to market control. It 
was also the first privatisation of a state-owned telecoms industry in the world. The 
decision to privatise British Telecom was largely inspired by the then Thatcher 
government's commitment to a belief in free markets, the need to finance the 
modernisation of the network and the demands of the international business community 
(Cook 1998: 228; Clarke 1993: 206 -7). Although British Telecom was forced to pursue 
commercialism before privatisation, it was under the direct political control of the 
responsible minister (Ferner and Colling 1993). The `political contingency' (Batstone 
et al. 1984) encouraged centralised decision-making, formalisation, stability, and 
consensual approach to employment regulation. British Telecom was also subject to 
commercial pressures of reducing costs, imposed by successive governments such as 
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strict cash limits, limiting employment levels, setting performance targets and regular 
reviews of costs and output during the 1970s and early 1980s (Clarke 1993: 208). 
Management aims and strategies were subject to various demands such as formal rules, 
commercial targets, ministerial interventions, public opinion and the pressure of public 
users' organisations and private sector interests (Batstone et al. 1984). These various 
forces often had conflicting objectives and made it difficult for management to pursue 
its strategies consistently. 
With the privatisation of BT, political control was replaced by shareholder control. 
Shareholder control has increasingly provided incentives for BT management to seek 
maximum short-term profits sensitively reflected in BT share prices, which is 
characteristic of the British financial systems mentioned in the last chapter. It has also 
been exercised through crude measures such as the number of exchange lines per 
employee or revenue per employee, compared with that of American telecoms firms 
(FT 27 Sep. 1990). This has tended to put considerable stress upon cost reductions and 
efficiency improvements, which has in turn driven radical corporate restructuring and 
work reorganisation. Shareholders are also concerned with the provision of quality of 
services because poor quality of services and the lack of the operator's responsiveness 
to customers' varied demands may mean the loss of market shares in increasingly 
competitive markets, resulting in lower profitability. Poor quality of services may also 
lead to tougher control by the regulator. 
Privatisation has essentially seen the replacement political control by regulator 
control over prices, competition and quality of services. Without being accompanied by 
competition and regulation, privatisation may merely signify the transfer of a public 
monopoly into a private monopoly. The pressures on management for efficiency and 
68 
quality of services come from a complex set of interactions among factors which 
include type of ownership, the market structure of the industry and the effectiveness of 
regulation (Vickers and Yarrow 1988: 44; Parker 1994: 92-3). 
5.2.2. Regulation 
A regulatory framework for the telecoms industry was set up as an independent 
body, Oftel (Office of Telecommunications) under the 1984 Telecommunications Act. 
The regulator has helped engineer the transformation of BT into a successful private 
firm on the one hand, while curbing monopolist market power of BT and fostering 
competition in markets on the other hand. Regulation is needed to develop competition 
and to protect customers and new, often small competitors from the abuse of the 
monopoly power of the dominant company (DTI 1998: 51). Overall regulation has 
exercised influence on two main aspects of BT's behaviour: pricing; and quality of 
services. 
Price-cap regulation: The most important aspect of regulating BT's monopoly is price 
control via the formulae of RPI - X. As shown in the table 4-1 below, price cap 
regulation became tighter and the percentage of BT's businesses subject to this 
increased until 1997. Line rental charges were subject to RPI +2 with the regulator 
allowing BT to raise line rental charges significantly and to rebalance BT's distorted 
price structure by bringing prices for services in line with costs. Since 1997 the 
percentage of services under price cap regulation has reduced to 26 percent. This 
release from the price cap reflects the fact that competition in the relevant markets has 
forced telecoms operators to cut prices. Tighter price regulation from 1991 onwards has 
forced BT management to improve efficiency through cost reduction as well as 
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increases in productivity. 
Table 5 -1 Changes in the nrice can 
Period Price cap Percentage* Service areas covered by price cap 
1984 - 89 RPI -3 48 - 53% local & national calls 
1989 - 91 RPI - 4.5 55 - 56% as above + directory enquiries and operator 
assistance 
1991-93 RPI - 6.25 64 - 66% as above + international calls 
1993 - 97 RPI - 7.5 64 - 67% as above + interconnection charges 
1997 -2001 RPI - 4.5 26% bottom 80% of residential customers 
1984 - 97 RPI +2 rental charges, installation/connection 
charges 
Source: Oftel Dec. 1995. Pricing of Telecommunications Service From 1997-Consultative 
Document; Oftel. 1999.1998 Annual Report 
Note: Percentage: percentage of BT's group turnover under price cap 
Quality of services regulation: As was revealed in 1987 when quality of services 
suffered because of field technicians' strike, quality of services has been a politically 
sensitive issue. The government and the regulator have been keen on meeting 
customers' expectation of quality of services via regulation. In 1991 regulatory bodies 
were given stronger powers for the privatised utilities in the form of approving the 
procedures in handling customers complaints and introducing the `Citizen's Charter'. 
BT introduced its `Customer Guarantee Schemes' as a means of implementing the 
Citizen's Charter in which customers would receive financial compensation for the 
failure of service delivery to meet the stated target time limits. Oftel has also published 
`comparable performance indicators' for residential customers and business customers 
respectively in terms of 6 performance indices including service provision, customer 
reported faults, fault repair, complaint handling, billing and disconnections (Oftel. Feb 
1999). These performance indicators are to be reflected in the next price cap regulation, 
that is, poor quality of service performance is likely to result in tighter price cap 
regulation. 
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Price-cap regulation, combined with competition, has led to price cuts in BT. 
Average prices for BT services fell in real terms by about 50 percent between 1984 and 
1998 (by 37%, 68% and 56% for local, national, international calls respectively) (DTI 
1998: 44; Oftel 1999: 25). These cuts have compelled BT management to cut costs and 
to increase efficiency in order to maintain or increase profitability. These cost-savings 
and efficiency enhancements have been sought through corporate restructuring and 
work reorganisation. Price-cap regulation and falling prices have been often used by 
management in order to justify various cost-cutting measures, organisational changes or 
work reorganisation (Ferner and Colling 1993: 129). Quality of service regulation has 
also pressurized BT management to pursue customer-focused strategies as discussed in 
chapter 6. BT management, in the midst of emphasising intensified competition, has 
used price cap regulation and quality of service regulation in order to promote the 
contradictory objectives of both cost reduction and an improvement in quality of 
services at the same time. 
5.2.3. Deregulation and Competition 
The processes of deregulating telecoms markets, engineered by the government, 
have been phased. In the Duopoly Review in March 1991 the existing duopoly situation 
on fixed lines was ended and the liberalisation of domestic telecoms services markets 
started, although international facilities-based telecoms services were still only allowed 
to BT and Mercury until 1995. The growing liberalisation of UK telecoms markets has 
considerably facilitated competition in local and national call markets since 1993 and in 
international call markets since 1997. In order to take market share from BT new 
71 
entrants have used strategies involving undercutting call prices, targeting business 
markets or providing cable TV services bundled with telephony and internet services in 
low prices. The degree of developments in competition are reflected in BT's market 
shares in table 5-2 below. 
Table 5-2 BT's market share in the UK telecoms market (%) 
m arket share 
1992/3 1994/5 1996/7 1998/9 Q4 
resident. business 
Nov. 1999 Q3 
residential busin. 
local calls 96.1 94.4 89 79.0 69.8 75.6 63.0 
national calls 89.1 83.2 79 80.3 53.4 76.3 49.0 
intemat'l calls 77.6 70.0 62 66.6 30.0 59.1 28.1 
leased lines na 95 88 88 
I overall 89.3 na 81 76 
Source: Oftel. 1995. Annual Report; Oftel. June 1999. Market Information; Oftel. March 2000. 
Price Control Review: A Consultative document issued by the Director General of 
Telecommunications on possible approaches for future retail price and network charge controls. 
Note: market share in terms of revenue, in 1998/9 
Because of the increasing competition, BT has considerably lost business markets 
and international call markets to competitors. Growing competition and the substantial 
decline in BT's market share since the early-1990s have increasingly put pressure on 
BT to reduce its call charges in such markets. Both BT's falling prices and sharp decline 
in BT's market shares in those markets, have led to a corresponding reduction in 
profitability in these markets. Sharp decline in market shares and falling prices 
alongside new technologies available have pressurised BT management to undertake 
corporate restructuring and work reorganisation to cut costs and improve productivity. 
The relative weight of traditional fixed voice telephony services in the total 
turnover has considerably shrunk over the years from 52.5 percent in 1992/3 to 36.6 
percent in 1998/9, excluding line rentals. This has forced BT management to further 
reduce costs in voice services in order to maintain profitability and extract cash to invest 
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in the expanding areas. However, intensifying competition, especially in business 
markets has also prompted BT to focus on customer care in terms of quality of services 
and customised services in order to keep business customers and to capture the 
emerging markets in competition. However, new services such as mobile phones, data 
services, multi-media and network solutions including non-UK operations have 
increased significantly enough to counter the decline. This shift is reflected in BT's 
repositioning or diversifying strategies from a simple voice provider towards being 
integrated services provider. 
A number of unambiguous forces have emerged during the transformation 
processes of the telecoms governance regime in Britain. The clear objectives of BT 
management have been to pursue profitability. Shareholders' short-term expectation of 
high profit, tight price control and growing competition are combined together to give 
birth to strong pressures on BT management to reduce costs and to improve efficiency 
in the face of falling call charges and BT's shrinking market share. BT management 
have been constrained to pursue rigorous cost-cutting strategies. Competition for 
quality-sensitive customers and the challenge from new competitors who are 
specifically targeting niche business markets, together with quality of services 
regulation, tend to highlight the importance and sensitivity of quality of services in 
terms of reliability, speed, expediency and the degree of customisation. BT 
management has also had to emphasise the provision of quality of service and 
customised services. The slow shift away from the traditional voice telephony towards 
mobile, data communications, multimedia services and the growing weight of global 
markets has inspired BT to re-establish its position in new expanding markets. This 
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new regime constitutes a context in which management strategies have been formed and 
corporate restructuring has taken place. 
5.3. Partial Privatisation, Regulation and Competition in Korea 
A transitional governance regime of the telecoms industry has emerged in Korea in 
response to global forces. Although the regime has slowly adopted market principles 
through partial privatisation, competition and regulation since the mid-1990s, the state 
has maintained significant influence in formulating major telecoms policies in KT. 
However, direct political control has been weakened with the transition of KT's status, 
the partial privatisation of KT and the shift in the government's policies towards relying 
on market mechanisms prompted by the financial crisis. 
5.3.1. Public Enterprise and Partial Privatisation 
From its establishment as a public enterprise in 1981, KT was subject to 
comprehensive formal and informal regulations and supervision of the government. 
This government intervention in KT management was justified in the period when the 
expansion of the national network needed the government's support for capital and 
administrative measures. Public enterprise status was a suitable vehicle for the 
expansion of the national network, given the levels of long-term investment required. 
When KT tried to manage various businesses in a more commercial way after the 
network expansion, ministerial interventions became barriers to efforts of KT 
management to efficiently run its businesses. Political considerations were often given 
priority over the internal requirements of KT management, as shown in the political 
appointment of a former army general as the chief executive of KT in 1995. 
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In the government's eye KT management, who capitalised on its natural monopoly, 
was too relaxed and inefficient. From the early 1990s the government imposed on 
public enterprises including KT various reform measures including the assessment of 
management performance, budget control, the introduction of private sector 
management practices and incentive schemes, employment reductions, the 
rationalisation of grading structure, a tougher stance towards trade unions in wage 
negotiation and a reduction in various welfare benefits (MoFE 1993.1994.1995). These 
initiatives in the first phase of reform led KT management to shape the politically 
imposed `moderate commercialism' that will be discussed in chapter 6. However, often 
conflicting, political and commercial, objectives and changeable political priorities of 
the government have caused inconsistencies and confusion for KT in formulating and 
implementing corporate strategies or policy-making. 
As the restructuring programmes of the public sector in the second phase, the 
government has sold off 41 percent of KT shares between 1993 and 1999 and changed 
KT's status from a Government-Invested Enterprise (GIE) to a Government-Backed 
Enterprise (GBE) in 1997.3 These changes have allowed KT management to have more 
scope for autonomy by redefining the relationship with the ministry, now creating one at 
arm's length. The financial crisis in 1997 has given KT management the momentum to 
expand its own autonomy by pushing its own reform agenda to help bring about 
corporate restructuring and to improve efficiency beyond measures imposed on KT by 
the government. The changed environments have helped KT management to have more 
3. Government Invested Enterprises are public enterprises more than 50 percent of whose shares 
are owned by the government, whilst less than 50 percent shares are owned by the government 
in Government Backed Enterprises. According to the relevant law which altered KT's status 
from a GIE to a GBE, KT management can exercise its authority without government 
intervention in the appointment of a chief executive, its decision-makings, and policy 
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discretion and to pursue commercialism on their own. 
5.3.2. Regulation 
The regulation of the Korean telecoms industry is characterised by the fact that 
there has been no clear boundary between the government's intervention and regulatory 
authority. The MIC has been authorised to regulate licensing, prices, interconnection 
and fair competition. According to KT managers, officials of the MIC have often used 
their regulatory authority to intervene in KT management. Regulation is more likely to 
be imposed by political considerations or ministerial interests as well as by industrial 
and economic accounts. Although the government established the `Korea 
Communication Commission (KCC)' in 1992, the commission has remained an 
advisory agency to the MIC which has the role of ensuring conditions of fair 
competition, protecting rights of users and effective arbitration for disputes between 
telecoms operators. With a view to preventing KT from abusing its dominant market 
power and to creating fair-competitive conditions, the MIC applies asymmetrical 
regulations to KT in the area of prices. 
Price Regulation: Regulation by the MIC largely concerned prices until the early 
1990s. With the exception of KT, all service prices of facilities-based telecoms 
operators need only to be notified to the MIC. KT services prices were determined on 
the basis of `the rate of return' as well as on the basis of the assessment of their impact 
on inflation levels and their political influence until the early 1990s. Prices of local calls 
were deliberately kept low because of their influence on inflation. Any increase in 
formulation, though telecom regulation still remains.. 
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prices for KT services still require approval from the MIC, whilst they must also consult 
with the MoFE in accordance with the Price Stabilisation Law (MIC 1999). These strict 
constraints have prevented prices from being rebalanced according to the costs of 
services. According to KT management, local call charges have remained at around 
86.2 percent of costs (KT Aug. 1998). The MIC has cut prices of long distance and 
international calls on the basis of falling costs and the rate of return. 
The government's policies of keeping prices low, together with the late adoption of 
more modern telecoms technologies, have helped KT management tighten budgets, 
especially labour costs. The proportion of KT's labour costs as a percentage of annual 
turnover has remained around 30 percent since 1990. These low labour costs have led 
to much less pressure on KT to downsize the workforce when restructuring its 
operations, which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
Quality of Service Regulation: Although there have been a number of measures 
whereby KT has assessed quality of service themselves, there has been no regulation of 
quality of services by the government. Despite the absence of quality of service 
regulation from the MIC, customers have become more sensitive to quality of service 
issues. Customers' sensitivity to service quality is reflected by the media, which has had 
indirect regulatory effects on KT concerning quality of service. The increasing quality 
sensitivity among customers in the contexts of growing competition has driven KT 
management to stress quality issues in terms of courtesy towards customers and to 
further promote culture changes in KT. As late as 1999, the MIC introduced a 
Telecommunications Performance Monitoring System (TPMS) to ensure that customers 
can choose a reliable service and that telecoms operators offer the better quality of 
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service. The TPMS uses an independent agency to evaluate customers services based 
on the data submitted by operators (MIC Dec. 1999). The results of the TPMS are as 
yet unknown. 
In short, regulation has been under the direct control of the government. The 
government has sought to keep prices low and to encourage gradual competition in 
telecoms markets to develop through regulation. Low price policies throughout the 
1980s and 1990s have had the effects of controlling costs, especially labour costs, 
which, to some extent, have relieved KT of much pressure to reduce the staffing level in 
restructuring processes. Growing quality sensitivity among customers has led KT 
management to focus on quality of service issues. However, the effects of regulation 
cannot be separated from those of competition dealt with in the next section. 
5.3.3. Deregulation and Emerging Competition 
Korea was not open to competition in telecoms markets until the mid-1990s. The 
main drive to market deregulation in Korea has been external pressures from the USA 
and later the WTO constantly raising the issue of market opening (Hyun and Lent 1999; 
KT 1992: 395-6). The continued pressures from the USA, the negotiations for market 
liberalisation through a `Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications (NGBT)' and 
the great potential threat of market opening spurred the government to deregulate 
domestic markets. The government policy was to encourage domestic competition first 
so that domestic telecoms markets may be saturated with domestic operators, and then 
to open telecoms markets to international competition. 
Telecoms markets have been deregulated in phases between 1990 and 1996-7 (Cho 
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et al. 1996) with competition building up a momentum since the mid-1990s. New 
telecoms operators launched their services in international calls from 1992 and then in 
long distance calls from 1996. Competition in the long distance, lease lines and 
international calls accounting for around 40 percent of KT revenues, has just started. 
Developments in competition have been slow as can be seen in Table 5 -3 below, 
though new entrants have made substantial inroads in international calls. The effects of 
this erosion have been regarded as significant by KT because the size of long distance 
market is much bigger than that of international market. 
Table 5 -1 Market Chary of KT in each markets 
1991 1 1992 1993 1994 1995 1 1996 1997 1998 
local calls KT's monopoly 
long distance 
calls 
no competition 91.40 90.61 91.3 
leased lines 84.3 86.6 88.5 90.6 90.4 91.6 
Intern't calls 79.0 73.3 72.8 75.5 75.5 73.2 69.7 
Source: KT. 1999. Annual Report; KT. 1997. "The Analysis of 1996 Integrated 
Management Performance, p. 23,26. 
Another important development to note is the rapid growth of mobile phone market 
from 3.1 million subscribers in 1996 to 22.8 million by Nov. 1999, leaving KT with 
little room to expand. Low prices in both long-distance and international calls, coupled 
with the loss of KT's growth potential, in a situation where local call prices (86% of the 
costs) make losses, have squeezed even further KT's profitability after 1995. 
This new phase of competition has led to lower call charges and very low 
profitability in KT. Falling profitability and the loss of growth potential between 1997- 
9 have had significant consequences for KT management strategies and corporate 
restructuring. KT management has been increasingly required to adopt a more rigorous 
commercial approach to corporate restructuring and work organisation since 1996-7. 
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Moreover, the IMF crisis of 1997-9 provided KT management with another spur to 
initiate corporate changes and to strengthen its commercial strategies in order to survive 
in a new competitive world. 
Overall, the partial privatisation, the move to an arm's length relationship with the 
government, tight price controls from the 1980s onwards and developing competition 
are the main characteristics of the current telecoms regime in Korea. These moves have 
tended to slowly change KT from a public monopoly into a quasi-private firm, though 
the processes have often been ridden with conflicts between frequent ministerial 
interventions, efficiency-seeking measures imposed by the government, and KT's own 
managerial initiatives. Though pressures on KT management to cut costs were not great 
until the mid-1990s because of relatively small labour costs and slow development in 
competition, it substantially increased in the late 1990s with increasing competition and 
in particular, the financial crisis in 1997. However, KT has faced the more important 
task of changing corporate culture in order to make itself operate like a profit- 
maximising private firm. The relatively low cost pressures and the greater need for 
cultural change have had implications for management strategies and corporate 
restructuring. 
5.4. Conclusion 
As discussed in chapter 4, global pressures are not just mediated and shaped by 
national systems into telecoms governance regimes in each country. These governance 
regimes constitute a context in which management strategies are formulated and 
corporate restructuring takes place. Management strategies and corporate restructuring 
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in BT and KT are constrained or facilitated in the context of these telecoms governance 
regimes in each country, which will be examined in chapter 6. 
The comparison of the telecoms governance regimes in the UK and Korea indicates 
that the two countries have clearly followed different paths of development in reforming 
those regimes. Changes in the respective governance regimes in terms of the speed, 
scope and extent of their reforms of privatisation, regulation and competition have 
differed to a considerable degree. Under the same global structural pressures, Britain 
has developed a more market-based regime by privatising BT earlier, introducing tight 
regulation, opening markets and encouraging competition. BT management has 
increasingly faced stronger pressures of saving costs and enhancing efficiency in the 
new governance regime and at the same time of guaranteeing quality of services and 
customised services during the 1990s than those in the 1980s. By contrast, the Korean 
government, in the face of the same structure forces, has carefully steered the way to the 
partial privatisation of KT, early tight price controls, phased market opening and the 
modest development of competition. KT management has encountered the tasks of, 
above all, how to transform its supplier-centred ethos and then of how to reduce costs. 
These differences in governance regimes between the two countries, especially in terms 
of ownership, market structure and the degree of competition, together with different 
kinds of pressure on management arising from them, have shaped the management 
strategies of both companies in different ways. These also form the backdrop against 
which corporate restructuring takes place, which is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. What kinds of management strategies and corporate restructuring these 
differing governance regimes have shaped and influenced in both companies, in the face 
of similar structural competitive pressures, will now be examined. 
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CHAPTER 6. MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURING 
Management strategies and corporate restructuring are important intermediate 
variables in mediating and transmitting global forces into work reorganization. 
Management strategies that are, to a significant extent, a product of interactions between 
global pressures and national systems influence the processes of reorganising work in 
certain ways or directions. The existing management structure and corporate 
restructuring may also constrain or facilitate work restructuring in one way or another. 
Although management strategies and corporate restructuring themselves are 
significantly influenced by national institutional arrangements, they are not simply 
dictated by the latter. There seems to be certain room for management to manoeuvre in 
reorganising work. Therefore, the focus on the changing processes of work organisation 
in this study necessitates taking into account these variables. 
In the monopolistic environments providing simple, standardised products until the 
mid-1980s, neither BT nor KT developed sophisticated management strategies. 
However, new management strategies are required to meet the needs of a changing 
market structure, new technologies and increasing competition in markets. Strategies 
based on cost-cutting and increasing customer-focus have been the two major, if often 
conflicting, logics adopted in order to drive corporate restructuring in differing clarity 
and priorities between the two companies. The underlying logics influencing corporate 
restructuring have been the decentralisation or customer-focus following market 
segmentation, and centralisation or consolidation driven by cost-cutting exercises or 
new technologies (Batt and Keefe 1997: 49-50; Ferner and Terry 1997: 94-5). Cost- 
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reduction strategies are normally realised via a reengineering and/or rationalisation 
approach which makes full use of the economies of scale (Hammer and Champy 1993), 
while customer-focus ones are more related to job-enhancement (Batt 1995: 15-6) or 
quality enhancement (Schuler and Jackson 1987: 209-13). Although management 
strategies are also closely related to industrial relations strategies, the latter cannot 
simply be read off from the former. Industrial relations strategies are also influenced by 
the power of unions, labour legislation and custom and practices. The potential for 
either innovation or automation made available by new technologies depends upon 
labour strategies (Zuboff 1988). 
As Chandler (1962: 383) argued, management strategies may be reflected in 
changes to management structure and corporate restructuring in both cases. 
Management strategies are guiding principles whereby corporate restructuring is 
planned and implemented. However, management strategies may also be affected by 
organizational factors such as the existing management structure or embedded practices. 
The methods and extent of corporate restructuring are also constrained and influenced 
by other national factors such as the dominant forms of structure, legislation, unions, 
and the relationships between industry, financial markets and ownership structure. 
Corporate restructuring can involve various aspects including re-engineering, 
rationalisation/ consolidation, downsizing and relocation. These dimensions of 
corporate restructuring may, to a more or less extent, have important implications for 
work reorganisation. 
To this end there is a need to examine what strategies management in each 
company has adopted to meet competitive pressures in the changing contexts, and how 
the management strategies have been translated or implemented into corporate 
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restructuring. It is followed by the analyses of changes in management structure and 
how corporate restructuring has taken place in the two cases. We will then briefly 
compare management strategies and corporate restructuring between the two cases and 
discusses their implications for work organisation. 
6.1. Management Strategies in BT 
Freed from political interventions, BT management, which has been under 
shareholders' control, has had clear objectives of pursuing maximum profits. Facing 
increasing competition and more diversified customers' demands for services, BT 
management has been under the twin pressures of saving costs and providing 
customised quality of services. BT management has responded to these pressures by 
refocusing on core and newly emerging businesses, reorganising its structure to serve 
segmented markets better, cutting costs and focusing more closely upon customers 
demands. These strategies have often functioned as mutually contradictory logics 
behind the corporate restructuring associated with them. The roles of the top managers 
who were brought in from outside the company were crucial in formulating and 
implementing these strategies. These managers have initiated culture changes and 
corporate restructuring based upon clearer strategies. The implementation of those 
strategies have also been facilitated or supported by new technologies. 
The selling-off or outsourcing of non-core businesses, frequent major 
reorganisation exercises, re-engineering, consolidation, relocation and downsizing have 
been guided and shaped by these strategies. Depending on priorities given to one of the 
three strategies (repositioning, cost-reduction and customer-focus), corporate 
restructuring has been heavily influenced. Divisionalisation, the creation of thinly 
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sliced business units or trading units and reorganisations to match defined customer 
segments were guided by customer-focus considerations. Other dimensions of corporate 
restructuring such as re-engineering, rationalisation, relocation and downsizing have 
been driven by cost calculation. Management strategies, which have led to corporate 
restructuring, have indirectly affected work organisation. Both cost-reduction and 
customer-focus strategies are linked to their respective labour management strategies. 
For example, cost-reduction strategies may have driven work reorganisation in terms of 
work control, work rationalisation, and flexibility, while customer-focus strategies have 
led to another form of control, customisation, and other forms of flexibility. These 
labour management strategies, and in particular strategies towards work organisation, 
have determined whether to use the potential for automation or innovation made 
available by new technologies. BT management has used the twin logics of minimising 
costs and providing customised services in order to press ahead with corporate 
restructuring and work reorganisation, while the unions have countered BT's cost- 
cutting strategies by insisting on the need to provide quality of service. 
6.1.1. Repositioning 
BT's repositioning strategies have largely been sought by hiving off non-core 
businesses and moving to newly emerging businesses which have been identified as 
having huge growth potential. After privatisation in 1984, the predominant 
consideration of profitability led BT management to separate core from non-core 
businesses and sell-off the latter from BT in 1991- 4. BT also contracted out debt 
collection, security services, catering and cleaning services which had employed 7,000 
staff, and the maintenance services of 8,000 buildings across the UK in 1991- 9, while 
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other businesses such as Building Facilities Management were put up for in-house bids 
or bids from outsider contractors (BT. July 1999). These strategies refocusing on core 
businesses have led to significant reductions in the number of workers directly 
employed by BT and the worsening of pay and working conditions in those activities 
contracted out. 
BT has also made conscious efforts to reposition itself not just as a provider of 
traditional voice services on fixed-line services but also as a provider of fast growing 
services such as data services including Internet, mobile services, solutions to business 
needs as well as global telecoms services. These new services markets offer BT the 
most important opportunities for growth ("BT Today. " June 1999), for example, BT's 
internet service grew by 300 percent a year during 1997/8 and BT's internet revenues 
accounted for 15 percent of all calls in July 1999. BT is replacing its voice network with 
a system based on Internet technology ("BT Today. " Aug. 1999; FI'. 05 Nov. 1998,10 
Dec. 1998). BT's mobile operation, BTCellnet has grown at a rapid rate with its 
increase in annual turnover by 29 percent. BT has already reaped the benefits as a data 
services provider and mobile operator with the rapidly expanding use of the Internet and 
a significant increase in calls to mobile phones ("BT Today. " March 1999). 
BT has also sought to adopt a strategy to establish itself as a global player. BT 
management has sought to restore the loss in increasingly competitive domestic markets 
by gaining market shares in other countries. The global strategy also caters for 
increasing international traffic of multinationals and other big corporations by linking 
its global network or by forming a strategic alliance with other global operators. 
However, significant losses due to global investment for a number of years have to be 
financed by domestic operations that can make profits. BT has invested a lot in eleven 
86 
new operators in eight European countries and completed its pan-European network. 
Thanks to its global presence BT is well positioned to provide seamless international 
services for multinationals and other big firms. 
The implications of BT's repositioning strategies for industrial relations are 
considerable. The selling-off or outsourcing of non-core businesses has led to 
downsizing or the lowering of working conditions to the market level. The large 
investment needed for upgrading networks should be financed from current `cash cows' 
such as voice services. BT's global investment has also required significant capital 
injections which are often followed by losses for a number of years. The funds for the 
huge investment should be secured through cost reductions and increases in revenues 
from the existing main sources. In the face of turbulent, fast growing telecoms markets 
the need for speedy investments has prompted BT management to rely on cost-reduction 
strategies rather than quality of service ones. 
6.1.2. Cost-reduction Strategies 
In the 1990s the most conspicuous strategies pursued by BT management concern 
cost reduction. There have been a number of reasons underpinning these. Relatively 
tough price cap regulation imposed by Oftel has led to compulsory reductions in service 
prices which have in turn forced BT management to cut costs. Moreover, the ban on 
cross-subsidisation from international or national calls to local calls led BT management 
to rigorously cut costs in local call businesses. New telecoms operators have begun to 
carve out, through price-cutting competition, a significant proportion of the more 
lucrative international and business markets from BT, forcing BT to lower prices and 
consequently threatening to lower profitability. As shareholders and City analysts 
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compare BT with American telecoms companies by its profitability and efficiency 
measures such as exchange lines per employee or revenue per employee, BT 
management has been under a strong pressure to minimise costs including labour costs. 
New technologies have provided BT management with significant room to automate, 
rationalise and consolidate its operations and work processes, providing opportunities 
for cost savings. BT has had to rely on cost-cutting exercises to maintain profitability 
which has been threatened by shrinking market shares in international call markets and 
business markets. To meet shareholder expectations and efficiency measures, BT has 
been forced to reduce costs. These pressures to minimise costs have provided a good 
justification for BT management to drive forward corporate reorganisation, and work 
restructuring all of which have had a potentially negative impact upon workers. 
BT has been able to take advantage of economies of scales made available by 
digital technologies and sophisticated computer systems in order to reduce labour costs. 
Cost-reduction strategies, combined with the huge capacity of new technologies, 
constitute a centralising logic. Moreover, the `systemness of the network' as a whole 
tends to lead to the centralisation of functions. Huge digital switching and optic fibre 
transmission capacities, together with computerised systems, have enabled BT to 
rationalise or consolidate various operations having been scattered around the country 
into a fewer sites or centres. New technologies have also been used by BT for the 
purposes of rationalising work processes, customising services and controlling work as 
a major way of minimising costs. Thus the cost-minimisation strategies may have had 
profound consequences for corporate reorganisation and work organisation in BT, which 
will be detailed in chapter 6-9. The automation of various functions associated with 
new technologies have also greatly reduced the level of staffing required, bringing about 
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unprecedented downsizing. Even if BT has made considerable profits, they have made 
nearly half of the workforce redundant over 5-6 years in the 1990s. Tight control over 
budgets has also led to even more redundancies and the extensive use of external 
flexibility. The use of new technologies by BT management for cost control also has 
resulted in tighter work control, various ways of work rationalisation, automation, the 
extensive use of external flexibility and spatial flexibility. 
6.1.3. Customer-focus Strategies 
The third strategy adopted by BT management has been influenced by the 
requirement for focusing on customers' various demands. Customers' diversified 
demands for services and their levels of bills are identified and have developed into a 
number of market segments, depending on their purpose of service use, their extent of 
using service volume and their use of the kind of services. The telecoms market is 
composed of a number of market segments such as big business markets, small and 
medium business markets, residential markets, voice markets, data service markets, 
international call markets and national or local call markets. Each market segment 
should be matched with the appropriate specialised part of the organisation dealing with 
each market segment. Intensifying competition in business markets has contributed to 
the specialisation or customisation of services that in turn has led to the establishment of 
separate organisations. Moreover, the proliferating number of services made available 
by new technologies has been used for customers' convenience by the increasing 
number of customers with sophisticated demands. Thus customer-focus strategies, and 
how to best serve, or respond to, diversifying market segments, have led to a 
decentralising logic. Markets should be segmented thinly enough to identify similar 
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kinds of customers' demand and these thinly segmented markets should be served by a 
separate organisation which is geared for specific customers' demands. Corporate 
reorganisation has also been driven by these strategies. Frequent reorganisations and 
`Project Sovereign' in 1991 which transformed the hitherto district-based organisation 
into a more customer-based one, followed these strategies crudely. In the mid-1990s 
the introduction of thinly sliced business units in BT reflected this decentralising logic. 
In this regard customer-focus strategies have had profound consequences for corporate 
reorganisation. 
Another aspect of BT's customer-focus strategies is the emphasis on the need to 
meet customers' convenience. Each part of the organisation, which is designed to serve 
a certain market segment or to be responsible for a certain function, should also be 
flexible enough to provide the increasing number of services for customers within its 
market segment or function. Every service should be delivered on a `one-stop service' 
basis by making a call, for example, to `150' CSCs without the need to call other 
relevant functions or departments. The needs for flexibility and one-stop service raised 
multi-skilling of workers, especially CSRs and field technicians. Other endeavours for 
customers' convenience include the instant provision of services and PCA in CSCs, and 
the appointments for installations or repair in the field. These requirements for 
flexibility, one-stop service, instant provision of services and appointments for 
provisions and repairs, which arise from customer-focus ideology, have had 
implications for work organisation. Quality of services or customised service has been a 
strong weapon of changing working practices and reorganising work. Some `soft 
control' measures, customisation and task and time flexibility are related to those 
requirements. 
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6.2. Corporate Restructuring in BT 
6.2.1. Divisionalisation, Business Units and Trading Units 
Divisionalisation 
BT transformed its organisational structure through Project Sovereign in 1990-1 by 
creating three major divisions from the old structure based on 28 Districts. Each 
district, having a considerable autonomy in operations and important decision-making, 
provided a comprehensive range of basic services and products for customers, and was 
responsible for the network (Beattie 1991). However, the organisational disparities 
between districts, and the difficulties in implementing long-term changes and 
monitoring their progress were recognised as barriers to task achievement across 
districts. There were also communications difficulties, the impossibility either to 
produce generic national working practices or to diffuse best practice between districts 
and costs incurred from different system requirements (BT Nov. 1990). 
In order to address such problems, `Project Sovereign' created the three main 
divisions: Personal Communications (PC) division for residential customers; Business 
Communications (BC) division for business customers; and Worldwide Network (WN) 
division for domestic and international core network operation (Carrel et al. 1993,23- 
4). As a result, BT shifted away from a regionally-based organisation with a supplier- 
centred ethos towards a customer-oriented, divisional one and was able to reap the 
benefits of both clearer focus and economies of scale. This divisionalisation also led to 
centralised decision-making by division. Once the divisional structure was established, 
each function or business operations within the division could be easily rationalised or 
consolidated under cost-reduction strategies. 
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Business Units and Trading Units 
Another important development was the establishment of thinly sliced business 
units of a national structure. Divisions were too large to focus each customer segment 
or each function. BT decided to introduce operationally autonomous national business 
units, which were thinly sliced by function or customer segment in around 1993-4. For 
example, CSCs (Customer Service Centres) were made as a business unit. Field 
operations were established as two business units. There were twelve national business 
units in CD (former PCD) and eleven business units in BD (former BCD or NBC) in 
1998. 
The establishment of business units has enabled BT management to centralise their 
operations through re-engineering and consolidation for the purpose of cost reductions. 
Efforts such as internal benchmarking to identify and to diffuse internal best practice 
were also effectively made. Thus thinly sliced national business units represent a 
structure of decentralised centralisation, which combines the need for cost savings with 
requirements for customised services. Their autonomy has remained operational and 
constrained by tight budgetary controls and rigid performance targets, both of which 
were set centrally by the division. Two national business units in charge of field 
operations were subdivided into 13 regional business units in 1997-8 which are 
composed of 107 Customer Service Teams (CSTs) across the country. These regional 
business units (RBU) and CSTs reversed the hitherto centralisation logic. These RBUs 
and CSTs are aimed at encouraging FMs and field technicians to identify closely with 
their local operations and their community in order to improve customer satisfaction, 
reduce costs and create an environment where sales people can drive up revenue ("BT 
Today. " April 1999). 
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`Trading units' were brought in to create an internal market relationship between 
business units, and a more flexible structure to respond to the rapidly changing market 
place and to increase managerial accountability (CWU 1997). Trading units tend to 
increase the decentralisation of decision-making and their respective operations. The 
arrangement forces each `trading unit' to go for the least cost supplier of services among 
external traders and other internal trading units through competitive bidding processes. 
Trading units have been a further spur to cut costs and to decentralise authority to the 
level of trading units. Trading units are designed to improve performance across the full 
range of measures and objectives including profits. There were 44 trading units until 
1998 one of which was CSCs in Consumer Division (formerly known as PC division). 
However, where there were no external trading activities such as field operations, 
national business units have remained. Each business unit and trading unit has its own 
board which decides important matters including some IR issues within the guidelines 
set by division or the headquarters. 
6.2.2. Consolidation and Rationalisation 
BT has been restructured through consolidation and rationalisation in terms of 
organisational structure and business processes. This includes business process re- 
engineering, rationalisation and consolidation. It follows the centralisation logic. 
A major BRP exercise, referred to as `Project Breakout', was initiated around key 
processes in 1993, alongside the reorganisation based on the introduction of business 
units (BT. 1996a: 32). `Project Breakout' was based on the suggestions of the French 
consultant, Cap Gemini which conducted a BPR study on BT. The BPR was focused on 
core processes such as service delivery and support processes in order to meet the 
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internal needs of each business unit and the nature of the processes. `Project Breakout' 
was composed of 76 small projects such as `Project Plan Do', a new process for 
planning and executing changes to the access network and `Project Aurora' which 
sought to improve customer services while increasing revenues through management 
and CSRs' job design, incentives, training and call streaming (BT. 1995). To improve 
processes and to support BPR, new technologies have been deployed and system 
development work such as `Work Manager System' was commissioned (BT. 1996a: 39). 
BPR, having started with the `Project Breakout' was more fundamentally implemented 
in the middle of large-scale redundancies. Under `Project Breakout' BT tested the 
contribution of each function to the company and assessed whether it would be more 
effective for each respective function to be contracted out. 
The consolidation of various functions or centres was facilitated in the 1990s by 
automation or economies of scale made available by new technologies, the creation of 
divisional and business unit structures, downsizing and eventually cost-cutting 
strategies. A number of operations which had been regionally scattered, were 
consolidated on a wider geographical or national basis. The establishment of a national 
business unit around service provisions or important functions has become an important 
basis on which further rationalisation or consolidation took place. Field operations in 
28 districts were re-established into nine geographical zones after Project Sovereign, 
and then reduced to two zones by 1998. These two zones became separate business 
units along with the total 13 regional business units during 1998. With these 
reorganisations, internal functions of field operations have been consolidated (BT. June 
1996). Field Performance Offices, Resource Management or National Administration 
Units were created to rationalise a number of field support functions. 
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The departments responsible for customer services were integrated into, and 
established as, dedicated CSCs (called CRUs before CSCs), NI (Number Information: 
directory enquiry) centres and OA (Operator Assistance) centres. For example, more 
than 200 operator assistance centres which had existed in the mid-1980s, were 
consolidated into 30 centres in 1993/4. Once CSCs, NI centres and OA centres were 
established as a respective business unit, these centres began to be rationalised or 
consolidated with the help of new technologies. The extent of consolidation in `150' 
CSCs, `151' CSCs, NI and OA is as follows. 
Table 6-1 Consolidation of CSCs. NI centres and OA centres 
1993/94 1997/98 
`150' CSCs 55 sites 34 sites 
`151' CSCs 44 sites 8 sites 
`192'NI centres 49 sites 46 sites 
`100'OAcentres 30 sites 16 sites 
The total 175 sites 105 sites 
Source: BT internal document (1998); BT. July 1998. BT Today. 
BRP, consolidation and rationalisation greatly changed the ways in which business 
are done at BT. In almost all cases consolidations or rationalisations were accompanied 
by job cuts (BT 1997a; BT 1997b; BT 1997c). Following rationalisations, many staff 
had to relocate or travel much further than before because each business unit or sector is 
organised around a given customer segment regardless of their geography. 
6.2.3. Building Rationalisation and Relocation 
The third dimension of corporate restructuring is office building rationalisation and 
relocation associated with it. BT's new property policies have sought to increase the 
degree of office property utilisation through building rationalisation and relocation. 
Through these measures BT management was able to cut its annual property costs for 
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over 8000 properties by 30 percent from £1.1 bn to £884 million and the size of the 
portfolio by 25 percent over the period 1993-9 (FT. 27/08/1999). The continued 
miniaturisation of advanced digital switching and transmission equipment, BPR, 
consolidation, and `garaging at home' have radically reduced the space required, led to 
the rationalisation of Telephone Exchange Centres (TECs) from 1992 onwards. Despite 
building rationalisation, some 95 percent of BT employees were located in just 49 
percent of the buildings in 1999, while the remaining buildings only catered for 6,000 
staff, 5 percent of the total employees (BT. March 1999. `BT Today"). 
Following the project `Workstyle 2000', systematic relocations of various functions 
and operations in BT have been undertaken away from inner London where building 
running costs are high (London Link Dec. 1995). According to the 'UK Office Plan, 
18,000 employees based at 75 buildings in inner London in 1995 will have reduced to 
6,500 employees in five buildings by the year 2000 (BT Today. July 1998). Apart from 
cost reductions, relocation has also provided BT management with the good opportunity 
to introduce new working practices by equipping new buildings with new technologies. 
As a consequence, many BT employees had to decide whether to relocate to a new 
place, often far from their home, or alternatively to become redeployees or to take 
redundancies. BT management was also able to lower staffing levels and introduce new 
working practices through relocation, which was facilitated by new facilities equipped 
in the new buildings and met little resistance from the existing staff, particularly in 
CSCs. 
6.2.4. Downsizing 
The most remarkable dimension of corporate restructuring in BT is unprecedented 
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downsizing in its size and extent. Downsizing is also closely interrelated to other 
dimensions of corporate restructuring. Labour-saving new technologies have been 
instrumental in BT's decision to downsize the workforce. About half of BT employees 
were made redundant in seven-year period through the successive company-wide 
redundancy schemes from 1990. Redundancies continued to be made by division or 
business unit even after 1997.101,000 jobs between 1988 and 1997 were reduced 
through redundancies. Redundancies took place to the disproportionate disadvantage of 
older employees. 38,097 employees (43.7%) out of 87,090 employees made redundant 
in 1991-7, were over the age of 50 and 59 percent were over 45. There are considerable 
differences in the number of redundancies among grades, as indicated in Table 6-2 and 
Table 6-3. 
TnhlP 6 _') Vniiintarv RarilInrlanriac 
by oratIi 
PCGs MPGs ETGs Operator clerical Other Total 
1990 - 96 2,945 17,054 36,816 15,845 12,666 9,485 
95,034 
Sources: BT Employee Statistics. 1991 - 1997 
Note: PCG - Personal Contract Grade (senior managers and middle managers), 
MPG - Junior 
managers and professionals, ETG - Engineering and Technical grades (ST, 
TO, TI, TIIA etc. ), 
Clerical Grades - CO, COMMO, CA. 
Tnh1P F _1 The niimher of emnlnveec 
by grade 
occupations 1988/89 1991/92 1995/96 1997/98 change 
Managers 40,970 38,670 25,979 25,206 - 38.5% 
Technicians 108,802 95,621 59,553 51,319 - 52.8% 
Operators 28,094 17,577 3,822 3,456 - 87.7% 
Clerical grades 33,398 34,950 25,869 23,814 - 28.7% 
PSGA 1,975 3,710 4,934 +149.8% 
Others 18,743 12,507 6,173 5,575 - 70.3% 
Total 231,982 199,325 125,206 114,304 - 50.7% 
Source: BT Employee Statitistics in 1988 - 1997 
Note: the number of managers in 1991/92 include the number of PSGs. 
PSGA: Professional Sales Grades. 
Operators were affected by the digitalisation of switches, the adoption of AVR 
(Automated Voice Response). The upgraded network through the deployment of digital 
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exchanges and optic fibre transmission and the automation of network operations has 
also reduced the need for maintenance, repair and administrative staff. The decrease in 
the number of employees in other grades reflects BT's strategy to separate non-core 
activities from core ones and to remove them. The drop in the number of employees in 
clerical grades resulted mostly from the reduction in the numbers employed at CA 
(Clerical Assistant) grade. Job losses in CA grade were countered by staff increases in 
the areas of sales, marketing and customer relations. With the delayering of managerial 
grades, around 20,000 managers and professionals left BT through voluntary 
redundancies during 1990-6. Despite the large reduction in the number of managers 
through redundancies, the number of managers reduced only by 38.5 percent between 
1989 and 1998 because of the recruitment of new managers. Conversely the number of 
employees in PSGs has actually increased over the years. 
An important factor underpinning downsizing was the unusually high staffing level 
maintained up until the 1990, which was due to network expansion based on rather 
outdated technologies such as electro-mechanical exchanges. The most powerful factor 
behind the redundancies was recognised as new technologies such as digitalisation, 
optic fibre cables and computerisation (Darlington 1996). Privatisation, competition 
and regulation contributed to the redundancies by the hiving off or contracting out of 
non-core businesses and through shareholder pressure to increase profitability. New 
technologies, competition, regulation and privatisation were used as the legitimisation 
for corporate restructuring and downsizing. BT Group finance forced divisions or 
business units to reduce full-time head count in their organisation by allocating tight 
budgets to them. 4 The improvements in performance or cost reductions as the outcomes 
of various dimensions of corporate restructure contributed to downsizing. 
The ways in which the redundancies were handled draw attention. The inherited 
long tradition of cooperative industrial relations in BT has helped BT management and 
the unions handle redundancies without much conflict. In return for BT's commitment 
to no compulsory redundancies, the unions showed a pragmatic understanding of the 
4. For example, Network and Systems had to plan to cut the number of staff by 5,000 due to 
budget cuts (CWU London Clerical. Sep. 1997. London Link No. 31). 
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need for corporate restructuring in the new environment and were able to negc 
better redundancy packages. 5 The widely felt uncertainty and insecurity ar 
employees, due to the impending radical restructuring, encouraged many employe 
take redundancies. Employees, who had scarce skills, gained high marks in perform 
appraisals or were in growth areas, were persuaded not to take redundancies. 
The downsizing at BT has had substantial repercussions on its corp 
restructuring, employment arrangements, resourcing and work organisation. 
proportion of staffing costs against operating costs has markedly declined and lo' 
the base of the total labour costs. The table 6-4 below tells us about the significani 
the downsizing for staffing costs. 
Table 6-4 Staffing Costs over Operating Costs in BT lc. 
1984/85 1990/91 1992/93 1994/95 1996/97 1997/98 
51% 45.5% 37.8% 34.8% 32.3% 31.0% 
)tiate 
nong 
es to 
Lance 
orate 
The 
rered 
:e of 
Sources: BT. BT Annual Reports and Accounts in relevant years; CWU. BT plc 1999 
Pay Claim: Telecoms and Financial Service Executive Report, Table 19, p. 27) 
The large-scale redundancies at first were a shock to employees who had believed 
that they would enjoy lifetime employment. Employment insecurity and demoralisation 
have begun to be felt widely by all employees. With the delayering of the former 
hierarchical structure, the chances for managers and non-managers for promotion have 
become slim. Employees have assumed more responsibility in the existing post but with 
little increase in authority. Under-resourcing arising from too many job cuts has too 
often forced employees to work overtime, to postpone annual leave, or to delay 
participation in training. Each division or business unit under tight budget restrictions 
5. Redundancy packages offered in 1992 included the average £30,000 redundancy payment 
made up of 2 years' salaries, £1,000 training vouchers, 25% bonus of salary and £100,000 plus 
pension entitlement (Financial Times. 30`s July 1992). 
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has had to use agency workers and contractors rather than recruit more expensive 
permanent staff, which will be explained in detail in chapter 9. Understaffing has also 
led line managers to seek tighter performance management in order to maintain or 
enhance levels of performance with less staff, which has in turn increased stress, 
pressures and stress-related sick leaves ("London Link. " Autumn 1995. No. 21; 
Feb. 1996. No. 23). 
Once the unions accepted the need for corporate restructuring through downsizing 
and redundancies started on a massive scale, the balance of power tilted towards 
management. In the face of successive large scale redundancies working practices or 
work organisation issues were seen as being relatively less significant. The downsizing 
provided BT management with good opportunities to reform work practices and to 
reorganise work. BT has made good use of these opportunities and have by and large, 
successfully implemented new working practices or work reorganisation without 
significant resistance. 
In summary, in response to changing contexts of the telecoms industry BT 
management has adopted repositioning strategies, cost-cutting ones and customer-focus 
ones. These strategies have resulted in a fundamental reorganisation of management 
structures based on two conflicting logics of cost reduction and the provision of 
customised services. Although the two logics appear to have often been contradictory 
and stand in the relationship of trade-offs between them, the fine-tuned reorganisation 
of BT in the 1990s, has achieved a more sophisticated combination of the twin demands 
for cutting costs and customised quality of services at the higher point of the trade-offs. 
They have also led to a radical corporate restructuring through BPR, consolidation, 
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rationalisation, building rationalisation, relocation and downsizing, thus transforming 
the traditional ways of doing businesses and affecting work organisation. These 
different dimensions of corporate restructuring, often inter-linked, pushed each 
dimension further and deepened the extent of restructuring. The improvements in 
business processes and consolidation have influenced, and gone along with, work 
processes in the direction of rationalising work and improving performance. 
6.3. Management Strategies in KT 
KT's status as a public enterprise helped KT maintain the legacies of hierarchical 
bureaucracy, centralised decision-making and stable employment arrangements specific 
to the public sector until the first half of the 1990s. The status of KT as a public 
enterprise was conducive to the rapid expansion of national networks which required 
huge capital and would result in returns over the long term. During the 1970s - 80s 
when demands for telephone lines far surpassed supply, a strong producer-centred, 
engineering-oriented ethos was entrenched. The public ownership, coupled with little 
competition and relatively low labour cost base, led to less pressures on KT 
management to start caring about customers and costs, at least until the first half of the 
1990s. 
However, the government began to impose some commercial measures on KT in 
the early 1990s. Budget controls and various measures of assessment enforced by the 
government slowly led KT to steer a direction towards cost consideration and customer 
care. The government started to slowly deregulate telecoms markets and promote 
privatisation and competition. All of these had brought in `moderate commercialism'. 
In the latter half of the 1990s the main drivers of the changes in KT have been the 
101 
evolution of competition, the financial crisis in 1997, and customers' diversified 
demands for services. The financial crisis has provided KT management with a 
momentum for corporate restructuring. These led to `managerial commercialism' in the 
latter half of the 1990s. 
6.3.1. `Moderate Commercialism' 
The government introduced a number of measures for the assessment of public 
enterprises' performance, and placed the guidelines for the budget control. Private 
sector management practices and incentive schemes were encouraged to be introduced. 
The needs to reduce corporate welfare benefits, rationalise grading structure, and adopt 
a tougher stance against trade unions in wage negotiation, were stressed and monitored 
(MoFE 1995). These commercial measures led KT management to be more aware of 
costs and to take some steps to save costs. 
Equally important were the gradual introduction of competition in markets and the 
partial privatisation of KT. The complacency, based upon the public monopoly, began 
to be undermined by the competitor's inroads into markets. Competition and regulation 
to protect new operators from KT's monopolistic power forced KT management to 
respond more actively by either providing better services for customers or charging 
cheaper call charges. In the early 1990s a number of reorganisations, which separated 
the department for business customers from that for residential customers, took place at 
the headquarters. Revenue-generating activities began to be emphasised through the 
strengthening of marketing departments. 
The government also intervened in many important decisions in KT and supervised 
KT management in detail until 1995-6. Apart from political control exercised through 
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the two predominant directors of the board representing the relevant ministries, prior 
approvals of important decisions from the MIC had to be made concerning investments, 
purchases of expensive equipment, reorganisation or personnel arrangements. On top of 
the political intervention above, there have been a number of inspections and audits by 
various state agencies. Detailed ministerial supervisions often shackled KT 
management from pursuing commercial initiatives more proactively. These often 
conflicting objectives and changing political priorities of the government have caused 
inconsistencies in formulating and implementing corporate strategies or policy-making 
in KT. According to IR managers interviewed, important labour-management policies 
were often dictated to KT management by the government in 1994 - S. The government 
imposed strict limits to wage increases on KT management in 1995-6 in order to keep 
the level of wage increases low in other sectors of the economy. Government 
intervention, and its often self-contradictory considerations were exemplified in the 
frequent replacements and political appointments of KT chief executives. 6 This 
`moderate commercialism', combined with limited competition in product markets, led 
to lesser pressures for corporate restructuring during the first half of the 1990s. 
Corporate restructuring did not take place in any significant scale and depth that, but 
rather, was largely been driven by new technologies. 
6.3.2. Managerial Commercialism 
Entering the mid-1990s, product markets saw various developments such as rising 
competition from newly licensed operators, falling call charges, growing customer 
6. The government replaced KT's chief executive 3 times between 1993 and 1996, two of 
whom were blamed for coping with the trade union too softly (Joongang Ilbo, daily newpaper, 
26 Dec. 1996). A army general was appointed as the chief executive of KT in 1995 as part of 
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expectations for quality of services. These developments, coupled with miscalculated 
overseas investment, squeezed KT's profitability almost to the point of zero in the latter 
half of the 1990s. The financial crisis in 1997 raised a further danger. The partial 
privatisation and efforts for full privatisation added another pressure. These provided 
strong pressures for KT to initiate various reform programmes 
A new management initiative in 1997, called 'PIN TO KT', highlighted 
`profitability', `incentives' and `network services', which symbolised changing 
objectives of the management (KT. 1997b). `Incentives' were designed to introduce 
HRM practices replacing seniority and bureaucratic hierarchy. `Network services' were 
encouraged to provide reliable and quality of services. Moreover, the alteration of KT 
status from a GIE (Government Invested Enterprise) to a GBE (Government Backed 
Enterprise) at the end of 1997 signalled the beginning of the end of detailed government 
intervention by guaranteeing a significant degree of management autonomy. All of these 
changes have given birth to a `managerial commercialism'. 
The efforts recently made to pursue `managerial commercialism' can be seen in 
various respects. Above all, KT has begun to reduce costs since 1996/7, due to the 
deteriorating profitability in 1995 -6 and the financial crisis in 1997. The government 
imposed on KT compulsory budget cuts, cost saving measures and job cuts. KT 
management was able to make use of the internal crisis and the financial crisis in order 
to push ahead corporate restructuring for cost reductions. 
Secondly, the emphasis on marketing has been matched by increasing customer 
care programmes and differentiating customer segments. A couple of cultural change 
programmes have been undertaken to help reform the previously complacent and 
political consideration. 
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bureaucratic culture and to encourage a more customer-focused approach to service 
provision. For example, in 1995-6 KT campaigned for the removal of `seven outdated 
attitudes' and `seventy bad practices'. 
Thirdly, KT has introduced "management contracts" between senior managers. The 
contracts have enabled KT management to devolve operational responsibility for some 
personnel matters and the use of budgets. KT has also begun to introduce new personnel 
arrangements which stress competence and performance rather than seniority or 
experience as a criteria for promotion and appraisal (KT March 1997: 16). 
Lastly, KT management sought to refocus its businesses through separating core 
activities from peripheral ones. According to `KT Vision 2005' of 1996, some workers 
in peripheral activities were transferred into KT's subsidiaries which were managed 
differently from KT. KT's strategic plans to move to newly emerging services such as 
data business, mobile telecoms services, solutions to businesses and internet, have 
partially succeeded through participation in a mobile phone business as a major 
shareholder and the launch of internet services. 
Despite `managerial commercialism' and the government's encouragement to 
reform the management structure, business processes and culture, KT is still subject to, 
albeit reduced, interventions by the government. Even KT's `managerial 
commercialism' has not brought about a fundamental corporate restructuring but sizable 
downsizing and some reorganisation. The implications of KT's `managerial 
commercialism' for work organisation are likely to be limited, taking into account 
overall limited corporate restructuring and inconsistent commercialism. 
6.4. Corporate Restructuring in KT 
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Up until 1987 KT was organised purely on the basis of combined principles of 
functions and geography. There was little consideration of different customer segments 
and to this end there was only one marketing department. In the early 1990s a number 
of small reorganisations, which separated the department for business customers from 
that for residential customers, took place. Then divisions without local or regional sub- 
structure directly supporting them were introduced in the headquarters. These 
reorganisation exercises mainly focused on making changes in the organisational 
structure of the headquarters. 
6.4.1. Matrix Organisational Structure 
KT's management structure has traditionally been based on geographical entities, 
having had around 260 local telecoms centres, 60 other centres and 10 regional 
divisions. Most of the basic business activities (sales and billing to field operations, 
switching and transmission) have been undertaken at local telecoms centres. Regional 
divisions have not actually undertaken business activities but coordinated those between 
local telecoms centres or supervised local telecoms centres within their own 
geographical region. Although KT has recently consolidated local telecoms centres into 
larger ones, the basic structure remains the same. 
Leaving this basic structure untouched, KT introduced four divisions (Telephone, 
Network, Business Communications and International Communications) in the 
headquarters during the first half of the1990s. The four divisions have not had the local 
or regional substructure to implement their policies and have had to rely on regional 
divisions and local telecoms centres. These efforts did not result in the divisionalisation 
but ended up with a matrix structure, reflecting a three-way matrix type combining 
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geographies, functions under the headquarters and divisions in the headquarters (KT 
Management Diagnosis Commission 1994: 3-8). This matrix structure is likely to make 
business processes between divisions and the headquarters more complicated, not 
reflecting the strategic directions of KT management. The matrix structure based on 
local telecoms centres has hindered KT management from utilising the economies of 
scale made available by new technologies in order to rationalise and consolidate various 
businesses or functions. 
The rise of managerial commercialism in the latter half of the 1990s led to the 
strengthening of the marketing activities for separate customer segments, especially 
business customers and high-spending residential customers. New special organisations 
which are responsible for internet businesses and private lines have been created. 
6.4.2. Rationalisation and Consolidation 
Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) 
There have been various efforts to make KT more efficient by reorganising 
functions and tasks, and re-engineering business processes. In June 1996 KT created a 
BPR team, and analysed 10 core processes including customer services and field 
operations at local telecoms centres (KT Marketing Team Nov. 1996). Based on the 
analyses of those processes and the benchmarking of BT, SK telecoms and other big 
companies, the team identified the following problems with each service process: little 
differentiation among customer segments; passive system to meet customers' demands, 
uni-linear processing of service orders; and ineffective operation of processes (KT 
Marketing Team Nov. 1996: 43-4). Although the plans for BPR were drawn up, the 
plan was not implemented properly, according to one of the managers involved in the 
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BPR team. According to the 1999 BPR report (KT Aug. 1999), KT's overall efficiency 
was assessed to be low with significant room for improvements being identified. 
KT has had legacies of hierarchical structure and bureaucratic control. Many 
activities or duties including minor ones are required to go through, and to get 
approvals of, senior managers. For example, 38 per cent of staff working time had been 
spent writing 874 kinds of report before 1996. Unnecessary report forms, rules, 
provisions or meetings within sections or departments were abolished to make things 
simpler (KT March 1997: 268). This rationalisation has been facilitated by the 
computerisation of clerical work, electronic approval systems, and some devolution 
downwards. 
The evidence proves that the reengineering of business processes and functions has 
been implemented to a limited extent. The three-way matrix structure still prevents KT 
from fully integrating various activities into more responsive ones to customers' 
demands. The effort to reengineer processes was often disrupted or backtracked by 
inconsistencies of KT management or internal resistance from the union or employees. 
Rationalisation 
KT has consolidated into larger centres a number of functions or tasks which had 
previously been located at local telecoms centres. 38 fault reception centres and 40 
CSCs were created across the country in order to rationalise most of the tasks 
undertaken at front-desks of local telecoms centres (KT. June 1997: 67-69). The 
rationalisation of these tasks has been facilitated by new technologies such as digital 
switches, CTI (Computer Telephony Integration) and ARS (Automatic Response 
Systems). The integrated systemness of the network and its subsequent economies of 
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scale are closely associated with the centralising thrust of new technologies. However, 
this technology-driven rationalisation and consolidation lacked the necessary 
interconnectedness between themselves because of the absence of strategic intervention 
of KT management in corporate restructuring (KT Dec. 1998: 8). KT management has 
not been proactively involved in planning and implementing these rationalisation 
processes so as to make full use of potential or economies of scale made available by 
new technologies. 
The most important reorganisation has been the rationalisation of local telecoms 
centres, encouraged by the financial crisis. Although the number of local telecoms 
centres reduced through the rationalisation exercises from 260 in 1997 to 91 by 1999 
(KT June 1999), 159 local telecoms centres rationalised were not completely 
consolidated but only with their support or administrative functions transferred to bigger 
centres. This rationalisation of local telecoms centres is closely associated with job 
redesign at local telecoms centres and with efforts to reduce the number of staff (KT. 
Aug. 1999; KT. Dec. 1998; KT. Aug. 1997). 
There was a considerable barrier to the rationalisation of various tasks or processes. 
Local telecom centres are so embedded in the local community that they become part of 
local economic activities. KT employees at the local telecoms centre have been filled 
with local people. Local people usually visit the local telecoms centre in order to order 
services, to pay bills, to report faults and to enquire others rather than just to call CSCs. 
Local people and local employees alike tend to resist any attempt to rationalise their 
local telecoms centres into other big centres and the circumstance of the local 
community had to be taken into consideration (KT June 1999: 16). The embeddedness 
of local telecoms centres in the local community may explain one of the major reasons 
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why KT could not easily give up the local structure. 
6.4.3. Downsizing 
Downsizing is another dimension of corporate restructuring in KT. Downsizing is a 
recent phenomenon in Korea. Korean companies including KT have begun to downsize 
their workforce since the national financial crisis in 1997. Until then redundancies were 
rare and employees displaced as a result of new technologies or restructuring were 
redeployed into other jobs. In 1995 there was a one-off voluntary redundancy 
programmes for technically redundant grades and old workers. There was strong 
resistance from the union and employees against further redundancies before 1997. 
KT has reviewed the level of the workforce regularly since the early 1990s in order 
to keep the staffing level low at each part of the organisation (KT Feb. 1992; KT June 
1997). Many jobs have been saved through corporate restructuring or by new 
technologies and workforce requirements for various tasks have changed over time. For 
instance, the rationalisation of local telecoms centres saved 2,124 jobs in 1998 and is 
expected to save 2,156 jobs in 1999 (KT June 1999: 11,53). The profit squeeze in 1996 
-7 and the financial crisis in 1997 gave KT management a momentum for downsizing. 
Redundancies started in 1998 and continued on a large scale in 1999 as shown in Table 
6-5 below. 
Table 6-5 Voluntary Redundancies in KT 
1995 1998 1999 Total 
No of employees 3,068 2,052 8,922 14,042 
% of the total 5.14% 3.62% 15.76% 
Source: various statistics from KT 
The ways in which redundancies were dealt with reflect KT's specific 
circumstance. Thanks to the strong elements of seniority in wage progression, 
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employees with a long tenure have received significantly higher wages than in external 
markets. In KT management's eyes, employees with a long tenure contribute little more 
than those with a short tenure, while they have received wages 2- 4 times more than 
those paid to new recruits. Therefore, the main targets of voluntary redundancies were 
older workers and workers with long tenure. Although the redundancies were officially 
voluntary, KT management mobilised almost compulsory means in order to make older 
employees with at least 15 years services take the redundancy packages, according to 
the personnel managers. Once a law allowing redundancies was agreed in the tripartite 
body in the early 1998, ' when the nation faced the financial crisis, the KTTU had little 
choice of accepting redundancies on the condition of a voluntary basis and negotiated 
better redundancy packages. KT provided attractive packages worth an average 
£24,000 on top of a statutory retrenchment payment in 1999 for people who decided to 
take redundancies. 
The consequences of the downsizing are various.. Though KT paid a lot of money 
out for the redundancies, it estimates that they can recover the payments in three and 
half years. The percentages of labour costs over operating cost were 33.2 - 33.4% in 
1995 - 6. The figures went down to 25.5 in 1997 and 23.7 - 25.6 in 1998 -9 (KT 
July 
1998: 8; KT. 1999. internal sources). The sharp drop was due to not only downsizing 
but also considerable reductions in wages, various fringe benefits and corporate welfare 
benefits such as bonuses. The downsizing has led KT management to undertake more 
BPR, rationalisation and consolidation so as to operate with less people. The remaining 
7. A tripartite body called `Nosajunghoeui' was set up in December 1997 when the financial 
crisis hit Korea in order to remove some legal barriers which made it difficult for firms to make 
redundancies. Under the government's strong guide an agreement was reached to allow firms to 
make redundancies in occasions of corporate restructuring 
in return for the legalisation of the 
teachers' union which had been banned from 1989 onwards. Although this body still exists, it 
was practically discredited as a means for bringing in redundancies 
by unions. 
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employees at the workplace have had to work overtime or are required to work more 
than before (KTTU 1998). However there were also positive signs that a significant 
number of relatively young employees including junior managers were given more 
promotion opportunities, which had been delayed before because of seniority in 
promotion. 
Overall, in the first half of the 1990s KT management fostered a `moderate 
commercialism', which was often shackled by various, formal or informal, government 
interventions. This `moderate commercialism' lacked both managerial freedoms to press 
ahead corporate restructuring and management's strategic intervention in the reform. In 
the latter half of the 1990s, when competitive pressures became stronger in the midst of 
the profitability crisis of KT and the financial crisis, KT management launched various 
restructuring initiatives and secured a significant degree of autonomy from the 
government, which can be referred to as `managerial commercialism'. Subsequently, 
KT reorganized its management structure geared to the service of customer segments 
and reduced the hierarchical order and bureaucracy. 
Corporate restructuring, which had initially been driven by new technology until 
1995-6, was initiated by management from 1997 onwards. KT management, taking 
advantage of the national financial crisis and the internal profitability crisis, undertook 
downsizing on a significant scale as part of cost minimization measures. However, 
corporate restructuring has been more or less limited thanks to relatively weak 
competitive pressures, and the stickiness of the local structure embedded in the local 
community and other possible route for reducing costs through significant reductions in 
wage and benefits. The significant but still limited extent of corporate restructuring in 
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KT appears to have had implications upon the extent of work reorganization. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The differences in telecoms governance regimes between the two countries have led 
to diversifying management strategies between the two telecoms companies in terms of 
their objectives, the extent of the clarity of their objectives, their strategic directions and 
the degree of the rigorousness in implementing them. BT management has clearly 
sought aggressive cost minimisation and customer-focus strategies as well as 
repositioning one, while KT management, trapped in conflicting objectives up to the 
first half of the 1990s, began to increasingly pursue managerial commercialism in terms 
of removing bureaucracy, reducing costs, focusing on customers, reforming its structure 
and exploiting new business opportunities in the latter half of the 1990s. The 
discrepancies in management strategies in the two companies have been followed by the 
divergence in corporate restructuring. 
BT reorganised its management structure into divisions, further sliced divisions into 
national businesses units and more recently trading units in order to meet the specific 
demands of each customer segment. Once reorganised into division and business units, 
cost minimisation strategies have driven BPR, consolidation, rationalisation, relocation 
and downsizing in a radically new way. When the unions recognised that corporate 
restructuring was necessary if BT was to survive in an increasingly competitive 
environment, the massive downsizing was inevitable and the balance of power has tilted 
towards management. Although bargaining and consultative arrangements have largely 
remained intact, the union's strategies of influencing changes through negotiations have 
not been very effective. During the radical corporate restructuring, the union's role has 
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remained passive in the sense that it has negotiated consequences of restructuring rather 
than participated in planning or implementing stages of restructuring. 
KT has only reorganised its headquarters into a structure mimicking business 
divisions without the dissolution of its local structure. Although the division-like 
structure in the headquarters appears to have partially met the demands of customer 
segments, KT's local structure is deeply rooted in the local community. The locally- 
based matrix structure has made it difficult for KT to re-engineer processes, rationalise 
or consolidate operations, and to focus on specific needs for each customer segment in 
an effective way. Though increasingly driven by commercial interests, KT management 
has not been so rigorous in seeking profit-maximisation. However, the shock effects of 
the financial crisis, together internal profitability crisis, have spurred corporate 
restructuring. The union has attempted to resist any change accompanying any 
corporate restructuring. Although the resistance was effective when the union had 
power to block changes, it has become ineffective when the union lost power and the 
situation has become unfavourable to the union due to the financial crisis. The hostile 
attitudes of the union towards corporate restructuring and its interests in distributive 
issues have made the union increasingly more reactive in responding to reorganisation 
and corporate restructuring. 
Corporate restructuring in BT has been driven by management strategies that have 
taken advantage of economies of scale made available by new technologies. Corporate 
restructuring BT has basically resulted from the combination of the two strategies, cost 
minimisation and customer-focus. Corporate restructuring in KT has not gone as far in 
relation to a significant re-engineering of business processes and rationalisation but has 
remained rather reactive to the introduction of new technologies. Apart from these 
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differences in national institutions and telecoms governance regimes between the two 
countries, diverse trajectories of the two companies may explain different management 
strategies and corporate restructuring. For example, relatively low labour costs due to 
low wages and low prices may explain weaker cost reduction pressures on KT 
management and less emphasis on cutting labour costs, while the high proportion of 
labour costs out of operating costs in BT has driven BT management to be obsessed 
with reduction in labour costs. 
Thus BT can be regarded as having reached a higher point at which a predominant 
cost-reduction or centralising logic is combined with a customer-focusing or 
decentralising one, while KT can remain at a low point at which the two logics have 
under-developed. These management strategies and corporate restructuring function as 
intermediate variables which are placed somewhere between national systems, or more 
specifically national telecoms governance regimes and dependent variables, work 
reorganization. Management strategies are influenced by global forces, shaped by 
national institutions, and formulated in the context of national sectoral governance 
regimes. Management strategies and corporate restructuring are not dictated by these 
global forces or national contexts but actively involve in work restructuring to a certain 
extent and thereby directly affect the process of reorganizing work. Now we move to 
work reorganization in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7. WORK CONTROL 
7.1. Introduction 
One of the core elements in work organisation is related to how management 
controls work. Work control problems are argued to arise from the open-endedness of 
labour contracts. Changes in work control may be more controversial than any other 
issue because of this indeterminacy. The fundamental challenge management faces is 
how to survive industrial adjustment in increasingly competitive environments. One of 
the strategic ways in which firms respond to the challenges is through the management 
of the workforce, in particular how to control or elicit their consensus as a way of 
improving efficiency in terms of costs, productivity and quality of service. 
Let us briefly review some relevant literature on management strategies before 
going into a discussion on work control. There have been long-standing dichotomies 
concerning the approaches taken to labour management. One questions how to extract 
maximum efforts from workers who are often seen as reluctant or opportunistic. The 
other is aimed at eliciting of employee cooperation or commitment to corporate 
objectives. These dichotomies distinguish between labour strategies based on the 
following: `Theory X' and `Theory Y' (McGregor 1960); low trust and high trust (Fox, 
1974); high commitment and low cost (Batt, 1995); intensification and empowerment 
(Waddington and Whitston, 1996); and cost-cutting/centralisation and empower/ 
decentralisation (Osterman, 1996). These two contrasting strategies intend to gain 
distinct management objectives of compliance and commitment by means of coercion 
and consent respectively. However, this over-simplified dichotomy of management 
strategies may not capture variations within the two broad management strategies and 
116 
therefore deserves more examination. 
Although Braverman's (1974) argument that Taylorism separates `conception' from 
`execution' and brings about degradation of work by concentrating control into 
management's hand invites attention to the labour process, he is criticised for 
mystifying craft control. Friedman (1977) dichotomises management control strategies 
into `direct control' and `responsible autonomy', which shares the main features of the 
oversimplified management strategies mentioned above, despite the emphasis on the 
dynamics of worker resistance. Edwards's (1979) argument for the historically evolving 
model of control such as `simple control', `technical control' and `bureaucratic control' 
neither recognises simultaneous co-existence of different control mechanisms within the 
same firms or sectors, nor corresponds to historical evidence. In another stream of the 
labour process theory, Burawoy's (1983) three successive types of production politics 
such as `market despotism, ' `hegemonic regimes' and `hegemonic despotism' highlight 
the importance of state intervention in the labour process and the emergence of the 
hegemonic despotism with decreasing state intervention in the new era of globalisation. 
However, he does not see the possibilities of co-existence of the three types of control 
system within the same countries, industries and firms. Although all these explanations 
contribute to the greater understanding of work control issues, they cannot characterise 
the subtle dynamics of work control in the current workplace driven by management 
strategies under global pressures. Moreover the reconfiguration of work control systems 
during corporate restructuring processes is not dealt with appropriately by the theories 
above. 
We start with how to capture restructuring of control relations in the telecoms 
industry in the next section. The third section focuses on how BT has developed its 
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control systems, `hard control' and `soft control', what has contributed to the 
development of various control relations and their theoretical implications for the 
existing control literature. In the next section we look at how KT has introduced or 
adjusted its control mechanisms under the new environments and the outcomes. The 
last section concludes with a comparison of control systems of the two firms and seeks 
an explanation for any similarities and differences. 
7.2. From bureaucratic control to where? 
Control relations are not historically successive or exist in pure forms as the 
proponents of the theories above perceived but rather various control mechanisms often 
co-exist in mixed forms. Control systems in each firm may consist in a combination of 
various control mechanisms one out of which is dominant over others. For example, 
bureaucratic control systems were predominant under the former public monopolies of 
the telecommunications industry. These bureaucratic control relations have co-existed 
in a craft control, self-direction or autonomous responsibility. Bureaucratic control 
systems in the telecommunications services industry may be different from those in 
manufacturing, particularly the car industry. Bureaucratic work control systems in the 
car industry are believed to be closely associated with mass production systems which 
are rationalised and Taylorised. Those in the telecommunications services industry are 
linked to mass service production systems but not based on rationalised work systems. 
Bureaucratic work control systems in the telecoms industry are more related to self- 
direction or craft control than rationalised work control. As indicated in Table 7-1 
below, bureaucratic control systems emphasise compliance to basic rules and therefore 
require detailed reports to confirm whether employees are compliant to standardised 
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rules or not on the one hand. These systems give substantial discretion of work control 
to workers in term of work pace, work methods and work scheduling on the other hand. 
As a consequence, workers have significant autonomy and responsibility for their job 
and tend to identify themselves with managerial objectives. However, the levels of 
quality of service or customised services have remained low under these systems. 
Bureaucratic control in BT was different from that in KT in that many rules in BT were 
products of negotiations between BT and the unions, while all rules in KT were made 
by the government or management. Constraints in KT were the lack of the workforce, 
especially the skilled workforce in the context of a rapidly growing economy. 
Under global pressures changes in national telecoms governance regimes and new 
management strategies associated with them may lead to alterations to bureaucratic 
control systems that may be a different mixture of the existing control mechanisms or a 
new mixture of control mechanisms, depending on the degree of corporate restructuring, 
what sort of strategies management takes, or what the phases of restructuring are. 
Newly emerging control systems may be a hybrid or a new form of control systems. BT 
has transformed its former bureaucratic work control systems into new ones, while KT 
is still in a transitional period away from the existing bureaucratic control systems to 
another. 
To address new forms of control mechanisms that could emerge in the processes of 
corporate restructuring, we may conceptualise `soft control' and `hard control'. These 
concepts of control are designed to secure employees' compliance, conformity or 
acceptance rather than commitment. Although management often claims to empower 
its employees to elicit their commitment to management objectives, the reality does not 
correspond to the claim. Truss et al's (1997) argument that even if the rhetoric of HRM 
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is `soft', the reality is almost always `hard', proves this. Legge (1995,47) also points 
out that there is little evidence for the widespread application of `soft' HRM model but 
there are only opportunistic responses to a new socio-economic situation, often dressed 
up in a `soft' HRM rhetoric. What is often mistaken or dressed up as `soft' HRM is not 
a new approach to labour management with internal consistency but may be an 
important variant to `hard' HRM. Insofar as `hard' HRM and `soft' HRM may, in fact, 
remain different variants to `low road' strategies, these variants may be defined as `hard 
control' and `soft control' when it comes to work control issues. The two control 
mechanisms of `low road' work systems differ from high commitment ones in the sense 
that employees are given little discretion or trust, and therefore, accompanied by various 
means of control. In general, quality production or quality of service is supposed to be 
strongly associated with high commitment strategies, while volume production is linked 
to cost-cutting/low trust strategies. This is not necessarily the case when we look at 
work control strategies closely. For example, Frenkel et al (1998) identifies a hybrid 
form of work organisation called `mass customised bureaucracy' whereby management 
continually attempts to reconcile two conflicting principles: standardisation of processes 
and customisation of products in their study of call centres. Customised service can go 
hand in hand with low trust strategies in some instances. 
Of more importance are the significant differences within broad `low trust' 
strategies that are assumed to be inherently consistent. The differences within `low 
trust' strategies can be conceptualised as `hard control' and `soft control'. Although the 
two control systems share some commonality in seeking compliance from the 
workforce, they show differences in the nature, the methods, the extent of the closeness 
or density and the areas of application, of control. The two can either be distinct 
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alternatives to each other on their own, or be sub-strategies within broad `low road' 
work systems. We can characterise the ideal forms of the two control strategies as 
below. 
Another way of changes to work control systems in the restructuring processes is 
adjustments of the existing control mechanisms to new environments in order to 
accommodate pressure for changes. In these adjustments, certain control mechanisms 
may be strengthened but others may be weakened. The mixture of control mechanisms 
may change or new mechanisms may be added to them as can be seen in KT later. 
Hybrid forms of control systems may emerge in the transitional period from public 
monopolies to private or partly privatised firms in a more competitive environment. 
These systems may take some elements of hard control or soft control but not in 
complete forms. 
Table 7 -1 bureaucratic control. hard control and soft control 
bureaucratic control hard control soft control 
areas loose control over quantity and quality quantity and quality 
quantity, quality and control, process control, process 
processes control (behaviour) control 
approach compliance to rules, coercion/tighter coaching 
to work significant discretion monitoring limited discretion 
little discretion hands-on / hands-off 
hands-on 
facilitator new technologies consultants 
methods detailed reports statistic (targets), observations, 
standardised rules comparisons, interviews, 
self-direction or craft threats, linkage to incentives, helps 
control rewards 
conseque- reduced uncertainty, increased efficiency, enhanced acceptance 
nces workers' autonomy frustration and much of managerial policies 
and flexibility, stress of employees, increased level of 
identification with reduced autonomy services, employee 
managerial objectives tacit resistance/quick satisfaction 
low quality of service fixes loosened hard control 
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7.3. Work Control in BT: hard control versus soft control 
7.3.1. Former Work Control Systems in BT 
According to Batstone et al. (1984), BT had traditionally controlled labour by 
bureaucratic rules agreed through extensive negotiation or consultation arrangements 
with the unions. There was little unilateral imposition of control over day-to-day 
operation of work. Management increasingly attempted to gain control with little 
success as a new commercial paradigm emerged and new technologies were introduced 
in the 1970s. There was a basic contradiction between `efficiency' sought by 
commercially oriented management, and `consent' sought by traditional co-operative 
approach for reliable service and smooth modernisation. Management's push to 
reconstruct labour relations in accordance with commercialism was mitigated by 
`political contingency', the unions' resistance, and management concern about 
uncertainty arising from the undermining of the hitherto consensus (Batstone et al. 
1984: 162). 
However, the pendulum swung to management with the privatisation of British 
Telecom in 1984, tougher regulation and increasing competition. Management soon 
began to reassert their right to manage and imposed their initiatives on the workforce in 
order to pursue their aims. Until the implementation of 1991 `Project Sovereign', 
management did not regain much control over the workforce. The unions still possessed 
the potential power to resist or delay management initiatives through protracted 
negotiations. Management began to hold tighter grips on important aspects of work 
relations as an essential part of various reorganisation initiatives. New technologies 
were instrumental in the process of transition to greater control. Culture changes from a 
traditional public service ethos to a customer-oriented one helped the shift away from 
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more consensual, rule-bound control towards an increasingly management-imposed 
one. From 1992-3 onwards management strategies to minimise costs and to provide 
quality of service have led to tighter control over work than before. Despite its 
substantial power to resist, the union still preferred `negotiated changes' to outright 
opposition to management's new initiatives. Management responded to the pragmatic 
attitude of the unions by keeping most bargaining and consultation arrangements intact, 
in so far as management could achieve the reforms they wanted to introduce. 
As such, BT has developed different control strategies whereby they can exercise 
effective control over labour in terms of work volume, time, work quality, and 
employees' behaviour. These various and mixed mechanisms of control can be 
explained by such new concepts as `hard control' and `soft control' rather than the 
existing control models. 
7.3.2. Hard control in BT 
Control over Work Volume and Time 
Until 1992 - 93, field technicians' work was subject to manual control. Senior 
Technicians (STs), the highest grade in the field technician hierarchy had a supervisory 
role of allocating and prioritising jobs, helping technicians, and monitoring job 
progress. Line managers rarely intervened in technicians' work directly, were usually 
office-bound, and were doing routine paperwork. Field technicians, composed of mostly 
TIIAs (Technician IIAs) and some TIs (Technician Is), had a significant autonomy in 
prioritising and scheduling jobs. 
However, from around 1993 and 1994 BT began efforts to control technicians' 
work time and volume by standardising work procedures and processes. The launch of 
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the Work Manager (WM) has significantly changed work control in the field. The WM 
system basically deals with job allocation and scheduling by controlling work speed, 
progress, punctuality, job closures and communications with technicians via remote 
handheld terminals. The system plays a prominent role in identifying the kinds of the 
jobs, the skills needed, commitment time, job priority, the estimated time to complete 
the job, and the travel time. The WM also enables BT management to control work 
performance. The system has textualising capacities of recording and keeping all 
information regarding field technicians' work, and then produces a great deal of 
statistics concerning work performance in printout forms called "Work Team Members 
Day". Field Managers (FM) are aware of exactly what their technicians did and how 
well they did their jobs by scanning down the reports. Additionally, the Field 
Performance Office that supports FMs, generates `Scoreboard Reports' on overall 
performance of their team and their field technicians, which identify the potential areas 
for improved performance (BT. 1996b). The statistics on technicians' performance are 
often compared with those of other technicians within the team, between teams within 
the site, and between sites in the form of various league tables. The worst performer 
within the team, the worst team within the site, and the worst site within the business 
unit are often openly `named and shamed' with negative performance recorded for the 
responsible manager. 
With customers' growing expectation of service quality and punctuality of service 
delivery, BT needs to provide services within a committed time. Control over 
punctuality can be translated into work speed or time control. STs in the control centre 
keep their eyes on how much time each job takes and ensures that the job is finished 
within the committed time. If a technician spends more time than `Quality Task Time' 
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(QTT), a standardised time for each job, STs in the centre could see and raise the alarm. 
If the field technician fails to repair the fault in time, the job goes to the automatic 
`Jeopardy Management System'. STs send a message to another field technician with 
much spare time until the committed target time. The next job will be allocated to the 
technician available. The FM will make an `Exception Report' against the relevant 
technician unless the technician reports back to the control that he had some special 
difficulties or others. This punctuality control tends to speed up field technicians' work. 
The much closer performance control as described above has often led to the `quick 
fix' of faults that means tinkering with faults so as to enable cables or lines to work 
temporarily without rectifying the ultimate causes of faults. The practice of `quick fix' 
became more conspicuous because the old network was prone to faults due to poor joint 
closure of cables. The bad practice developed while field technicians were pressurised 
to do as many jobs as possible, ignoring quality of work. The result was that there were 
a good deal of recurring faults. BT management acknowledged that they had sent mixed 
messages about their expectations of technicians on quality and quantity in seeking to 
fix faults quickly (BT. 1996b). To address `quick fix' practices BT had to bring in 
another control mechanism, control over work quality, which tended to make the matter 
even worse. 
The combination of automatic job allocation by WM, QTT, an increase in effective 
time, and control by comparison tends to enforce field technicians to undertake more 
jobs within a certain time. These various means of performance control were designed 
to more fully and efficiently use field technicians' time and capability. According to 
one personnel manager responsible for the access network, the statistics on performance 
were produced in such a way that 
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every aspect of work or performance had four or five measures attached to it, and 
that the collection of the statistics became a thick book. 
There were too many statistics, tables and league tables. BT has begun to realise that 
those measures have not become productive because they do not represent the truth. 
Until the early 1990s there was no significant attempt to control CSRs' work. The 
activities were completely reactive ones to customers' demands and there was no 
proactive selling. CSRs' work was much looser and slower than now, and managers 
only had to check around 10% of the work done on paper. Despite partial 
computerisation underway, much clerical work was done manually until the late 1980s. 
Work control gained momentum when management consolidated customer service 
functions that had scattered across the country into separate `150' or 151' CSCs in 1992 
- 3. New CSCs were equipped with CTI (Computer Telephony Integration) and RT 
1000. These systems have their built-in abilities to textualise and visualise CSRs' work 
and their implications for work have been much debated in recent call centre researches 
(Frenkel et al. 1998; Taylor and Bain 1999a; 1999b; Kinnie at al. 1999; Knights et al. 
1999). BT's cost-driven strategies take full advantage of the textualising and visualising 
potentials made available by new technologies in order to monitor CSRs. The main 
pillar of work control in CSCs is the CTI system that automatically and continually 
feeds the stream of calls to CSRs available like a conveyor belt and reduces wrap up 
time. Moreover, the deliberate match of the minimum number of CSRs to the average 
number of calls at national level is designed to reduce small spare time between calls. 
Textualising capability (Zuboff. 1988,316) to record and analyse comprehensive data 
on every detail of work processes, enables BT to closely monitor and enhance CSRs' 
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performance. The systems produce an `Agent Trace Report' detailing CSRs' work 
virtually by minute on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. Another effective controlling 
device in CSCs is `RT 1000', a system is linked to CSS and CSR's telephones on both 
ends. The visualising capability of `RT 1000' allows management to keep CSRs under 
constant surveillance in real time (Finney 1996). Each CSR is identified by his/her pin 
number that is inputted in when work starts. There are a number of code numbers to be 
typed in when CSRs do something else other than taking calls. The manager can then 
monitor on his/her computer screen what each CSR is doing. Visualisation via RT 1000 
has been used to force CSRs to work more and harder, while reducing their discretion. 
CHT, the average time spent on taking a call, has been a means of controlling work 
time. In 1993 -4 `CHT' had been about 360 seconds per call and then it went down to 
260 seconds per call, and now it has gone up slightly to 275 seconds because of the 
selling aspect. The trend in `CHT' shows how statistical means of monitoring can be 
used to intensify work. If employees perform badly, they may be subject to a discipline 
or `Poor Performance Procedure' (PPP). It creates more stress and panic. PCA was 
adopted as a measure of checking service quality. An increase in PCA has reduced short 
spare time between calls, which was legitimised for customer convenience. Effective 
time is the time during which CSRs are available. There is a target of 9% on the 
ineffective time. Going over this limit can result in a verbal warning, and then maybe the 
PPP. The focus of BT's control in CSCs has been on work volume, speed and time and 
later the amount of sales. Another area of control is selling. CSRs are required to sell as 
many service products as possible. Selling in CSCs that had at first been voluntary has 
become a requirement for CSRs and really another measure of performance (CWU 
Voice July 1998). CSRs may receive a `gift voucher', depending on the amount of sale 
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beyond targets unilaterally set, often unrealistically by management. 
Statistical control is also applied to teams and CSCs. According to an internal 
document (BT. 1996a), BT produces 13 different kinds of statistics for teams within each 
centre and for CSCs within the business unit, for example, CHT, PCA, Sales volume, 
Quality, Care and Complaint Handling. Targets are basically set for each CSC and then 
broken down to teams and individuals. Comparisons are made through ranking 
individuals within each team, teams within each CSC, and CSCs within the entire units 
in terms of league tables by each target, and as a whole. As their bonus is linked to 
whether they hit the targets or not, site managers tend to put pressure on CSRs via team 
managers to meet the targets. BT management admitted that control emphasising on 
quantity produced a lot of problems with people management in CSCs: too many 
performance measures, unrealistic targets, and performance comparisons in terms of 
statistics; insufficient time for paperwork/ reading; and resource problems (BT. Nov. 
1997: 29). 
Since 1990 BT's incessant cost minimisation strategies, subsequent large scale 
redundancies and various exercises to push up productivity have led to tightening 
performance control in terms of work volume and work time. BT management has 
developed a number of control methods, greatly facilitated by new technologies. 
Statistics relating to various aspects of work performance have been used to monitor 
and drive up performance of CSRs and field technicians. Other methods include 
technical control over work processes by job allocation technologies, control over 
punctual service delivery, and control by comparison shown in league tables. 
Paradoxically, the proliferation of statistics has not increasingly worked as effectively as 
they hoped. The combined effects of these various work control mechanisms on 
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workers have been quite harsh, unbearable, and stressing, in a word, `hard', which has 
been expressed in exhaustion and high levels of sick leaves and high labour turnover 
rates. Despite significant improvement in productivity, the mounting pressures of `hard 
control' have resulted in other problems such as low service quality or recurrent faults 
that must be addressed. 
Control over Quality 
Quality of service or work quality is believed to be linked to high commitment 
strategies to help induce the co-operation and commitment from the workforce and 
therefore, employees are supposed to be given responsible autonomy. However, 
differing from the claim above, major quality control exercises in BT were introduced to 
address quality problems arising from the emphasis on control over work volume and 
time. Quality control goes hand in hand with quantity control in most cases. Here 
quality control is meant by `control over quality of work' as well as quality of service. 
As touched upon earlier, BT's drive to cut costs and to increase productivity made 
field technicians cut corners. The rate of repeated faults were reported to be quite high. 
To improve quality of work and thereby reduce operational costs, BT set standardised 
work procedures and processes through `Field Effectiveness of Quality' (FEQ) 
programme in around 1993 to ensure the quality of work. For BT, `quality is simply 
compliance with requirement of the standardised procedures and processes already set' 
(BT. 1994b). Before 1993 much was left to managers' and workers' discretion with few 
requirements for work procedures and processes to be conformed with. 
As part of the `FEQ' programme Field Managers (FMs) were introduced in 1993/4 
to replace the former field managers. FMs are supposed to spend 80 percent of their 
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time in the field supervising technicians in order to ensure that technicians conform to 
quality standards in terms of the work procedures and processes (BT 1994a). FMs' in- 
progress quality control is concentrated on whether standardised work procedures are 
observed by technicians at the appropriate stages of installations or fault repairs. In 
front of many local contingencies, these standardised work procedures and practices to 
ensure quality of work often turned into rigidities for field technicians who needed some 
discretion meeting local requirements. 
A variety of other measures were taken to check whether field technicians would 
comply with the standardised work procedures and practices. The comprehensive data- 
set called `Scoreboard Reports' covering both `quality' and `quantity' provides FMs 
with a dashboard by which the overall operation can be monitored (BT. 1994b). More 
significant was the initiation of quality checks by independent auditors with the rollout 
of the `FEQ'. The audit system was specifically aimed to address quick fix problems 
because a lot of bad plants and bad practices were not picked up by FMs. BT pushed the 
auditor arrangement to monitor field technicians' work quality in a harsh, follow-up 
checking way for a couple of years. The system brought in the linkage of 20 percent of 
FMs' pay to quality. If any `Critical Defects' found in work completed by his field 
technicians, the FM would lose a proportion of up to 20 percent of his pay. The linkage 
of quality failure to FMs additional pay were used as a penalising tool and led to a 
management style reminiscent of "big brother watching over your shoulder with a big 
stick". Many field technicians complained about a good deal of formal or informal 
warnings, threats of discipline, harassment and bullying by FMs concerning critical 
defects. The audit system linked to the additional pay scheme for FMs was universally 
hated by FMs as well as field technicians. The system did not work in a way that it 
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should have worked. BT finally decided to withdraw from FMs' additional pay scheme 
linked to Critical Defects in April 1998, though the audit is still running in a softer way. 
BT management exercised a form of `hard control' in the field by requiring field 
technicians to conform to standardised work procedures, introducing FMs tracing field 
technicians, linking quality of work to FMs' payment systems and using the audit 
arrangement as a punitive tool, and therefore getting FMs to threaten or bully field 
technicians. 
Service work in CSCs is featured by three-way relationships between workers, 
customers and management. As interactive service work in CSCs is simultaneously 
produced and consumed, control over quality of service leads to particularly invasive 
forms of workplace control which oversees areas of workers' personal and subjective 
features (Macdonald and Sirianni 1996). Until 1992 BT did not really care about how 
CSRs treated customers. According to the interviewees in CSCs, it was quite common 
at the time for CSRs to cut calls off, when customers became nasty or abusive, though it 
was not publicly said. As competition increased, BT has turned to quality of service 
and specifically how their CSRs are talking to customers. 
Emphasis on quality in CSCs is concentrated on behavioural control, how CSRs are 
required to behave so as to satisfy customer needs when they talk to customers. The 
most common form of quality control has been `remote monitoring'. When CSRs spoke 
to customers, their managers secretly began to listen in on their calls. The remote 
monitoring practice was first introduced in CSCs for business customers in 1992 and 
CSCs for residential customers later. Managers are required to listen in to calls by 
sitting alongside or remotely a number of times a month for each CSR. 
Remote monitoring has evolved into the `Moment of Truth' (MOT) whereby 
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managers record the conversation that their CSRs made with their customers. The 
manager highlights good and bad points of the conversation recorded, and then offers 
the suggestions of how to improve customer satisfaction or sales. Management has 
devised simple routinised scripts for how to sell service products and to answer 
questions. Depending on how well CSRs deal with customers, they are assessed into 
one of 5 MOT scores (Dazzles: 1 point, Exceeds: 2 point, Addresses: 3- 4 points, Fails: 
5 point, Avoids: 6 points). These MOT scores were linked to the incentive schemes 
whereby CSRs are able to accumulate SIS selling points according to the amount of 
sales. CSRs could then redeem those points for vouchers of up to the value of £ 200 a 
month. However, If CSRs got bad MOT scores, they could lose SIS points and the 
vouchers. The linkage of MOT scores to SIS points became an important source of 
complaints until 1997. BT broke the links between the SIS points and MOT scores 
because it was seen as a punitive measure. 
Remote monitoring has created mistrust between CSRs and management, though 
management claims that its key purposes are to coach CSRs and to enhance their skills 
by providing constructive feedback for them (BT. Aug. 1995). CSRs, at first, felt very 
much offended by the remote monitoring. As time moved on, remote monitoring has 
increasingly become incorporated into daily working lives and the resistance to it has 
declined. Overall, it has remained a very emotive and sensitive issue in CSCs, 
combined with an intimidating management style. 
Quality control was designed to address the problems of poor work quality or low 
quality of service. The major quality initiatives have been FEQ and the audit system in 
the field, and `remote monitoring' and `MOT' in CSCs. These initiatives have 
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contributed to intensify monitoring, to limit workers' discretion, and to chase workers. 
According to FMs and field technicians, management attempts to link quality control to 
FMs' additional pay schemes or to CSRs' voucher schemes brought about some serious 
consequences such as field technicians' hatred of FMs and auditors, lots of complaints 
about fairness, and a very aggressive management style. Line managers and workers 
(field technicians and CSRs) blamed each other for the loss of FMs' additional pay or 
voucher and management style. BT at last had to give up some of its hard nature of 
quality initiatives, that is, the additional pay schemes for FMs and the linking of MOT 
scores to voucher schemes for CSRs. As the quality control initiatives in BT do not 
come from high commitment strategies that allow employees discretion, they rather 
furthered the hard nature of workplace control. 
Workers' responses to Hard control 
The intensifying hard nature of work control has given rise to individual or 
collective example of, explicit or implicit, resistance or avoidance. Field technicians' 
`quick fix' practices cut corners in order to increase the number of jobs completed. 
CSRs also tend to pass more calls to the next level in order to get on to the next calls, 
take more calls and sell more products and services, as evidenced by the staff in Credit 
Management function. These are `making out' and `escape' behaviour of workers' five 
survival strategies (Noon and Blyton 1997: 164). Collectively, the 1997 London field 
technicians' strike was the first major evidence of resistance to BT management after 
the major strike of 1987. Although the cause of the strike appeared to be the abuse of 
contract workers in the field, the accumulated workers' frustration and intensified 
pressure arising from practices associated with `hard control' were one major reason 
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behind the strike. The strike led BT management to change its management style to a 
softer form. In 1997 there was a open protest by clerical union members against BT 
management style at BT Headquarters, because CSRs were increasingly under pressure 
to work more and quickly. Close and hard control over CSRs led to a one-day national 
strike in Nov. 1999 that was staged by the CWU in order to protest against repeatedly 
broken management pledges concerning improving staffing levels, management style, 
agency staff and unachievable targets. The strike in CSCs has brought about some 
improvements in staffing levels, targets (collective rather than individual) and 
management style. 
There was also a lot of opposition and resistance to remote monitoring. The union 
concluded an agreement with the company about a national procedure for monitoring 
and recording: As such `The Code of Practice for Call Monitoring' for employees 
involves notification of remote monitoring and recording in advance with results used 
for coaching and counselling (BT. Nov. 1996). 
Apart from the explicit resistance or avoidance, there have been a number of 
implicit forms of passive responses from individual workers to the constant pressure 
and monitoring. High labour turnover rates in CSCs and what people call `burnt-out' of 
an average six months into employment in telemarketing centres are another sign of 
individual workers' passive resistance to the harsh control. According to the CWU 
(Feb. 1998), turnover rate in CSCs that had been around 5 percent in the late 1980s and 
early 1990 became around 15 percent per annum, which was higher than that in other 
part of the organisation because of undue stress arising from high targets. According to 
the union branch officers interviewed, CSRs' absenteeism due to sick leaves has been 
highest in the firm in recent years. Sick leave resulting from depression and stress had 
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been very unusual in the past but now it has become usual. 
The union has argued that quality of service can be provided only when employees 
are given more autonomy, dignity and trust than close control, and that BT would suffer 
from low quality of service arising from `hard control' and strong cost-cutting exercise. 
Consequences of Hard control 
`Hard control' over quantity and quality as seen above seems to have had 
significant consequences, positive and negative, in terms of productivity, management 
style, employee morale, working conditions, and the power relationship between 
employees/the union and BT management. `Hard control' to step up improvements in 
productivity and quality of service, helped by new technologies, has led to quite 
impressive results, despite a lot of negative repercussions on employees. For example, 
BT has 40 per cent fewer field technicians than in the late 1980s, though the increase in 
productivity from new technologies and work rationalisation has been significant. The 
emphasis on quality has reduced the number of recurring faults to some extent, which 
has in turn brought down the amount of repair work. The productivity improvement in 
`150' CSCs are even more striking. Yet, the improved results do not solely arise from 
various forms of `hard control' but also from the combination of standardisation, 
computerisation, and task flexibility. 
Tahle 7-2 Productivity in '150' Customer Service Centres 
1990 1997 increase 
Call volume (a week) 320,000 1,300,000 306% 
People (full-time equivalent) 2,400 5,300 121% 
Productivity (calls/people/week) 133 245 84% 
Service level Poor 80% PCA 
Source: BT. 1998. an internal document 
Note: `150' CSCs deal with calls regarding billing enquiries, services product enquiries, 
complaints and sales. PCA (Percentage of the called answered within 15 seconds) 
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However, underlying these impressive productivity improvements has been a 
macho management style, declining employees' autonomy, stress, demoralisation, and 
shifting power balance towards management, which, taken together, represent radical 
changes in work control systems in BT. These changes are associated with BT's 
relentless cost-cutting exercises, job cuts and radical corporate restructuring in the 
1990s. During the transformation, line management has found itself at the workplace 
aggressively pressing workers to achieve high targets. The new assertive management 
style is epitomised as `cop' among managers as well as employees. As management 
persistently watches over them, employees are forced to work harder. If they do not 
perform to the level expected of them, poor performance becomes evident straight 
away. According to the stress surveys conduced by the CWU clerical regional 
organisations (1998), 88 percent of CSRs said that they have not had autonomy in their 
jobs. Not only have technicians and CSRs been allowed little discretion but also first- 
line managers do not have much autonomy. Since there is nowhere to hide, heightened 
pressures have led to unbearable stress. The surveys show that 84 - 90 percent of CSRs 
replied that the most stressful aspect of their job was unreasonably high targets. Many 
employees felt frustrated and demoralized when they were hard pressed to work beyond 
their mental and physical limits. 
BT management, to an increasing degree, has imposed new initiatives on 
employees in order to reform work practices without consultations or negotiation with 
the union. It has often threatened to implement their plans unilaterally if the union 
attempted to block them. The power relations between the union and management have 
gradually shifted towards management. The shifting power balance and the assertive 
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management style have accompanied, and have been accompanied by, `hard control'. 
However, BT management began to notice that `hard control' alone is neither workable 
nor viable. The fact that prevailing `hard control' was no longer able to improve their 
performance beyond certain limits was confirmed by the results of the annual CARE 
surveys. There should be something alternative to, or supplementary to, `hard control' 
for BT management to rely on. That is what we will call `soft control'. 
7.3.3. Soft control 
Distinct from various forms of `hard control', `soft control' methods seem to have 
emerged in BT since the mid-1990s. As BT management has realised that the 
imposition of various form of `hard control' on employees was not workable and 
produced negative consequences, `soft control' as an alternative system of control to 
`hard control' has been adopted. The two main methods of `soft control' are identified 
and examined concerning how they have been used. 
Empowerment 
One important initiative associated with `soft control' is `empowerment' exercises. 
In most of the existing literature, empowerment strategies are supposed to be the major 
alternatives to, and qualitatively different from, work intensification strategies. Here 
`empowerment' is presented as a soft mode of management control within a broad low 
commitment strategy. At first, a programme called `For a Better Life' was initiated in 
CSCs in around 1995 and then Network & System Division developed its own 
programme, `Investing in Our Future' in 1997. The empowerment exercises are aimed 
to encourage and give BT staff more responsibilities for their actions allowing staff to 
"Own, Decide and Do" what they do. First-line managers are instructed by their senior 
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managers in this way, 
"Don't tell them (workers) what to do but work with them to try to improve what 
we do and encourage people to take responsibilities for their own jobs. " 
The Network and System (part of BT responsible for the network) version of 
empowerment is called "Investing in Our Future". The main points of the empowerment 
initiative are summed up in a personnel manager's words as follows, 
It is aimed at encouraging people to get involved and related to the work and 
trusting them to do the work without managers standing there with the stick all the 
time and beating them into submission. It was all about changing management and 
convincing our people that we would change the way we do business. 
It is claimed to be all about going from `command and control' to `standing back with 
managers' hands off and letting people work without direction. There are many field 
team workouts where field technicians get together with their coaches and start looking 
at ways they might invest in their future and make a change. However there have been 
some difficulties in implementing empowerment. One personnel manager on the access 
side stated; 
There are some managers who will resist it because that's the way they have been. 
After years of the only way we were convinced it ever worked, if you were on the 
case the whole time of probing, asking question of, directing people and never 
letting them think for themselves, it is very difficult to stand back and let them get 
on with it. 
However, the problems facing the empowerment initiative arise not just from managers' 
inertia in managing people but rather from inconsistencies and contradictions inherent 
in management strategies. Even if management proclaimed to empower people, field 
technicians are still subject to close control via rigorous statistics and checks. Field 
technicians are not entrusted to have, any significant autonomy over their work. Their 
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work schedules are still tightly controlled by the WM even after the "Investing in Our 
Future" initiative. 
`For a Better Life', a declared empowerment programme in CSCs has allowed 
people to make decisions on what they sell and billing. In the past there were tight 
financial limits concerning what they could do when there was a dispute about the bill. 
CSRs had to ask their immediate boss to make any decisions when the bill was beyond 
a certain limit, e. g. £5. Every minor problem involving money should be referred to the 
manager. This situation has led to an unnecessary workload for the manager and to 
inefficiency. Now they do not always have to seek guidance from their manager. In 
most cases employees' discretion boils downs to their ability to waive customers' 
controversial bills. They could write-off or discount bills on a good will ground or 
whatever, as long as they could keep customer happy and stop them going to other 
competitors. BT has sought to make sales people almost like sale reps in the way they 
deal with customers. Empowerment is also deployed from management's needs to 
reduce workload and ensure work is undertaken effectively. Although there is a small 
degree of empowerment, some people, especially young people who are enthusiastic 
about it, are always keen to take on more responsibility, and have ownership of what 
they do. BT has taken advantage of these people to a much larger degree. 
According to the logic of empowerment, when employees deal with customers, they 
are supposed to own the problem, and to decide what is required and they should do it. 
However, BT's claim that they have empowered CSRs is not very well supported by 
evidence. CSRs still have to get their manager's permission for any concessions or 
arrangements they make concerning their customers. There are grey areas in which they 
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cannot make judgements. Empowerment initiatives have been well received by many 
CSRs but not by all, especially people with long tenure. Despite the rhetoric of 
empowerment, the extent of employees' discretion and autonomy of how to perform 
their work is fairly limited in practice. The limited degree of empowerment is due to 
different interpretations of the grey area among managers where CSRs cannot judge 
issues themselves. 
The half-hearted, partial nature of the empowerment implemented in BT falls much 
short of the vision of empowerment as a distinct strategy, becoming rather a variant of a 
low trust approach. It also results from the fact that the empowerment initiatives have 
not been strong enough for employee discretion to roll back. First-line managers who 
were once accustomed to commanding their staff tend to continue to work in a more or 
less similar way, even though their senior manager emphasises a shift towards the new 
empowerment. Management continues to rely on hard forms of control such as 
statistics, remote monitoring for performance measurement, though in more diluted 
ways. 
Coaching 
The appearance of `coaching' as a management tool in BT heralded an important 
change in existing forms of `hard control'. The change of a symbolic term denoting 
management style away from `cop' to `coach' suggests that management has tried to 
shift towards a softer style. BT managers are required to officially become `coaches' 
rather than managers. `Coaching' was at first put into practice in around 1995 in CSCs 
with the help of a consultant. But it was not until 1997 that the initiatives really gathered 
pace across the company. Coaching has been suggested to do things in different ways. 
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The concept of `team working' was introduced with the concept of coaching at the same 
time. Managers as team leaders are urged to motivate, lead, and encourage employees to 
do their jobs right by getting rid of obstacles to work and helping them solve difficulties 
in front of them. At first it was a big shock to BT managers since the approach is quite 
different from the command, control and threat style up until that time. The changes 
away from control towards support/coaching in the approach to people management had 
has somewhat filtered down through the organisation from senior levels to first-line 
managers. 
Up to the mid-1990s duties, which FMs had been performing, in general were to 
carry out the instructions of the higher managers and to press field technicians to do 
their jobs. Some of them have tried to change the culture and to become what they call 
`coaches'. In some parts of the business some positive changes have happened. Each 
FM referred to as a `coach' leads a team of field technicians. According to the FMs 
interviewed, they are trying to change their mentality and culture in the workplace. 
However, they are still responsible for their team performance. FMs are assessed 
on the basis of monthly statistics and their performance is compared with each other. 
The worst performing FMs sees his manager having to submit a report to the level 3 
manager on how to improve his team's performance. Fluctuating management emphasis 
between coaching and high performance sends managers and workers confusing signals. 
FMs themselves do not have much autonomy and are tightly managed by their own 
level 2 managers. `Work team' is just another name for a group of field technicians 
under one manager. Work team members that work individually scattered in the field 
meet each other once a month or so, which means that they have little chance to talk 
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about their work. There are no other HRM practices that reinforce coaching in a more 
systematic way, apart from just two so-called empowerment exercises of the same kind. 
Not only does `coaching' fall much short of eliciting employees' consent and 
commitment but it is often contradicted by the continuing pressure for higher 
performance in terms of work volume and speed, and work quality. 
In CSCs the concept of `coaching' was introduced in 1995. Here have been more 
positive interventions from managers in CSCs than they used to be. In general, most of 
the managers in CSCs are now more prepared and more willing to intervene to assist 
people and to tell them how to gain improvements. As long as it is carried out as a tool 
not of control but of coaching, and used in the right way, remote monitoring may 
sometimes actually help people. As the manager can pick up on where the CSR is 
going wrong, record the conversation with customers and play back to the staff 
concerned, problems can easily be identified and better ways of conversation with 
customers can be suggested. 
However, a lot of `coaching' comes down to the capability and propensity of 
individual managers. Some managers seem to be more enthusiastic about `coaching' but 
the others are less so. There is so much pressure on first-line manages to improve work 
performance from their managers. CSRs supposedly work as a team under one coach 
(manager). Each team has to compete against others in terms of work performance. 
Most staff do not like teams because the teams often put people under a lot of pressure. 
`Coaching' has often not been very well received by CSRs because where a worker had 
a `coaching', it means that he/she was not achieving the targets. The worker is seen to 
be at the bottom of the league because he/she needs coaching. Many CSRs still 
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perceive that their managers actually direct them. In this regard coaching is not 
consistent across CSCs. 
In CSCs the management approach has been a mixture of both `cops' and 
`coaches'. The reality is not always the same as the rhetoric. Managers in CSCs do not 
often have enough time to coach and listen to their team members because they are so 
busy doing other things. There are still a lot of directions, bullying and cajoling. Some 
personnel managers in CSCs interviewed seem to attribute the inconsistencies in 
implementing coaching to junior managers' slow re-adaptation to the new changes. 
Although it may be recognised that a large company like BT cannot change its way of 
managing people overnight, there is little compelling evidence that the change towards 
the new way of managing people has really begun to take place. 
Consequences of Soft Control 
The two modes of `soft control' above were introduced to more than merely 
counterbalance any of the negative effects that `hard control' has brought about, and to 
shift away from the hitherto hands-on approach to a hands-off one. These softer forms 
of control, where they are implemented as intended, have been generally well received 
and accepted by BT employees in both the field and CSCs. Most staff in the field and 
CSCs assess `coaching' in a positive perspective. They also welcome the empowerment 
initiatives and appear to have enjoyed some discretion given to them. Where these 
initiatives associated with `soft control' were successfully implemented, passive or 
negative outcomes that `hard control' has brought forth have significantly reduced. 
They have also helped employees see management policies in a positive eye, sometimes 
be willing to take responsibilities in undertaking their tasks. 
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However, there are a number of interlinked factors that prevent management's 
rhetoric from becoming a reality. While these initiatives went down the organisational 
hierarchy, the focus and the real extent of them were often watered down at the 
workplace level. Junior or middle managers' inertia originated from the old way of 
control, that is, `hard control', has played its part. Management's prior consideration of 
profits and the pressing need to minimise costs that arises from both shareholders' 
expectation of greater profits and rapidly changing markets have rendered management 
priorities inconsistent by making them oscillate between `hard control' and `soft 
control'. This has furthered suspicion among employees of those management 
initiatives associated with `soft control'. In their eyes these initiatives might be seen as 
management fads that would soon fade away. Moreover, the lack of other practices 
reinforcing or complementing these softer practices is the last important factor that has 
made the initiatives remain management's only hope. Therefore, empowerment and 
coaching have not reached a new distinct strategy but have remained a `soft control' as 
a variant to low commitment strategy. 
7.3.4. The Implications of Hard control and Soft control 
`Soft control' and `hard control' are mutually complementary in some aspects and 
contradictory in others. BT management has pursued cost-cutting strategies through 
`hard control'. The budgetary limits set by financial considerations and pressures of 
having to show short-term profitability to shareholders have tended to force 
management to keep staffing level low and productivity level high. Line managers still 
have to achieve high performance targets, which drives the managers to push their 
people to work as hard as possible. This line of logic arising from a stringent cost- 
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cutting strategy is likely to produce the damaging physical and psychological 
consequences as explained in the section of `hard control'. `Soft control' reduces the 
negative effects of `hard control' and loosens the density of control by taking into 
account human factors. `Soft control' may thereby reduce the resistance of the 
workforce to various management initiatives, and enhance employees' acceptance of 
those reforms and initiatives. In this regard `hard control' and `soft control' may be 
complementary. However, the aims and consistencies that `soft control' is seeking are 
easily undermined by continuous `hard control'. 
'Soft control' is aimed at getting compliance from the workforce by diluting 
resistance to, eliciting acquiescence about, or increasing the understanding of, the 
company policies or initiatives, while `hard control' may try to bring about conformity 
or compliance to targets by fear or coercion. The control methods used for `soft 
control' include some discretion given to employees, coaching and hands-off 
management, whereas those for `hard control' are high targets, close monitoring, a good 
deal of statistics, comparisons and threats. These differences between `soft control' and 
`hard control' may explain the fact that `soft control' can also be seen as a new way of 
work control, distinct from `hard control'. 
Differing from `soft control', `high commitment' approach requires a cluster of 
mutually interlocking and reinforcing working practices, which internally fit to each 
other in order to get the whole desired effects. Even though BT management has 
adopted the jargon of empowerment and coaching, the partial and incomplete nature of 
the practices, even undermined by `hard control', is much short of an alternative control 
strategy, `high commitment' one. `Soft control' cannot replace `hard control' but 
remains supplementary, and often contradictory, to the latter, and to be deployed with 
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the latter at the same time. `Soft control' may be only seen as another sub-control 
strategy within a broad low trust strategy. It is the softer and more sophisticated forms 
and methods of control that are more effective and acceptable to the workforce. `Hard 
control' and `soft control' are a management strategy within a broad low trust approach, 
alternatively deployed depending on the circumstances and customer segments BT 
workers deal with. 
Despite significant differences between the field and CSRs in terms of the nature, 
complexity, cycles and place of work and customer interaction, the extent to which 
management has implemented both `hard control' and `soft control' is generally similar 
in the two areas. However, some differences can be shown between the two. Field 
technicians work is geographically dispersed and their work cycles are very long and 
often unpredictable (e. g. 4-8 jobs a day), while CSRs work side by side in the open- 
space office and their work cycles are very short. In spite of the automation of job 
allocation and scheduling work in the field is still conducted manually and largely craft- 
based, whereas how CSRs work are much more tightly controlled by computerised 
systems. The degree of the closeness or density of control and statistical control, what 
we call the `density of control', is much higher in CSCs than in the field. Quality 
control in the field is focused on work quality, whist quality control in CSCs is 
concentrated on behavioural control. 
7.4. Hybrid Forms of Work Control in KT 
7.4.1. Former work control 
Rule-bound work systems, inherited from the past as part of the government 
organisation, dominated KT until the mid-1990s. There were fairly well developed 
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rules and bureaucratic culture that had governed KT employees, suitable for its 
hierarchical structure and firmly established order. The personnel arrangements 
including the internal labour market with a stratified grading structure supported the 
work systems. The rules were unilaterally set and changed by management or the 
government. The influence of the union was very weak and rather subordinate to the 
interests of management up to the early 1990s. The means to measure workload and 
outputs and to assess employees' performance were believed to under-develop. The 
shop-floor regimes governing the workplace at the time were ones in which 
management did not supervise employees in detail and substantial responsibility for 
work was left to workers in terms of how to work, job allocation, and work scheduling. 
Experienced senior workers led work in the field. CSRs at front-desks in local telecoms 
centres were reactive to the demands of visiting customers. 
Until the early 1990s employees, conscious of public obligation, demonstrated a 
strong public service ethos and showed a significant commitment to the national goal of 
completing and upgrading the national telecoms network. A relatively high level of pay, 
the good growth prospect of KT and its associated potential for career progression 
further reinforced this commitment. In this regard, a relatively `relaxed foam of 
bureaucratic control system' had been in place at KT until the mid-1990s. As 
competition has developed in markets and management has pursued commercial 
strategies under its own initiatives, new demands for providing quality of service at a 
relatively cheap price arise. 
7.4.2 Emerging Form of `Hard Control' 
With regard to work control, KT management has focused on cultural change as 
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part of enhancing quality of service rather than cost-minimisation in the late 1990s. KT 
management has increasingly been required to meet heightening customers' demands by 
focusing control over quality of service since the mid-1990s. The initiatives to change 
employee ethos have been sought by caring about customers' various demands. KT 
management has tried to improve customer satisfaction by intensifying control over 
quality of service but not necessarily by intensifying work. In the process of bringing in 
cultural changes towards customer-orientation and improving quality of service, a new 
form of `hard control' has just emerged. The intensity, extent, and methods of control 
which KT management has imposed on workers particularly at various customer 
interface in order to deliver quality of service, have increasingly been hard in its nature. 
The project representing the approach adopted at Korea Telecom is called 
'FOCUS'. The ways in which KT has tried to improve quality of service are to provide 
services on time, at the right time and with courtesy. One of the features of the project in 
KT is to use customers in order to monitor whether or not employees provide quality of 
service. Quality of service usually depends upon employees' attitudes, the extent of 
courtesy, connectivity, the speed and punctuality of service delivery, and work quality 
(KT 1999a). Customer service quality is checked and controlled in the areas related to 
provision of service such as CSCs, front-desks, fault receptions, fault repairs and 
installation. 
The project 'FOCUS', planned in 1994, has been implemented since 1997. The 
'FOCUS' initiative has been applied to the directory inquiry centres, CSCs, front-desks, 
fault reception centres, and the field. There are around 60 agents at the FOCUS centre 
who make calls, `Happy Calls' to customers having a transaction with KT the day 
before in order to monitor the degree of customer satisfaction with the services. The 
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`FOCUS' agents automatically make up to 3,000 phone calls everyday to customers 
drawn from the lists of the customers by using the computer system. FOCUS agents 
ask the customers 17 questions for each service addressing a number of activities related 
to service speed, courtesy, punctuality and quality of work. According to the answers of 
the customers to the questions, each relevant employee is assessed by 5 'FOCUS' 
grades and scores are given for each grade: very satisfied (grade 5- 100 points), 
satisfied (grade 4- 75 points), average (grade 3- 50 points), unsatisfied (grade 2- 25 
points), and very unsatisfied (grade 1-0 point). The average points are then published 
and ranked in the form of monthly league tables for each function to compare FOCUS 
points other among employees in local telecoms centres, among the local telecoms 
centres within the regional division and nationally. Before 'FOCUS' points are marked 
and league tables are published, KT management set FOCUS target points for each 
service function to achieve in that year. The points that each employee of each function 
in local telecoms centres or each centre in regional divisions achieve, are assessed 
against the target points. Statistics are widely used for comparison on a daily, weekly, 
and monthly basis. 
The project FOCUS is, above all, applied to the field where fault repairs and 
installations are provided by field technicians. Field technicians are supposed to provide 
quality of service according to the initiative of 'FOCUS. They have to arrive in the 
field at the right time in order to keep the appointments with customers, which were 
made at the control considering the workloads and situation in the field, and deliver 
services punctually. If an installation or fault repair service is much delayed, the 
customer is entitled to financial compensation from KT. Faults are supposed to be 
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repaired within 12 hours after the report to the fault reception centre. Line installations 
are made on appointment with the customer. They are supposed to install the line where 
the customer wants it to be, or possibly to install a couple of phones in different rooms 
when the customer wants this. They are required to perform quality work and to attach 
on the side of each phone installed a sticker on which their names and contact numbers 
are printed. They should clean the area where they worked. They are also supposed to 
test whether the line repaired or just installed is actually connected to the network. They 
have to explain to the customer what the customer questions or why the fault occurred 
in detail. However, if a field technician is to meet the customer's various demands, he 
may exceed the allocated job time and miss the next appointment. The time allocated 
for each job depends upon the situation in the field because the field technician is in 
charge of a certain small area. If it rains, the number of repair jobs swells. Then they 
have to hurry up to clear the faults within the day, often supported by a number of field 
technicians responsible for other jobs in the same local telecoms centre. When it comes 
to the spring season and people relocate a lot, the number of installation jobs increase. 
The FOCUS agents call and ask the customer whether all the requirements above 
are met by the field technician and whether the customer is satisfied with the service 
provided. Therefore, field technicians are forced to carry out the tasks as careful as 
required above. Otherwise they will not get good FOCUS points. 
The areas to which the FOCUS initiative is applied concern CSCs (call centres), 
front-desks and fault reception centres. CSRs at the customer interfaces of local 
telecoms centres usually deal with sales, billing inquiries, removals, and fault reports. 
Most customer services are still carried out by CSRs at front-desks in local telecoms 
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centres and partly at CSCs but in the process of transition away from front-desks in each 
local telecoms centre towards consolidated CSCs on a regional basis. 
In CSCs all calls are supposed to be answered within nine seconds, and customer 
enquiries are required to be responded quickly, in details, and in a courteous manner. At 
front-desks of local telecoms centres CSRs are also supposed to deal with visiting 
customers quickly and courteously. At fault reception centres fault reporting calls 
should be treated in the similar way as at CSCs. Moreover, the recent emphasis on 
quality of service and customer satisfaction through the project FOCUS has brought 
about the shortening of the time within which calls should be answered from average 21 
seconds to in 9 seconds at CSCs. The FOCUS agents call those customers who 
contacted CSCs or fault reception centres, or visited the front-desks in order to monitor 
the quality of service in terms of the speed of service provision, the kindness of CSRs' 
attitude, and the degree of their knowledge of products and services. The results of 
monitoring quality of service at CSCs, front-desks and fault reception centres by the 
FOCUS agents are assessed and compared in the exactly same way as described on the 
access side above. 
The current CHT is 101 seconds and the effective time for CSRs in CSCs to spend 
to actually take calls per day is 265 minutes a day. CHT is going to be lengthened to 
180 seconds and the average time for CSRs to actually take calls a day to 225 minutes. 
CSRs are going to be allowed more time in order to serve customers more satisfactorily. 
KT management does manage CSRs' performance at CSCs in terms of CHT or the 
number of calls taken a day, effective time (the time available to take calls) a day, and 
the number of sales to a certain extent but the emphasis has been put on quality of 
service. KT management has not imposed tight control over quantitative outputs on 
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employees. Significant differences between employees working in the same centre are 
continuously observed. There is no evidence to suggest that a hard form of output 
control is there. 
If a local telecoms centre fails to achieve the target points in access network, front- 
desks or CSCs and is ranked as one of the poorest three performing centres, the tactics of 
`name and shame' has been used. FOCUS points among centres within each region and 
nationally are publicly compared via league tables. The relevant first-line manager is 
summoned to report to the managing director of the regional division in front of his/her 
colleague managers why his/her section could not achieve the target and how to improve 
it. If the function in the centre consecutively fails to achieve the target and are ranked as 
one of the lowest centres again, the general manager of the centre as well as the line 
manager has to report to the managing director of the region in the same way. The 
managers of the worst centres experience humiliation and public shame. Then, the line 
manager is most likely to pick out the poor performing field technicians or CSRs and 
reprimand or warn them. If this kind of public disgrace happens to the line manager, the 
staff in the function would feel guilty for the disgrace and be often willing to accept 
being pressed hard by the manager in order to improve FOCUS points. 
FOCUS points are also an important element in management assessment, reflected 
in differential bonus payments among regional divisions or local telecoms centres. The 
poorest performers or managers in terms of FOCUS points are selected and sent onto 
some training courses, often used for more punitive purpose (KT Marketing Division. 
1998; KTTU 1999). In addition, the FOCUS team of the Marketing Division undertakes 
the auditing of the poorest performing local telecoms centre (KT Seoul Regional 
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Division. 1999). In these circumstances, line managers have tended to force line 
managers to cascade the hard pressure down to their subordinates. They tend to get 
tougher to, and treat, poor performers in a more heavy-handed way. So most of the staff 
are upset or depressed when they got grade 4 (75 points) or below because grade 4 or 
below will lower average FOCUS points in their section. 
These various means of monitoring and enhancing customer satisfaction are aimed 
at controlling workers' attitude or behaviour towards customers, work quality, or 
punctuality and speed of service delivery. As indicated above, these tend to give birth 
to a bellicose management style. These various forms of enforcing control are aimed at 
getting employees to comply with the requirements for quality of service. The extent of 
monitoring, imposing the required attitudes towards customers on employees, and 
therefore supervising them is very hard, tight and aggressive. Thus there is strong 
evidence to suggesting that a form of `hard control' has emerged with the launch of the 
project 'FOCUS' from late 1997. 
In contrast to the evidence of the emerging `hard control', `soft control' in KT has 
been less conspicuous. A number of methods of `soft control' have been used, which 
are not deliberately deployed with particular control objectives in mind. Education and 
training are the most often used methods of getting employees, normally poor 
performers, to improve quality of service. Every section manager holds the `Good 
Morning' session every morning for 30 minutes. Here the manager repeatedly focuses 
on how to deal with customers and how to enhance quality of service. Repetitive 
emphases on the same may bring the sense of brainwashing and other pressing effects 
on the employees. However, these methods of training, education and the Good 
Morning meetings remain complementary to the hard form of control. They help to 
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reduce employees' overt or covert resistance to the control via the 'FOCUS' initiative 
and facilitate their compliance to the requirements of the FOCUS. Besides, few 
management practices such as TQM, coaching, team-working or empowerment that 
may be deemed as a means of `soft control', have been imported. KT management uses 
the existing practices or channels to reinforce control in a softer way. 
Responses of workers to the `hard control' 
The `hard control' over quality of service has met resistance from employees and 
the union. The main points of what they argue against the FOCUS concern its 
objectivity, and the methods used for assessment and its subsequent legitimacy, though 
they do acknowledge the need to improve quality of service. The most frequently 
quoted are as follows: the subjectivity of customer satisfaction; problems with marking 
FOCUS points; customers' unreasonable demands for service; and the lack of technical 
and material conditions for consistent quality of service (KTTU. 1998). As a result of 
continuous questioning by the unions and employees, the union and KT management 
agreed to reduce the number of FOCUS grades from 5 to 3 in July 1999: grade 3 
(satisfied); grade 2 (average); and grade 1 (unsatisfied). Employees at customer 
counters are likely to gain the FOCUS grade 3 more easily than before. However, the 
implications of the new agreement for the nature of work control remains to be seen. 
Equally important is the fact that employees at customer interfaces, especially in 
the field, have invented some avoiding or resisting tactics against the tough imposition 
of the FOCUS initiatives. According to the technicians interviewed, some technicians 
sometimes manipulate the results when they report to the control. If any customer who 
may complain about the technician negatively, the technician may report to the control 
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the absence of the customer or the phone jack of the customer pulled out of the wall 
outlet when he visited the customer' house. In those cases the FOCUS agents do not 
make a call to the customer. The other technicians interviewed argued that high FOCUS 
points above 85 or 90 were impossible in the field, considering the situation of the field, 
unless the field technicians manipulate work results in one way or another. Considering 
that these practices were found even in interviews of the project teams of Korea Labour 
Institute, these practices do not seem be rare. Even though line managers may be aware 
of such practices, they appear to condone them. However, senior managers or FOCUS- 
related managers in the headquarters do not seem to know what is going on at the 
workplace. 
7.4.3. Self-Direction and Bureaucratic Control 
Apart from the emerging `hard control' at customer encounters, there are many 
other areas where the existing control systems have not changed very much. 
Bureaucratic control systems in some areas of KT have gradually weakened but there 
are still strong elements of `self-direction' (the lack of immediate external control) at 
the workplace. The basic structure of bureaucratic control is still quite persistent but on 
the defensive. Self-direction and bureaucratic control are the legacies of the former 
control systems rather than management's conscious control strategy. It is 
fundamentally different from self-managed teams or autonomous work groups linked to 
eliciting employees' commitment to the aims of the company. Work in the field is still 
largely craft-based in terms of work execution. Work at front-desks is also mostly left to 
the autonomy of CSRs. The reactive structure of work management in the field and at 
front-desks, which matches work volumes with the number of workers at the level of 
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local telecoms centres, reinforces self-direction of workers. Although employees are 
under clear rules and directions of immediate managers, their self-direction has 
remained a central part of bureaucratic control in KT. 
Self-direction 
Much work is still left to individual employees' discretion. Workers still have some 
discretion in work allocation and how to undertake their work. Except for control over 
quality of service, work performance is not tightly controlled. Despite the introduction 
of CTI systems with control capacity into CSCs, KT management has not sought to 
control work performance and processes. Craft work in the field still remains. 
There are two categories of field technicians in a local telecoms centre such as 
`reactive field technicians' responsible for overhead wires and `proactive field 
technicians' for underground cables. We will focus on the reactive field technicians. 
Reactive field technicians in local telecoms centres are divided into a number of small 
"work groups" composed of 4-5 field technicians. Each work group is responsible for 
a small area within the geography the local telecoms centre covers. Two technicians in 
each group normally perform installations whilst two or three other technicians are 
involved in fault repairs. The patch of the area for which the group takes responsibility 
is divided into two or three for fault repairs or installations, depending on the number of 
the group's technicians. Therefore, each field technician is in charge of a certain sub- 
patch for fault repairs or installations. 
Job allocations and job closures in the field are largely made manually. Every 
morning each technician has got the print-out of the jobs received during the afternoon 
of the day before or the night. The print-outs of allocating jobs for the day have job 
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details such as job location, the tasks involved, the appointments and the phone 
numbers. Technicians report job closure to, and receive jobs from, the control whenever 
a fault is cleared. Installation technicians have print-outs for afternoon jobs at lunch 
time. Field technicians report to the system the kinds and number of jobs they did by 
inputting the results of their work into the system at the end of the day. 
The number of field technicians in a local telecoms centre is determined by 
considering the average workload of the area covered by the centre. Workload for field 
technicians is not always even, requiring some flexible deployment of technicians in the 
same work group. When workload is normal, the field technician could complete it by 
6 pm, and have some rest if he does his work satisfactorily. How they work, or in what 
order they work is directly up to field technicians. Importantly work volume is not 
determined by line managers or the system but depends on the situation of customers in 
the field technician's geographical patch. This reactive structure of determining 
workloads, limits management's capacity to control each employee's performance in 
terms of work volume and speed. Without the proactive structure of work management 
that can match the number of people to workloads, the limitations would not be easily 
overcome. While the communication means in the field developed from handsets 
through paging to mobile phones, fault clearings and installations have retained strong 
craft elements. The craft tradition prevalent in field technicians' work lends itself to 
limited control over their work. Individualised and dispersed work of field technicians 
adds further difficulties to the control of field technicians' work. Furthermore Field 
technicians are required to put small stickers on which their name and contact number 
are printed to a side of customers' phone in order to boost field technicians' 
accountability for their work to the customers. 
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`Senior technicians' called `Siljang' have much experience, skills, the contextual 
knowledge and long tenure. They take on some elements of an informal supervisory 
role in the field in terms of work methods, work allocation/adjustment, and skills, and 
receive some allowances for this role in the field. Despite great potential for these senior 
technicians to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of work in the field, their ability 
and skills are under-utilised because they have no chance of being promoted or 
compensated. Line managers check each technician's work performance (the number, 
and kind, of jobs) through print-outs everyday but do not monitor it closely. These 
control systems, which allow field technicians significant self-direction and discretion 
and ask them to take direct responsibility for their work at the same time, have not 
changed much since the mid-1980s. 
There are two areas of customer services - front-desks function and CSCs. Most 
work at front-desks and CSCs has been done more or less autonomously by employees. 
They are supposed to be accountable for their work. However increasing differences 
are to be found between different clerical functions. CSRs at front-desks deal with 
customers who visit local telecoms centres. CSCs have been established to deal with 
customers' enquiries or orders via phone. Front-desk functions are now gradually being 
transferred to these CSCs. 
Nearly every local telecoms centre has its front-desk function in its building. CSRs 
at front-desks wait for, and deal with, visiting customers. Work volume at the front-desk 
is directly dependent upon the demands, and the number, of incoming customers in the 
area that the local telecoms centre covers. This passive structure of front-desks, 
responding to incoming customers, limits management's capacity to control work 
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volume. Most work at front-desks is done autonomously following established rules and 
procedures. In recent years more discretion has been granted CSRs at front-desks in 
terms of their authority to waive bills within a certain limit. With the devolution of 
authority, multiplied number of services, diversified customers' demands and added 
sales activities, CSRs at the front-desk have more discretion in their dealing with 
customers. The results of daily activities are now reported only to the first line manager, 
while all results including minor ones had to be reported to the second line managers in 
the past. There has been no performance control for staff at front-desks in terms of 
work volume and sales volume except the FOCUS points. 
CSCs have the capacity to measure and monitor CSRs' performance in real time 
through the system called `Inforex ACD CTS'. They can also check work performance 
of each CSR by printing out performance statistics during the day: CHT; the number of 
calls taken; the time spent on taking calls; the number of calls not taken; the time spent 
on waiting for calls; and the time unavailable (KT Customer Service Centres. May 
1999). Despite the sophisticated technical capability of the system, KT management 
does not use the capacity fully for control purposes. Management usually encourages 
CSRs to look at their performance themselves and to make an effort to improve if their 
performance is lower than average. Management encourages CSRs to spend more time 
than CHT (101 seconds per call) up to 180 seconds per call to explain more to 
customers, considering that the number of services provided has become diverse and 
often technical explanations are needed for each service product. CSRs can adjust CTI 
from automatic function to manual function to slow down the speed of incoming calls 
and control the number of incoming calls. 
Any listening in by managers to CSRs' conversation with customers would be a 
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very sensitive issue and provoke strong emotions among CSRs. All conversations with 
customers at CSCs are recorded. These recordings are used for proof when a dispute 
arises with the customer. These are also used for self-learning and assessment by CSRs. 
6-7 CSRs who are grouped into a team go into a recording room, listen to what they 
said to their customers, and discuss how best they can serve customers in terms of 
voice, words used, expressions, and methods. Thus work at CSCs is still left to CSRs to 
a significant extent even if management has the systems to monitor their performance 
more closely. 
However, there are some noteworthy developments at CSCs. Line managers at 
CSCs have started to use various performance statistics to manage work performance as 
a whole, though the move is cautious. As the size of CSCs increases, the scope of 
control increases to 40 - 70 CSRs as well. line managers have begun to use statistics to 
manage work performance. Otherwise, they would have no ways of knowing how well 
CSRs are doing. If a CSR's performance is too poor, the line manager calls in her/him, 
asks her/him why the performance is so low, and requests her to make more effort to 
improve performance. Moreover, the shift of promotion criteria away from seniority 
towards performance encourages line managers to devote more concern about work 
performance. This new trend at CSCs appears to be beginning to bite into the elements 
of self-direction prevalent under the bureaucratic control system. This is designed to 
strengthen performance control in a softer form. However, this soft form of control in 
KT is different from `soft control' envisaged in BT because the latter is being pursued as 
an important variant to `low road' strategies, while the former may be seen as an initial 
sign of tightening control. 
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The shop-floor regimes of self-direction under bureaucratic control that had existed 
in the past have not greatly changed on either the access side or the clerical side. In 
CSCs management has not fully used technical capability available to strengthen 
control. Then an important question is raised: why KT has not developed any new 
control systems to change the existing self-direction. KT management has not been 
under strong competitive pressures to cut costs and to improve efficiency because of 
phased deregulation and slow developments in competition, though the pressures 
imposed by the government have become stronger since the financial crisis. KT 
management had not developed the overall system for performance management until 
1996 but, with the introduction of management contracts, it has just begun to adopt a 
number of performance measures for senior managers such as budget savings and 
revenues generated. Newly adopted performance management arrangements fall short 
of a systematic performance management of individual employees. The current main 
interests of KT management lie in pursuing organisational changes for strengthening 
marketing functions, downsizing and culture changes but not in work organisation or 
control issues. What is also significant is that the organisational structures in the field 
and front-desks are not appropriate for controlling work performance. Though CSCs 
were introduced and began to be expanded, much work in the field and front-desks is 
still based on a reactive structure of work management. Despite management's attempts 
to monitor and control employees' performance at CSCs, the extent of their success is 
still partial and patchy, except the project FOCUS. However, the partial developments 
and the experience of the FOCUS may be a basis on which further efforts to strengthen 
control can be made. 
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Weakening Bureaucratic Control 
One of the main features of the work systems of public enterprises such as KT was 
the development of `bureaucratic control'. It was supported by the hierarchical 
structure of the organisation and impersonal rules and procedures that were designed to 
serve public interests rather than to generate maximum profits. However, the evolving 
commercialism of KT has revealed that the rules and procedures needed to provide 
public services are not appropriate for more commercial purposes. Many rules proved 
to be burdensome to responding to customers' demands quickly and flexibly. For 
example, decision-making processes were so complex and often several steps were 
needed in order to get final approvals. Even minor facts had to be reported to, and dealt 
with or approved by, senior management. Now KT management has begun to jettison 
some of the rules which function as barriers to its commercial activities. The measures 
comprise the reduction in the number of official documents and forms, the introduction 
of electronic stamp of approval arrangements, the reduction in the number of decision- 
making layers, and the devolution of authority downwards (KT. 1997a; KT. 1999a). 
The criteria whereby management is assessed are now focusing upon not how well the 
rules and directions from above are followed but how management actually contributes 
to generating revenues. Consequently management increasingly tends to assess 
employees by their performance and the extent of their commercial contributions to the 
organisation. Thus the promotion criteria have already significantly shifted away from 
seniority towards employees' competence, attendance, and performance. The 
management contracts between the chief executive of KT and the managing directors of 
divisions, promotion of young senior managers, the project FOCUS have begun to 
shake bureaucratic culture rooted in the organisation. Boosted by the relatively 
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successful implementation of the FOCUS initiative, KT management appears to be 
preparing more ambitious plans for accelerating new working practices in order to 
restructure work control systems as well as its basic structure as can be seen in various 
plans (KT Marketing CS Team. May 1999; KT. Dec. 1998; KT Network Division. 
March 1999). 
In this regard the restructuring of bureaucratic control systems is still in the initial 
phase and has yet to be gone through. Although bureaucratic control systems with self- 
directed control have gradually been weakened, they are still persistent. Taken together, 
hybrid forms of control systems, a mixture of emerging `hard control' system with 
gradually weakening but persistent bureaucratic control, now govern the workplace. 
Their relative weight is likely to change over time against bureaucratic control. 
7.4.4. Consequences and Implications of Hybrid Control 
The punitive nature associated with the FOCUS initiative gives relevant employees 
and first-line managers negative psychological impacts to quite a significant extent. 
Most employees and first-line managers interviewed report stress, depression and 
demoralisation in general. The positive side of hard control is that it has led a relatively 
successful change in corporate culture away from supplier-centred, public service ethos 
towards a more commercial, customer-oriented one. Employees, in particular those at 
customer encounters are getting used to how to provide customers with quality of 
service and to satisfy them. What KT employees are complaining about is not the 
necessity to offer customers quality of services, but the way in which KT management 
has monitored quality of service and enforced it on them. Employees at customer 
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contact points gradually tend to assimilate values of quality of service and to make 
efforts to satisfy customers by showing customer-friendly attitudes, by keeping the time 
appointed, and by delivering services timely. According to a survey by the Korea 
Gallup Polling Agency (KT Seoul Regional Division. 1998) and KT's own report 
(1999a), customer satisfaction has improved significantly after the launch of the project 
of FOCUS. Some young employees and junior managers complain about bureaucratic 
control because it prevents them from pursuing their proactive activities. However, 
others, especially with long tenure feel unease about gradually weakening bureaucratic 
order and increasing commercialism. 
Hybrid control systems are not stable, but more contested. They reflect the 
transitional phase of control systems. The features characterised by old control systems 
are slowly receding and new features associated with emerging control are surfacing. 
`Hard control' over quality of service is linked to the internal and external needs of KT 
for cultural changes at the current phase of corporate restructuring. Management 
incentives to tightly control productivity and speed do not seem to be very strong in KT, 
considering that CSCs do not show much interest in controlling CSRs' productivity. 
Management control structure at front-desks and in the field is quite passive and 
therefore is not appropriate to increasing control. The conceptual tools of `hard control' 
and `soft control' are partially effective in explaining KT's hybrid control systems. 
7.5. Conclusion 
Comparing work control systems in the two companies, we find that there are 
considerable differences in control systems in their various aspects. BT has transformed 
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its work control systems from traditional bureaucratic ones to more sophisticated ones 
which combine `hard control' with `soft control', while a hybrid control system has 
emerged in KT, which mixes an emerging form of `hard control' with the gradually 
weakening but still persistent bureaucratic control systems which include strong 
elements of self-direction. The degree of the density or tightness of control is much 
higher in BT than that in KT. The nature of work control in BT has been so consistently 
tight, close and pressing that employees have been given little discretion. Work control 
in KT has not been so tight in that self-directed elements still remain substantial in the 
field and front-desks, although less so in CSCs. Although CSCs in KT are equipped 
with the very similar technologies to CSCs in BT, KT management has not used the 
technologies for control purposes, whereas BT management has taken full advantage of 
the technologies available for those purposes. 
There are some similarities in the hard nature of control over quality of service in 
both companies. Both BT and KT have used `hard control' over quality of service. 
However, important differences are found between the two cases. Quality control in BT 
has been exercised to further reduce employees' discretion, whilst that is not the case in 
KT. Quality control in BT has something to do with work rationalisation, customisation 
and employees' behaviour. By contrast, quality control in KT is designed to facilitate 
corporate culture changes away from a public-service, engineering-centred mentality 
towards a more commercial, customer-oriented ethos by highlighting basic employees' 
attitude towards customers. 
Why then do the two companies show very different work control systems? First of 
all, different work control systems between the two may be accounted for by divergent 
sectoral regimes and varying financial regimes between the two countries, both of 
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which are in turn linked to disparate national systems. The telecoms governance regime 
in Britain made up of the privatised former monopoly, increasingly intense competition 
and relatively tight regulation have continuously put significant pressures on BT to 
minimise costs and to improve the level of service. The demands of the City of London 
for short-term high profits since privatisation have been a main driving force of 
constraining BT management to reduce costs for generating high profits. The 
developed stock market in Britain tends to make BT management be sensitive to share 
prices, which depend on short-term profitability. The financial systems in Britain, have 
put BT management under even stronger pressures of cutting costs as well as providing 
quality of service. These strong pressures to minimise costs, to increase efficiency and 
to provide customised services have been translated into `hard control' strategies and 
later `soft control' ones by BT management. By comparison, KT is still a public 
enterprise which lacks strong profit motives. Developments in market competition in 
Korea have been relatively slow and less intense than those in Britain. As the influences 
of stock market on KT management have not been significant, the partial privatisation 
of KT has not given KT management significant incentives to save costs or generate 
short-term profits. These environments, coupled with low labour cost base of KT, have 
led KT management to be less concerned with short-term profits and cost minimisation 
strategies. KT management is rather pressed to strengthen commercial strategies and to 
change its old public service culture in order to meet diversifying customers' demands 
and to compete with other operators. Therefore, KT management has not shown much 
interest in developing performance management of individual employees so far, apart 
from the FOCUS. 
Work control systems also differ between the two because management structure in 
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KT is rather passive or reactive to customers' demands, while that in BT is more 
proactive in matching work volume to human resources. Despite the recent efforts of 
KT management to rationalise and consolidate businesses and local structure, the 
current management structure in the field and front-desks, inherited from the past, has 
presented KT management with the stickiness embedded in the locality. The structure, 
based on local telecoms centres, is not appropriate for management to control work but 
helps employees retain self-directed work. This differing management structure 
between the two reflects not just gaps in the extent or phase of corporate restructuring 
but also different ways of restructuring. Work control systems in KT and BT differ 
because they are closely associated with diverse ways of structuring their organisations. 
Both the degree of deploying new technologies and how to use them affect work 
control systems, although to a certain extent both of them are also a variable of 
management strategies. The advanced extent of the deployment of new technologies in 
BT has helped BT management control work more systematically by automatic work 
allocation or work scheduling. The limited extent of introducing new technologies has 
left KT management to partially control work or workers to exercise their self-direction 
in their work. Depending on the approach of management to new technologies, the 
similar technology in CSCs such as CTI are used disparately in the two companies. 
Lastly, the responses of the unions to work control played a part in explaining 
differences between the two cases. The NCU or later the CWU has been constrained in 
how to respond to tighter work control because the political climate and labour 
legislation until early 1997 was unfavourable to the union and BT management already 
gained upper hand when large scale redundancies were implemented. A miscalculated 
industrial action would have been a disaster for the union, as experienced in the 1987 
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strikes. The alternative left to the union was to accept the need to minimise costs and 
increase efficiency but to negotiate work control in labour's favour. The union's 
strategy of negotiated change proved not to be very successful, since BT was able to 
impose `hard control' over the years without much resistance from the union. By 
contrast, the newly elected leadership of KTTU was influenced by the emerging 
`militant' independent labour movement in Korea. KTTU posed outright opposition to 
any significant changes in working practices and often collided with KT management or 
the government by promoting various collective actions. This has barred KT 
management from imposing tough control on workers, for example in CSCs. The 
FOCUS initiative met strong resistance from the union and KT management was forced 
to loosen its hard nature. These different responses of unions are related to the 
respective national industrial relations systems. 
In the light of these four explanations of significant differences between the two, 
work control systems proved largely to be bound to national systems and, to a certain 
extent, to management strategies or the existing management structure. 
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CHAPTER 8. WORK RATIONALISATION AND MASS 
CUSTOMISATION 
Work rationalisation may often be regarded as leading in the opposite direction to 
customisation. In other words, the more rationalised work is, then the less customised 
work is likely to be, whereas the less rationalised work, the more customised work is 
likely. However, this is not necessarily the case when we look at recent developments 
concerning work organisation in the telecommunications services industry. Work has 
often been rationalised or customised alongside corporate restructuring in the two cases 
being looked at. Work rationalisation and customisation are also very closely related to 
work control systems as were discussed in the previous chapter. 
We will now look at in greater detail how the two telecoms operators have 
rationalised or customised their service work in the course of accommodating, and 
responding to, global competition, deregulation and ever-changing technologies. The 
first section defines rationalisation and customisation. The next two sections examine 
how work has been rationalised on both the access and clerical side in BT and their 
respective consequences. They are further followed by two sections which investigate 
work rationalisation and mass customisation in KT and their outcomes. The last section 
compares the two cases in terms of rationalisation and customisation and explanations 
of the differences and similarities are sought. 
8.1. What are Rationalisation and Customisation respectively? 
8.1.1. The Definition of Work Rationalisation 
Work rationalisation is defined as the reorganisation of work processes, procedures 
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and methods in a number of ways for enhancing efficiency and effectiveness in work 
allocation, work scheduling and work pace. It may involve the following aspects of 
work restructuring: the separation of planning from doing; division of value-added 
activities from supporting ones; removal or rationalisation of support work functions; 
subdivision of value-added work processes into simple repetitive ones; identification 
and diffusion of best work practice; standardisation of simplified work activities in 
terms of unit work time, work processes or procedures across the firm; the adoption of 
assembly line via virtual conveyor belts; and automation, and computerisation of as 
much work process as possible. Work rationalisation is a much wider and 
comprehensive concept than that of valorisation or standardisation. 
Demands for services on a large scale in the telecommunications services industry, 
combined with the need for efficiency in providing services, have led to standardisation 
and then rationalisation of service provisions. In the 1970s, Levitt (1972,1976) argued 
that there would be a need for either a production-line approach to service work or the 
industrialisation of service. One form of the rationalisation (Taylorisation) of service 
work has been widely reported in the form of a "McDonaldisation" of service work in 
various service sectors, particularly in the fast-food sector (Ritzer, 1993; Leider 1996). 
Taylorisation of operators' job in the telecommunications sector had already taken place 
during the 1890s - 1920s, firstly in the USA and later in other industrial economies. 
Taylorised work of human switches (operators) was mechanised in the 1920s by AT&T 
(Vallas 1993). Although most telecoms monopolies provided standardised services at 
relatively cheap prices in the name of universal services by the 1970s, work related to 
service provisions was not generally subject to standardisation or rationalisation, apart 
from operators' work and later on mechanised switches. Recently, rationalisation or 
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Taylorisation of service work, or white-collar factories has been widely discussed with 
reference to call centres (Taylor and Bain 1999b; IDS 1997; The Guardian 
02/June/1998). However, a significant proportion of service functions had remained less 
automated or rationalised and left to the discretion of craft technicians in the field or 
clerical workers until new computerised equipment was introduced. Computer 
technologies have opened a new era with their versatility and huge capacity. These new 
technologies have facilitated rationalisation and customisation in the field and customer 
service functions in the telecoms industry. However, management has been crucial in 
rationalisation and customisation because management seeks to utilise economies of 
scale and scope made available by new technologies in order to enhance efficiency, 
reduce costs or to customise services. 
8.1.2. The Definition of Mass Customisation 
In contrast to work rationalisation found in service production both on the access 
side and on the clerical side, there has been another development in service delivery. 
`Mass customisation' may be defined as a new effective way of service delivery 
designed to meet customers' diversified demands for services on a massive scale in 
terms of shortened lead time, punctuality, prioritisation and convenience. Mass 
customisation has generally been discussed with reference to the manufacturing sector 
(Pine 1993; Feitzinger and Lee 1997). Progress in mass customisation is also argued to 
have occurred in the service sector (Pine 1993; Hart 1995; Gilmore and Pine 1997; 
Bowen and Youngdahl 1998). Although Pine (1993,37) has already identified a trend of 
mass customisation in the telecoms industry, the theoretical concept of mass 
customisation has been underdeveloped. 
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Customers often intervene in service production to a more or lesser degree because 
services are produced in the interactive processes between customers and service 
workers (Macdonald and Sirianni 1996,3; Frenkel 1999). This interaction between 
customers and services workers in service provisions has important implications for 
customisation. It is largely limited to front-line workers who contact customers, while 
back office functions are not usually so interactive. Until the mid-1980s residential 
customers had to passively choose only few simple, standardised voice services options 
available to them in the former production systems. There had been limited 
opportunities to intervene in service production. Gradually, the customisation of service 
delivery has developed as telecoms operators have pursued their competitive advantages 
through the provisions of more customised and responsive services. The increasing 
importance of customer relationships has given birth to a new fashionable management 
technique, called Customer Relationship Management (CRM) (FT Spring 2000). 
Above all, customers' increasingly sophisticated demands for services and 
products, and customers' pursuit of convenience have underpinned customisation. 
Competitive advantages lie at telecoms operators' ability to provide customers with 
diversified services tailored for individually different customers' tastes with high 
standards of reliability and responsiveness (Berry et al 1994). Priorities in service 
provisions need to be given to high revenue-generating business customers over others. 
Heightening customer expectation of services prompts service `lead time' from service 
orders or fault reports to service delivery to be shorter. The impossibility to store 
produced services, in other words, the simultaneity of service production and 
consumption tends to lead service providers to deliver services at the exactly time when 
customers want them (Macdonald and Sirianni 1996,3). Thus the requirement for 
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instant or just-in-time service delivery is another source of customisation. Customers 
also demand convenience in service provisions. They want any service they need to be 
provided by making a call or visit, thus leading service operators to provide `one-stop 
services'. The demand for `one-stop services' has become an important impetus for 
customisation. These demands have been supported by `data warehouse' technology 
(e. g. Computer Service Systems in BT), which enables telecoms operators to provide a 
proliferating number of products and services for customers and to meet mass 
customers' various demands (Kelly 1994). 
8.2. Work Rationalisation in BT 
Management strategy to cut costs has led to the drive to rationalise work as well as 
to control work. In order to bring down costs, BT management has deployed new 
technologies and initiated work re-design to bring in more efficient work systems in 
conjunction with radical organisational restructuring. According to an internal document 
(BT. 1993b), BT management systematically measured, analysed and standardised 
various work processed across the company in the early 1990s by using process 
management techniques. Work processes and procedures in the field and CSCs should 
be understood, measured, reviewed, and standardised as a basic step to redesign work 
and to gain control of the processes. These rationalising efforts were aimed at taking 
advantage of economies of scales made available by new technologies. Time and 
motion studies were used to rationalise work, and efforts to identify `best practices' and 
to attempt to diffuse them across the company have subsequently been made. 
Taylorisation of work in call centres have been recently well documented with its 
extensive control and work intensification effects (Fernie and Metcalf. 1998; Taylor and 
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Bain, 1999b). However, it has not fully been explored how far rationalisation has 
actually taken place in call centres. Despite some studies on switching technicians in 
the telecommunications industries (Clark et al. 1988; McLoughlin and Clark. 1994), 
there have been few studies on field technicians' work in network industries. 
Work rationalisation in BT is composed of a number of work restructuring 
processes. It may involve simplification, new division of labour, routinisation, 
automation, computerisation, proactive matching work volume with the number of 
workers, and the adoption of virtual conveyor technologies. We now need to look at 
how rationalisation has taken place in the field and customer services functions. Then 
we will discuss the consequences of work rationalisation. 
8.2.1. Rationalisation On the Access Side 
The technical work that field technicians were doing possessed the strong elements 
of craft work. Most of the work was performed manually with some help via automated 
or sophisticated equipment. Traditionally, field technicians' work was featured by the 
following factors: mobility, geographic dispersion and unpredictability, of the place to 
work; different travel times from one place to another; various kinds of job; varying 
degrees of skill requirements and demarcations among technicians; and variant work 
procedures and methods among field technicians. These factors had prevented the 
technical work from being properly controlled, automated or easily rationalised, and led 
field technicians to retain a strong craft nature. In BT management's eyes these were 
barriers to a more efficient use of the workforce in the field and over time therefore 
incurred too many costs. 
Despite these constraints, installations and fault repairs in the field have been 
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rationalised in a number of ways: standardisation of work time; standardisation of work 
processes and procedures; the separation of core activities from support ones; proactive 
matching of work load with the workforce in a certain geographical patch; and most 
importantly the adoption of a virtual conveyor technology. These various ways of work 
rationalisation have been undertaken via cost minimisation as well as efficiency 
improvements. 
Work Standardisation 
BT utilised `motion and time study' through the `Field Effectiveness and 
Continuous Improvement Programme' in 1992 in order to standardise work time for 
installations and fault repairs (BT 1993a). In the programme, field technicians were 
encouraged to observe how much time their colleagues spent on installations and fault 
repairs and what sort of problems they encountered. BT management then set a 
standard time, `Quality Task Time (QTT)' for each job, within which 80 per cent of 
observed field technicians were expected to complete their respective jobs. The 
standardisation of working time for each job simplified job scheduling task of the 
controls. 
Reflecting increased variations in organisational structure and control functions 
among districts until 1990, work procedures and processes have shown disparities 
between districts (BT 1990a; NCU. Jan. 1990). Although there were standard work 
processes or procedures in ISIS Documents, there was little emphasis on requirements 
to conform to those. Then the standardisations of work procedures and processes started 
in the field from around 1993 - 4. Management developed a `production management' 
approach in order to organise the processes. The methods and procedures of provisions, 
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maintenance, and fault repairs were rigorously standardised by Field Effectiveness of 
Quality (FEQ). This provided `the chapters and verse' on how field technicians would 
do everything in the form of flow charts and diagrams (BT 1994b 50; 1994c: 66; 1994d: 
59). They have also tried to secure a uniform quality of work and consistent work 
results by introducing the factory concept. They tried to establish and run a `factory 
process' with better production management and control, and a responsive system for 
matching resource and demand by identifying the key production lines in terms of 
volume and unit costs, setting standard procedures and measures to control the 
processes effectively (BT 1995b). These procedures were intended to ensure a common 
approach to field operations. The standard procedures and working practices were 
defined and management has monitored whether field technicians follow the procedures 
and practices in a number of ways. 8 They also tried to identify a `best practice' out of all 
the diverse practices put together and they have then sought to make everybody in that 
work area follow this best practice so that the same result could be delivered. However, 
according to the interviews with managers, such standardisation has not necessarily 
worked as originally intended because of local customs and practices and other local 
factors that made the application of standardised processes and procedures inapplicable. 
The rigidity arising from standardised work procedures and practices may suffocate a 
small discretion necessary in order to take into account local conditions. 
The project `Framework 2000' was designed to standardise or rationalise work 
Processes in the network to counter these local variations and extend `best practice' by 
8. BT management has used a number of monitoring methods to make sure that all field 
technicians observe the procedures and working practices. Those methods are quality checks by 
line managers, monitoring performance data covering quality and effectiveness, later 
independent quality check by auditors, and focus groups for monitoring fault volume by type 
and location (BT. 1994b). 
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building on `Centres of Excellence' in each of the functional areas (Network BT Feb. 
1998). The project sought to identify best practice in one part of the organisation and to 
get the rest of the organisation to follow this. Though the diffusion of best practice is 
neither always successful nor uniform, more and more work methods and processes 
have actually been standardised. BT internal audit reports confirmed that standardised 
work processes and procedures were followed by field technicians fairly well, despite 
some minor problems (BT 1997d). These efforts to standardise work processes and 
procedures have been facilitated to a certain extent by the consolidation of zones and 
work sites which were responsible for the access network. The standardisation of work 
laid down the basis for introducing the Work Manager (WM). 
Separation of Supporting Functions from Core Ones 
According to a BT document, field technicians have only been fully effective for 50 
per cent of the time (BT 1992). That is, the other 50 percent of their time had been spent 
on doing routine administrative work or support activities or solving problems. Support 
activities such as administrative work, vehicle-related work, and stores were separated 
from core activities such as installations and repairs. Field Support Offices (later Field 
Performance Offices) were created to absorb these support activities (BT 1994e; BT 
1996a). The offices were required to ensure that all stocks, tools and equipment should 
be supplied on time so that field technicians can concentrate on their jobs. The offices 
are supposed to support Field Managers (FMs) by undertaking administrative work, 
quality checks and data analysis, and keeping stocks, material and vehicles. FMs are 
supposed to spend 80 per cent of their time in the field to support field technicians. As a 
result field technicians were encouraged to concentrate on their core activities and 
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therefore to increase effective time, the actual working time. They have now been 
exempt from performing administrative task such as filling in work sheets or work logs, 
or doing support activities. In around 1993 BT already introduced `Garaging at Home', 
a practice which involves field technicians taking their cars to their home in the evening 
and going to work straight from home in the morning. `Garaging at Home' has 
increased the effective working time through saving time for field technicians in going 
to the depot to pick up vans in the morning and to park them back at the depot in the 
evening. 
Matching of Work Volume with Human Resource 
In relation to work rationalisation, what is also important were the endeavours of 
management to proactively match work volume with the number of the workforce, 
normally called `resource'. The difficulties for BT management in resourcing the 
workforce have been the uneven demands for provisions and fault repairs, the 
shortening lead time for service delivery and tight staffing levels. Demands for 
installations and fault repairs have also been uneven, depending on weather, season and 
geographies. Without a proactive effort to match demands and resource, the situation 
would be that many technicians are idle at some periods or in some localities, or 
alternatively too few technicians clear faults in winter or in other localities. The 
following two major ways in which the problems can be tackled were found: the 
enlargement of the geographical patch for which each control is responsible; and the 
establishment of `Resource Management' team. In the past each group of field 
technicians looked after their relatively small geographical patch, for instance, the town 
or city, often close to where they lived. There was imbalance in work volume among 
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localities. To match demands and resource, the geographical areas field technicians 
have responsibility for were enlarged. In larger geographical areas the number of 
service orders or faults reported are likely to be less uneven than in smaller patches, 
which could ease any strains arising from uneven work volume. The establishment of 
`Resource Management' teams, separate from line management, was designed to make 
sure that they deliver `resource` (the number of workers) in the right numbers, at the 
right time and in the right location. Previously, line managers used to control their own 
people. Resource Management teams now have their own national structure in each 
functional area such as the access network. For the average number of installations or 
faults reported, they decide how many technicians are needed in that part of the zone or 
unit at any time on any day. They then decide how many people are needed to do 
overtime or to go on training courses or annual leave and how many contractors are 
needed to sort out work backlogs, taking into account tight budgets. When an 
emergency happens such as flood or gale, Resource Management teams decide how 
many field technicians in one locality need to be sent to the other affected by the 
emergency. Thus in the face of uncertain or uneven demands for services, Resource 
Management teams have been able to maintain a relatively responsive system for 
matching resource and demands for work within given budgets. 
Work Scheduling Technology 
In around 1990 BT management introduced a new technique of job allocations and 
job closures by `Field Distribution Officers (FDOs)' relying on voice mail functions. 
This voice mail system allowed FDOs more control of job allocation by giving them 
ability to place details of each job on the system. Field technicians lost their control of 
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job scheduling with the introduction of the job scheduling and allocating system via 
voice mail and FDOs. The new job scheduling system reduced time lost, while waiting 
on an engaged line to the controls for the next job, and allowed FDOs to serve more 
than one field technician at the same time. 
BT management has developed the job scheduling technique, combining with work 
rationalisation described above, into the Work Manager (WM), an automatic job 
allocation and scheduling system, which is aimed primarily at supporting provisions, 
maintenance and repairs on the access network (BT 1996b). The WM is basically a 
`virtual conveyor-belt' based on computer systems. Based on the information provided 
on CSS, the WM is able to identify the kind of the job, the skill needed to complete the 
job, the commitment time and priority of the job, and the estimated travel time to go to 
the job. Using a set of algorithms to match a job detail with the most appropriate 
technician and taking into account the current location of the technician, the job is 
allocated to the field technician (BT 1992). Field technicians receive their jobs from, 
and report completion of them to, the WM on a one job at a time basis via a 
sophisticated hand-held terminal. Immediately after the field technician reports the 
completion of his current job, the system looks at his location, identifies the highest 
priority job nearest to him which matches his skills, and allocates the job to him. The 
WM is also able to prioritise each job depending on whether the line is a residential line, 
a business line or a business line in `Total Care'. 
However, the WM did not work very well to start with and got a very bad press 
internally among field technicians and line managers alike. The initial version of the 
WM often led field technicians to bypass neighbouring jobs for remote jobs and failing 
to match jobs with technicians possessing the required skills. It needed a lot of manual 
180 
intervention referred to as `hard-pinning' for changes in job priority or other changes or 
because field technicians were not fully multi-skilled. The WM has been upgraded into 
more sophisticated versions which have improved functions. The new WM with 
`dynamic scheduling' ability employs an artificial intelligence technique which can 
generate long-term job assignment schedules up to four days in advance that minimise 
travel time, maximise contingency and set priorities (BT 1999a). The WM has brought 
about further work rationalisation via work scheduling technique. The new version of 
the WM appears to nearly realise Just-In-Time principles in field environment to a 
certain extent. 
8.2.2. Rationalisation On the Clerical Side 
Though work organisation in call centres has been much researched with the issues 
centring around control being hotly debated recently, the rationalisation of work in call 
centres has not been the subject of detailed investigation. Work on the clerical side, 
particularly in CSCs has largely been divided into two kinds of job: dealing with 
customers via the phone; and administrative work which processes orders, faults, billing 
and engaging in other clerical support. Rationalisation of clerical work in BT involves 
transforming these two kinds of jobs in order to make them efficient and simple and to 
help by better matching resources and demands. Work has been rationalised on the 
clerical side by BT management with the great help of new technologies in order to 
reduce costs. Staff working in CSCs have been called Customer Service Advisors and 
staff in NI, OA and Telemarketing have been called operators or Sales Advisors. Here 
we will refer to them as Customer Service Representatives (CSRs). 
Computerisation of Administrative Work 
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Administrative work in the office, associated with processing service orders, faults, 
billing and mails, and other clerical support duties, was done manually until the early 
1980s. There were customers' files at hand to refer to for information, or to add new 
information to. Much routine clerical work such as filing customer information and 
sending reminder mails to customers, was done by Clerical Assistants (CAs). With the 
introduction of a computer system in the early 1980s clerical functions such as storage 
of customer information, billing, recording service orders and faults and transferring 
them to field technicians were computerised and automated. However it was difficult to 
link the computer system to other systems. The database it established could not be 
relied on easily and instantly when new services were ordered, and sales or billing 
enquiries were made. 
It was not until CSS (Customer Services System) was introduced in 1989 that the 
rationalisation of administrative work was further progressed. The CSS, an integrated 
computer system has a vast customer database whereby it supports BT's customer 
service operations. It also provides immediate access to customer information about 
services, orders, repairs and billing details as well as to product information. This 
enables CSRs to handle large volume of service orders, fault reports and enquiries via 
the phone. Not only did CSS rationalise administrative work associated with order 
handling, repairs, customer information and product information, but it also absorbed 
much of the customer interface work which had been done in many different parts of the 
organisation. As a result of this rationalisation following the establishment of CSS, 
much administrative work of clerical functions has greatly been diminished or 
simplified. 
As soon as a customer comes on-line, the customer's phone number, account 
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number, name and address automatically turn up on the screen by the screen-popping 
function. Then the system prompts some questions for CSRs to ask the customer, 
depending on the kind of customer's demand for service. Thus much clerical or 
administrative work has been simplified and reduced through computerisation and 
automation. That is why a majority of CAs have disappeared in CSCs and other 
functions. The number of CAs has decreased from 12,613 in 1985 to 10,228 in 1990 to 
2,674 in 1998. The computerisation has relieved COs of administrative tasks, and 
enabled them to concentrate on dealing with customers on the phone. 
Standardisation of Service Work 
With regard to handling customers, a number of different aspects or processes 
would appear to have been standardised on the clerical side: standardisation of scripts; 
call handling time (CHT); and call waiting time (PCA). First of all, BT has used very 
simple, rountinised phrases for each customer contact in CSCs, NI, OA or 
Telemarketing Centres. The phrases are called `scripts' and appear in printed form on 
paper or an on-screen template form. The scripts have been used to instruct CSRs on 
how to treat customers, to sell services and to answer customers' questions so that 
customers may be satisfied with the services. The phrases include such things as how to 
make caring responses, how to empathise with customers and other defusing skills when 
customers complain, how to use the right words and how to avoid using wrong words 
(BT 1995c). How effectively CSRs use these phrases, is monitored very closely as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
Another important aspect of the standardisation of CSRs' work has been to set and 
monitor CHT. which refers to the average time spent on taking a call, and `Percentage 
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of Calls Answered in 15 seconds' (PCA). `CHT' should be short as far as CSRs can 
provide quality of service for customers. HelpDesks in CSCs which deal with routine 
calls are allowed to spend 260-80 seconds per call as CHT, while CASs (Customer 
Account Services) in CSCs, which normally deal with complex work and high volume 
residential customers, are allowed to spend more time on calls. The extent of work 
standardisation is different between HelpDesks and CASs within CSCs. CHT is one of 
the main indices whereby CSRs and their sites are assesses in terms of their 
performance. Other important standardisation associated with work time is PCA. All 
calls from customers should be answered within 15 seconds. Though it is one of the 
important indices adopted for checking quality of service by Oftel, it is likely to drive 
CSRs to carry on taking calls without a short break. However, CHT and PCA were not 
enforced until customer service functions were consolidated into separate centres and 
CTI (Computer Telephone Integration) system was introduced into centres in the early 
1990s. 
Matching of Work Volume with Human Resources 
Another preconditional element of rationalisation if the CTI was to be introduced 
was to set up separate CSCs. Until the late 1980s each district had its own customer 
service functions such as answering enquiries, billing, sales, and fault reception 
separately. Customers who wanted to order new services, to enquire billing, and to 
report faults had to call a local number and were then put through by an operator to the 
relevant department. At the end of the 1980s BT began to consolidate customer service 
functions, which had been scattered in each city or town, into 60 relatively large 
Customer Reception Centres and 40 Fault Reception Centres. This consolidation of the 
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functions into separate dedicated centres made it possible to match demands for such 
services and the number of people working, in a locality or across the country in a more 
predictable way. BT has been able to utilise CSRs more efficiently by correctly 
matching demands with human resource. In order to use CSRs or operators more 
efficiently, separate Resource Management teams were also created. Their job is to 
calculate and estimate call volume on an hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis and 
resource the number of people by combining full-time staff, part-time people, and 
agency workers. Their main priority has been how to use people more effectively, 
keeping down labour costs, allowing line managers to concentrate on getting their 
people to work more and to provide quality of service for customers. 
Taylorisation 
The most important development in influencing work rationalisation on the clerical 
side was the introduction of the Automatic Call Distribution system (later CTI - 
Computer Telephony Integration) into CSCs in 1992. The ACD allowed customers 
calls to be evenly distributed among CSRs in CSCs first, and then among centres 
nationally. It is, therefore, possible to optimise the number of people taking calls to the 
size of demand not just on a region level but also on a national level. Whenever a CSR 
finishes a call from a customer, the next call is automatically delivered to the CSR 
without a slack time. Calls keep being fed to the CSR like yet-to-be-assembled parts of 
vehicles, which keep coming through a conveyor belt in a auto factory. CSRs have to 
expect or associate endlessly coming calls in their mind as soon as they finish a call. 
That is why CSRs or operators are to have `an assembly line' in the head (Taylor and 
Bain 1999b). We can call it `a virtual conveyor belt' in the information age. Another 
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ability of the CTI system to monitor all calls in real time or monitor daily, weekly, 
monthly performance of each CSR, has significant potential for intensive control as 
noted in the previous chapter. The ability of the CTI system to switch customer calls 
from one place to another with little cost has had important implications for the 
restructuring of the organisation and work in BT. The CTI system has provided the 
means, of massive relocation of many buildings away from London, of establishing 
CSCs in green field sites. It has also enabled BT management to link all CSCs together 
like a virtual national centre and reroute call traffics to CSCs and thereby optimise the 
number of the workforce to work volume. 
Overall, work rationalisation can be simplified as the follow table. 
Table 8 -1 Rationalisation of service work in RT 
On the access side On the clerical side 
virtual conveyor Work Manager (work scheduling) Computer Telephone Integration 
belt Hand-held Terminal (CTI) 
standardisation/ QTT (Quality Task Time) for CHT (Call Handling Time), 
routinsation each job, rationalisation of PCA (% of calls taken within 
work processes & procedures, 15 seconds) 
identification and diffusion of scripts for various occasions 
best practice 
computerisation HHT, local network map, computerisation of support & 
repair history administrative work, 
database on customers 
core vs non-core separation of core work from concentration on dealing with 
activities support work customers via phone 
increase in garaging at home, giving every monitoring effective time 
effective time support to technicians 
matching of reorganisation of activities on a reorganisation of activities on 
resource with wider geographical area national basis 
work volume separate resource management separate resource management 
8.2.3. Consequences of Work Rationalisation 
BT has made full use of economies of scale made available by new technologies in 
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order to rationalise work in the field and CSCs. Work rationalisation has, above all, 
been inspired by cost considerations. Work rationalisation in BT has had profound 
consequences for work control, JIT principles, productivity, staffing, organisational 
structure, skilling, the location of operations and employees' well-being over the years. 
First of all, BT was able to make the labour process more transparent through the 
rationalisation of work. This has given BT management more knowledge of work 
processes and has enabled BT management to identify where and how they can improve 
levels of efficiency. BT management has also been able to exercise more control over 
work, often in `hard' forms as shown in the previous chapter, by using this knowledge. 
Therefore, BT management has been able to reduce elements of craft control and self- 
direction that had significantly remained in the field, and less significantly in clerical 
work. 
The rationalisation of work, together with effort to proactively meet customers' 
demands with the least possible number of workers, has also led to a kind of `lean 
service' provision system: by rationalising or often automating work processes and 
procedures; by getting rid of non-core activities and concentrating on core businesses; 
and by removing time buffer and human resource buffer. Job prioritisation, 
appointments for services or commitment time via the WM has led to a realisation of 
Just-In-Time (JIT) principles in the access environment, succinctly expressed in the 
following phrase much quoted within BT, "Getting the job right first time, every time 
and on time" (NetworkBT Dec. 1998). JIT provision of service is realised and ensured 
in the clerical environment through a combination of PCA and CTI. 
Thirdly, rationalisation, coupled with intensive control, has improved productivity 
in the field and CSCs. Standardisation of time and work processes in the field before 
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the introduction of the WM was reported to have increased efficiency by 20 percent (BT 
1993b). Indirectly, the reduction in the number of TIIA technicians, who are mostly 
field technicians, from 48,000 in 1990 to 21,000 in 1998, to a certain extent, reflects the 
increase in productivity. Other factors contributing to productivity include multi- 
skilling, the overall upgrade of networks through cable upgrading and digitalisation, and 
the subsequent reduction in maintenance and repair requirement. Even though the 
factors above were taken into account, it is true that work rationalisation is one 
important factor which has contributed to productivity improvement. Work 
rationalisation in CSCs has played a part of improving productivity reflected in Table 7 
- 2. The CTI system is believed to have brought about a big reduction in CHT and an 
improvement in PCA from 80 percent within 20 seconds to 90 percent within 15 
seconds (Espicom Business Communications 1997: 34). The greatly reduced number of 
CAs from 10,228 in 1990 to 2,674 in 1998 also testifies the extent of improved 
efficiency via computerisation and work rationalisation. 
Fourthly, the implications of work rationalisation for skilling are complex. Field 
technicians are definitely deskilled in Braverman's sense because work scheduling was 
taken away from them and given to controls. The elements of craft control have been 
reduced. Contrary to this deskilling, field technicians are multi-skilled to deal with 
various tasks such as installations in customers' premises and repairs of overhead cables 
and underground cables. The actual execution of installations and repairs has not 
changed much. CSRs are also deskilled because self-directed work in the past was 
Taylorised and under tight management control. However, they have acquired some 
computer skills and multi-skills through the integration of billing and sales. 
Lastly, employees' responses to work rationalisation have been largely negative. 
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There have been few perceivable benefits for workers. This is probably because work 
rationalisation has been driven by cost reduction strategies and accompanied by `hard 
control'. Field technicians' hostility towards the WM is expressed in the nicknames of 
WM or the handheld terminals. They are called the `Work Mangler' or `Brick' in a 
negative, contemptuous sense respectively. Automation of work scheduling via the 
WM has got rid of the human touch between the controls and the field. The CTI system 
has put CSRs or operators under real time surveillance discussed earlier. This has 
caused mounting stress for CSRs. Despite significant improvements in employees' 
morale and job satisfaction reported in annual CARE Surveys conducted by BT, the 
union surveys have painted a more gloomy picture of CSCs (CWU 1997; CWU 
Midlands Regional Committee 1998; CWU Home Counties 1998). 
8.3. Mass customisation in BT 
BT's customer-focus strategies were, above all, implemented via its frequent 
reorganisation exercises. The most significant reorganisation, the `Project Sovereign' in 
1991, transformed BT from a geographically-based organisation to a customer-centred 
one. Before the project all service activities had been carried out at the district level. 
With the project BT separated businesses for business customers from those for 
residential customers and field operations from the management of core networks. 
Different priorities were given to each segment of customers so that BT could provide 
services for homogeneous groups of customers. 
In 1991 a New Customers' Charter that declared that BT would provide quality of 
service for customers was announced. Customer Service Guarantee Schemes were 
introduced at the same time (FT 14 Nov. 1991; 20 Sep. 1994). Any failure to provide 
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installation or repair services by promised deadlines would lead to a claim for 
guaranteed compensation by the customer concerned. Business customers would receive 
an even higher level of compensation for the potential loss that delayed services might 
incur to them. The proclaimed customer service guarantee schemes tended to have the 
strong effect of enforcing field technicians to keep to their commitment time for 
installations or repairs. At the same time thousands of quality improvement projects 
were launched and targets were set for each department (FT 27 March 1991). Customer 
calls were not allowed to get lost or to be shunted endlessly from one department to 
another. 
Customisation reflects the relational aspects of work towards customers, while 
work rationalisation focuses on work tasks (Frenkel et al. 1999). The guarantee schemes 
above have allowed customers to control and supervise workers in conjunction with 
management. This alliance between management and customers under management 
initiatives is often observed as a mechanism of controlling work and customer relations 
elsewhere (Leidner 1996,38; Frenkel et al. 1999,202). Customisation has been made 
with regard to prioritisation, shortened lead time, customer convenience and punctuality. 
Customisation has functioned as an effective management ideology for changing a 
producer-centred ethos into customer-oriented ones and thereby providing legitimisation 
for the reform of working practices and more control over work. BT management is 
able to achieve other objectives than giving customers more satisfaction through 
customisation. Customisation has often been interwoven with work rationalisation or 
work control, and become one important aspect of work organisation. 
In the processes of customisation new technologies such as the WM in the field 
and CSS in CSCs have been essential. These technologies have laid the basis on which 
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customisation can be made. The WM in the field has served customisation through job 
prioritisation, while CSS in CSCs has served customisation through instant, one-stop 
services. 
8.3.1. Customisation On the Access Side 
Service Control via Customers 
Mass customisation in the field can be evidenced with reference to shortened lead 
time, punctuality of service delivery, and the priority given to business customers. In 
addition to the Customer Service Guarantee Schemes, two different kinds of service 
control systems have been introduced. Since the early 1990s BT has run feedback 
systems whereby customers who have just had dealings with BT are surveyed by card or 
telephone questionnaires (Johnson and Jakeman 1997,50-2). Survey cards, in which 
about 10 questions were asked of the customer about the level of satisfaction with 
service order or fault report process, punctuality, and service delivery, were used for 
large customers after a repair or an installation. BT's Event Driven Customer Service 
Measure (EDCSM) surveyed 11,000 customers a year via telephone questionnaires who 
have had recent transactions with BT. A number of questions are asked of the customer 
concerning whether the customer is satisfied with quality of service, lead time, 
punctuality and the degree of employees' courtesy are asked. These feedback control 
systems are designed to use customers to control and supervise technicians' work in 
addition to other means of management control. However, the feedback service control 
systems have not been run strictly but reflected in BT policies towards customers. 
Prioritisation and Shortened Lead Time 
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Customisation in the field involves differentiating between customers, which means 
that it gives business customers priorities in terms of repair fault services. BT has 
introduced a number of options for maintenance or repair services which require 
different charges. Business customers have to pay for more rental charges (£ 80) than 
residential customers (f 22.50) do. In return for that, business customers are given a 
priority above residential customers in fault repair services. `Standard Care' guarantees 
fault repair with no additional charge in 5 hours (4 hours from 1999) for business 
customer and 9 hours for residential customers. Other options such as `Prompt Care', 
`Total Care', or `Customer Care' are mostly reserved for business customers, and 
provide a quicker clearance of faults for subscribers than for others when faults occur to 
the customer (Piemonte 1994: 107). The WM has enabled BT management to prioritise 
repair jobs and to schedule work of field technicians, depending on priorities as well as 
efficiency. This prioritisation may, to a certain extent, dampen efficiency, but it also 
increases business customers' satisfaction. 
To compete against new operators, BT management decided to shorten the lead 
time of services for installations and repairs in around 1991. Until 1991 fault clearance 
was normally supposed to take two working days. The proportion of fault repairs 
within two days increased from 74.3% in 1986 to 99.0 - 99.5% in 1991. Since around 
1991 field technicians have been required to clear faults for business customers and 
residential customers within new targets of five hours and nine hours after report. The 
percentages of faults cleared in the new target time or by successful appointment were 
expected to be 86% for residential customers and 84% for business customers in 1998 
(NetworkBT May 1998). Installations have been expected to take six working days for 
business customers and eight working days for residential customers. The percentage of 
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installations to be completed within the target days for business customers and 
residential customers increased from 28.4% and 18.0% in 1986 to 78.0% and 88% in 
1992 respectively. The respective percentages of installations completed within the 
appointed date increased from 91% and 95% in 1992 to 97.3% and 97.4% in 1998 for 
business customers and residential customers (Carrel et al. 1993: 59; Oftel Feb. 1999). 
Punctuality and Convenience 
For the punctual delivery of services, BT has operated `Jeopardy Management' in 
the field. Jeopardy Management begins to operate, when it becomes clear that the 
technician who is supposed to take a job, cannot keep to the committed time agreed 
with the customer for installation or repair for any reason. Then, the `controls' which 
are in charge of job scheduling via the WM, become alert and check why the technician 
cannot take the job, whist identifying another alternative technician available. The job 
`in jeopardy' is given priority. So whilst the available technician has to take the job, the 
job can be quite distant from his current location. Despite the fact that the efficiency of 
field technicians' work may clearly decline due to `Jeopardy Management', keeping to 
the commitment made comes first because customers may judge BT's reliability and 
expediency of service provision from it. 
To deal with service to customers whenever they want, BT has introduced a 
weekend service and a late hour service for installations and fault repairs. In the past, 
field technicians used to work 9.00 am-6.00 pm from Monday to Friday. However 
some customers have wanted BT to provide services at evening or weekends when they 
stay at home. To meet such requirements, BT has had to introduce weekend and late 
hour work in the field. These flexible working hours will be discussed in more detail in 
193 
the next chapter. Customers are to be provided with services at the time when they 
want, which includes weekend and late hours. 
Customisation through service control by customers, prioritisation, shortened lead 
times, punctuality and customers' convenience in the field have all had significant 
impacts on field technicians. Field technicians' jobs have become more demanding and 
difficult because they are required to complete a job within the time set, to keep the 
committed time arranged with the customer and to work un-social hours. Combined 
with the introduction of the WM, the requirements for shortened lead times, 
prioritisation, punctuality and customer convenience have made field technicians less 
flexible and autonomous, and more passive in terms of job scheduling, how much time 
they spend on a job, and how they undertake jobs. Significant cuts in field technicians' 
jobs since 1992 have made the situation worse with all technicians becoming 
increasingly busy. Installations and repairs have to be more effectively carried out in 
order to keep to given commitment time. 
8.3.2. Customisation On the Clerical Side 
Convenience 
Customisation in CSCs has much to do with the convenience with which customers 
are provided with information or services, which is quite different from that in the field. 
In the past, information search for customers and products took time and customers had 
to wait accordingly. The number of services and products has proliferated over the years 
and customer information has become a huge database. The big step taken to improve 
and customise services was via the introduction of CSS in around 1989. It has not only 
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integrated different computer systems and all databases scattered around them into one 
single system and a database but it has also made the information retained instantly 
available for various customers' enquiries, service orders, and fault reports. The 
database system built in CSS is regarded as laying the basis for customisation (Kelly 
1994,20,81: Pine 1993,172- 9; Adler 1997: Whitehead 1999). CSS retains all 
customer information, and products and service information necessary to provide 
various services for customers in CSCs. When a customer call is taken by a CSR, the 
screen-popping function of CTI enables customer's detailed information to be displayed 
on the screen. The CSR can then easily identify the customer's name, address, bills, 
fault history, services being used by the customer and all other relevant information. 
CSS has led both sales and billing functions to become integrated and carried out by the 
same CSRs. CSRs were multi-skilled in billing and sales. With the customisation of 
service delivery and CSRs' multi-skilling, their jobs have become more demanding but 
have not been repetitive or boring because they have to deal with customers with a 
variety of demands. Customers can be provided with the instant services they want in 
one call. The realisation of `one stop service' is an important aspect of customisation at 
CSCs in terms of the convenience, personalisation, and immediacy of services. 
Other measures adopted to provide customers with convenience include extending 
working hours to 12 hours in 17 CSCs and to 24 hours in one CSC in 1997, leading to 
improvements in PCA. To cover weekend working and late night working BT 
introduced part-timers and agency staff into CSCs. Customisation through extended 
working hours will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Differentiation 
A kind of stratification in CSCs has emerged to address the specific needs of 
different segments of customers and different kinds of services. CSCs were divided for 
residential customers and for business customers in 1991. There were a gradual 
separation between regular CSRs and agency staff dealing with `0800' simple calls in 
CSCs before 1998. In 1998 `150' and `151' CSCs were reorganised into either 
`Customer Account Service' (CAS) or `Helpdesk'. By differentiating the customer base 
into groups with similar requirements, for instance, information intensive customers, 
home movers and teenagers, or pensioners, the reorganisation of CSCs was designed to 
bring about differentiated customisation among customer segments and to generate 
maximum revenues to BT (BT Dec. 1997). CAS work is supposed to deal with calls 
which require detailed solutions to problems or complex needs such as home movers, 
new service provisions and higher level sales. CAS work is geared up for high billing 
segments of residential customers. Helpdesk work is perceived to provide basic support 
for bills, fault reports, and consumer products, to take calls forwarded from Call 
Steering System and to involve some sales duties. Helpdesk work is designed to cover 
medium-level billing segment of residential customers. All operator assistant calls, 
directory enquiries calls and other simple calls and enquiries such as reading billing or 
faults go to Transaction Services, which is supposed to cover the low billing residential 
customer segment. Work in CAS involves a bit more discretion for CSRs to deal with 
complex calls, while work in HelpDesk has become a bit simpler and shorter. 
Transaction service work has remained very simple, straightforward and repetitive. CAS 
work has no official CHT, while CHT for HelpDesk has been shortened to 260 seconds. 
The relative weight of sales in CAS work has become bigger and CSRs in CAS are 
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required to sell products more actively as well as to deal with customers' various 
services. The element of sales work in CAS not only involves more stress but also 
requires more creativity, more social skills and higher-order contextual and theoretical 
knowledge (Frenkel et al 1999,91-2). CAS work, HelpDesk work and Transaction 
services work lie in a continuum between more customisation and standardisation. 
This differentiation tends to polarise skills between more skilled CSRs in CAS, less 
skilled CSRs in HelpDesk and unskilled CSRs in Transaction services. Customer calls 
to `150' CSCs are connected to a `Call Steering System' in which customers are given 4 
options: press 1 for billing; press 2 for faults; press 3 for sales; and press 4 for all 
others. Through the System, calls are divided into CAS, HelpDesk and Transaction 
Services. 
Customisation through the immediate provision of services on a one-stop basis in 
CSCs has led CSRs to be multi-skilled so as to deal with every type of calls. 
Customisation has also brought about extended working hours and improvements in 
PCA. Customisation via differentiation among customer segments in CSCs has 
increased differences in work between CAS and Helpdesk. The development of the 
differentiation between CAS, HelpDesk and Transaction services has led to skill 
polarisation among CSRs and may become a potential basis for separating grades into 
two, which will eventually lead to different grades with differing payments, despite the 
strong opposition of the union (BT 1997e). The increased weight of sales in CAS has 
caused more stress to CSRs and changed the nature of CSRs' work away from passive 
service work towards sales work. Another unexpected development in CSCs that 
customisation has given rise to is the gradual replacement of regular CSRs by agency or 
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part-time staff. The skill is polarised, especially between full-time CSRs and part-time 
CSRs or agency workers, depending upon their employment status in BT. This form of 
skill polarisation has parallels with the wider processes between occupations identified 
by writers such as Gallie (1991) and de Witte and Stejin (2000) but is of a more `micro' 
form, taking place within a single occupation. 
As extended hours required for customisation in CSCs were strongly opposed by 
the union and full-time CSRs, BT has introduced part-timers and agency workers 
without having to pay for premium rate or at lower rates. Once they were introduced, 
the extension of working hours has led to a growing proportion of them out of the total 
workforce. 
8.3.3. Consequences of Customisation 
Overall, customisation has been made possible through prioritisation, shortened 
lead time, punctuality, one-stop services, differentiation or enhanced convenience. 
Shortened lead time, punctual service delivery and other measures enhancing 
customers' convenience have been contributory to JIT service delivery. Through 
customisation customers are now able to get what they want from BT at a time suitable 
to them. BT management has also been able to achieve the reform of working practices 
and create customer-friendly service delivery arrangements. However, customisation in 
the field and CSCs tends to make service work more demanding and stressful and often 
involves significant changes in the nature of work and grading. It has brought few 
tangible benefits to field technicians and CSRs in terms of autonomy, workload, 
working hours and job satisfaction. This reflects the fact that customisation is part of a 
managerial agenda which legitimates management-initiated reforms. However, 
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employees gain little except multi-skilling in CSCs but find increasing variations or 
differences among themselves. 
The progress in customisation of service provision in BT has been made by BT 
management's customer-focus strategies. Although there are some occasions where 
customized service provisions may dampen efficiency, customisation has led to little 
job-enhancement for workers but has by and large gone along with work rationalisation. 
That is, customisation has not been achieved through job-enhancement or a `high road' 
approach. This means that customer-focus strategies do not necessarily lead to job 
enhancement outcomes. Service work in the field and CSCs has simultaneously been 
rationalised and customised. These developments are what we can call `customised 
rationalisation', a new phenomenon differing from past service delivery systems in BT. 
In short, the new picture of work systems, emerging from a simultaneous progress 
towards work rationalisation and customisation, is that of a `lean service' system, based 
on JTT service delivery, virtual assembly lines and tight buffer of human resources and 
time. 
8.4. Work Rationalisation in KT 
There has been little tradition of job control or job demarcations in the workplace in 
Korea because there were few horizontal occupation labour markets during the rapid 
industrialisation era. The relatively short period of industrialisation in Korea over the 
1960s-1980s saw the direct import of modem mass production systems without treading 
the path of small production systems. Work rationalisation has often meant the 
upgrading or expansion of industrial production facilities, evoking little resistance from 
the workforce in so far as it is not accompanied by job cuts. 
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There have been some attempts from KT management to rationalise work in the 
field and in customer service functions. The reorganisation of managerial structures 
within KT has just taken into account work redesign, including work rationalisation and 
its implications for efficiency. Work rationalisation has not been made by consistent 
management policies but on an ad hoc basis. In this regard work rationalisation in KT 
has been reactive rather than proactive to environmental changes. Despite less attention 
being paid to work reorganisation in KT, there have been a number of developments in 
computerisation, standardisation, notably in CSCs, fault reception centres, and local 
telecoms centres. Work rationalisation includes a number of reforms in work processes, 
procedures and methods. It involves computerisation, a new division of labour, 
standardisation, rationalisation of various activities of local telecoms centres and the 
partial adoption of automatic job allocation in the field and in customer service 
functions. However, persistent elements of self-direction that have remained, as 
discussed in chapter 7, indicates a limited degree of work rationalisation in KT. 
8.4.1. Rationalisation On the Access Side 
The work that field technicians perform in KT still retains strong `craft elements'. 
Most of work is largely done manually with some help of equipment and some has been 
automated or computerised. Field technicians' work in KT has, above all, been 
characterised by work group arrangement. Four to six work groups composed of four to 
five field technicians are responsible for field operations in a small geographical area of 
their local telecoms centre. Three to four work groups undertake installations and fault 
repairs, while one or two groups carry out rearrangements or renewals of overhead 
cables. Each group in charge of installations and repairs has its own geographical patch 
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within the area. Two or three technicians normally undertake installations, while two 
technicians clear faults. The work group has been flexibly organised into installations or 
repairs, depending on work volume. If too many jobs occur within the patch of the work 
group, technicians in other groups will join the work group to help fix faults or install 
lines. These flexible arrangements within the workgroup and among work groups in the 
local telecoms centre are designed to meet the uneven volume of jobs. Thus the 
deployment of field technicians may be sub-optimised locally but not beyond that level. 
The rapid expansion of the network on a massive scale up until the late 1980s 
brought disorder and mess to the access network, including underground cables and 
`drop wires' from poles to customers' premises. The tasks of realigning or rearranging 
messy drop wires and cables in the access network an urgent priority as part of work 
rationalisation. From the mid-1990s KT management paid their attention to upgrading, 
realignment and rearrangement of cables and drop wires in order to make the local 
network more stable and less faulty. Mostly due to network upgrading and realignment 
of cables and drop wires, KT has been able to reduce the staffing level in local telecoms 
centres. For instance, in a local telecoms centre 32 people used to look after 60,000 lines 
in 1985, while 32 technicians including temporary workers are responsible for 160,000 
lines in 1999. 
Installation jobs are allocated to field technicians twice in the morning and at lunch 
time every day. Repair jobs are allocated in the morning and then whenever faults are 
reported. As jobs are allocated in the morning and at lunch time, work scheduling and 
work pace are largely left to technicians, though work pace depends upon the number of 
jobs occurring in their sub-patches. 
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Automation 
There have been standardised work methods and procedures, for example, how to 
make joints of cables, how to install `drop wires' from poles to customers' premises, or 
how to rearrange messy cables within customers' premises. Every kind of work in the 
field has its own standardised procedures and methods (KT 1999b). Varying situations 
in the field require field technicians to apply standardised work methods and procedures 
more flexibly depending on the situation. There have been few consistent efforts from 
KT management to systematically standardise work processes and procedures and to 
strictly apply them to field operations. 
KT management has partially automated at least two work areas by introducing 
new technologies. A new system called TIMS (Telephone Installation Management 
System) enables KT to install lines without field technicians who go out to the field. 
The TIMS enables clerical staff to connect the already existing line in the house to the 
network by choosing the distribution line and an exchange line and linking them within 
exchange building without asking technicians to go to the field. The TIMS may be very 
useful in Korea where people frequently move home. The proportion of installations by 
TIMS is said to account for 40 - 50 percent of the total number of installations, 
according to the manager in charge of access network management at the headquarters. 
Another new system called SLMOS (Subscriber Line Maintenance and Operation 
System) is a centralised computer system for taking fault reports, testing faulty lines, 
storing data, and analysing fault statistics. Testing of lines and fault receptions, which 
were separately performed manually and locally in the past, are now integrated and 
consolidated on a regional basis. As soon as faults are reported, the testing of the faulty 
lines is undertaken instantly and automatically. Due to SLMOS the former technical 
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nature of line-testing function has become more clerical work-based and integrated into 
a whole process including fault receptions. These two systems have automated and 
rationalised some of field technicians' work and have significantly reduced workload. 
Passive Structure of Matching Work Volume with Resources 
The number of jobs that field technicians undertake is not set or adjusted by KT 
management but determined by the number of jobs which occur at their geographical 
patches or areas. The match of work volume with the number of field technicians may 
be at most sub-optimised at the level of local telecoms centres. There is no mechanism 
to proactively match the average number of jobs with the number of technicians at the 
level of a larger geographical area beyond local telecoms centres or at national level. 
The number of field technicians in the local telecoms centre is, above all, determined by 
the number of telephone lines of each local telecoms centre. Uneven demands for 
installations and fault repairs among local telecoms centres have not been addressed by 
any proactive effort to match work volume and resource on a larger geographical basis. 
Thus the possible local sub-optimisation of the number of technicians compared with 
work volume may be overridden by the unevenness of work volume among local 
telecoms centres. 
This passive system is related to work pace and work scheduling. Apart from the 
committed time or appointments for installations and repairs, and the number of jobs 
occurring in their small patches, how fast or in what order technicians would carry out 
work is up to them. This work system based on local telecoms centres allows field 
technicians to have significant discretion in work scheduling, work pace and work 
methods, while it does not give management much scope for control. It has prevented 
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field technicians' work from being more rationalised. 
Most recently KT has begun piloting RIMS (Repair and Installation Management 
System), whose basic function is to allocate installation and repair jobs to field 
technicians and to receive reports of job closures. The consequences of the national 
rollout of RIMS might be far-reaching for field technicians' work. However, the effects 
of RIMS would be very different from those of Work Manager in BT unless the current 
passive local structure to match work volume to the number of technicians is not 
reorganised into proactive one. 
Work rationalisation on the access side in KT has been made on the basis of the 
existing structure, work group arrangements in local telecoms centres. Overall field 
technicians' work has still retained significant elements of craft control in terms of work 
scheduling, work methods, job allocation and the pace of work. Rationalisation was 
concentrated on realigning or rearranging messy local cables and drop wires rather than 
work processes or procedures. Despite significant developments in automations in 
installations, fault receptions and line testing, the passive system of matching work 
volume with resources has remained intact. 
8.4.2. Rationalisation On the Clerical Side 
Clerical work in KT includes front-desk work and administrative work in local 
telecoms centres and work in CSCs. Various administrative functions have been 
rationalised to a significant extent via computerisation. Customer service functions have 
been gradually rationalised and taylorised. However, work rationalisation on the clerical 
side has been limited by the extent of corporate restructuring in KT. 
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Rationalisation and Computerisation of Administrative Work 
Many administrative or clerical functions in the office have been rationalised as 
computer systems were introduced and upgraded in almost all areas. Much clerical 
support work such as paper work and information processing has been automated with 
the spread of personal computers. Up until the mid-1990s administrative staff had to 
produce a great deal of paper work. Much paper work was merely to inform managers 
of the situation at, or progress in, work but not related to actual revenue-generating 
activities. A significant reduction in the number of, and the simplification of, reports has 
been made as rationalising and de-bureaucratising measures were taken. The 
introduction of an "Electronic Stamp of Approval" arrangements has contributed to the 
removing of much paper work (KT 1992: 369; KT Feb. 1999: 156-7). Nevertheless, 
many manually written reports are still being asked of administrative staff in order to 
report to senior managers. 
Computerisation of various functions and information such as billing, customer 
information, products information, and some management functions has been made (KT 
1992: 359-65). In the past, for instance, four copies of the service order were written 
manually and sent to the relevant departments, when a customer ordered a new line. 
When CSRs at front-desks or in CSCs take orders and type service orders into the 
computer system, now service orders are now processed automatically and printed out 
for field technicians. Despite significant efficiency gains through the computerisation of 
administrative and support work, each system addressed one or two management 
functions and were often not compatible with other systems. These various separate 
systems have not been integrated into one large system, which causes significant 
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inconvenience and inefficiency in undertaking work. In July 1999 the unsuccessful pilot 
of ICIS (Integrated Computerised Information System), equivalent to CSS of BT, 
further delayed the introduction of the integrated system (KTTU 23 July 1999). 
Administrative and support work in local telecoms centres has been rationalised since 
1997 and is being accelerated with the consolidation of local telecoms centres. The 
remaining bureaucratic ways of doing businesses, the lack of linkages among various 
systems, the absence of integrated computerised system and the local structure prevent 
further rationalisation of administrative work. 
Taylorisation 
Important developments have happened in CSCs, and fault reception centres 
regarding work rationalisation. Until the mid-1990s the function of customer services 
provisions via phone was a very small section in each local telecoms centre. The 
function was to take calls from the small area which the local telecoms centre covered 
and remained very passive and relaxed. Consolidations of this function and fault 
reception function into dedicated centres that are equipped with new technologies, has 
led to work rationalisation. Call centre technologies including ACD or CTI system were 
brought into the newly established CSCs and fault reception centres. 
The CTI system tends to bring with them new forms of work reorganisation into 
CSCs and fault reception centres: the use of standardised script; the setting of call 
waiting time and CHT; and the introduction of a virtual conveyor belt technology. 
Above all, CSRs in CSCs are required to use or at least refer to scripts which are 
composed of simple, routinised phrases for several common occasions of service. They 
include how to first greet customers with salutary words, how take to the lead in 
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conversation, how to interpret customers' intentions and to put them into simple words, 
and how to confirm service orders the customer has made (KT CSCs 1999). CSRs are 
also instructed as to how to speak in a clear, cheerful voice in a courteous way at all 
times. The scripts for CSRs have to be used more flexibly for a great variety of 
situations relating to customers enquiries, complaints, and service orders. 
The CTI in CSCs allocates calls to CSRs in a similar way to the conveyor belt 
allocating jobs on car assembly lines. This automatic call allocation on a regional basis 
has taylorised work in customer service functions by controlling work pace, distributing 
calls evenly among CSRs, and thereby reducing time between calls. These technologies 
also have built-in functions which measure and produce CHT, the number of calls 
taken, PCA and other aspects of performance in real time or in statistics form on a daily, 
weekly and monthly basis. KT Management in CSCs has been concerned about the 
number of calls taken and PCAs but not CHT, which is a very important measure for 
work pace control. KT management has not shown much interest in utilising these 
performance measures for control purposes, despite the availability of information on 
individual workers' performance by technologies. Work in CSCs has not been so tight , 
though much work is Taylorised. 
Rationalisation 
Work rationalisation on the clerical side has been fundamentally influenced by the 
degree of corporate reorganisation. More than two thirds of customer service functions 
are still carried out on the face-to-face basis by CSRs at front desks of local telecoms 
centres. CSRs at front-desks undertake some administrative functions and customer 
service functions at the same time. Until front-desks are reorganised and integrated into 
207 
CSCs fully, work rationalisation in customer service functions will have remained 
limited. Front-desks or supporting functions in local telecoms centres accounted for 
more than two thirds of the whole customer service function in 1998 (KT 1999c: 16). 
CSRs working in CSCs numbered 1,780 out of the 5,484 employees undertaking 
customer service functions in 1998 (KT 1998b: 30,33). Thus the extent of work 
rationalisation in customer service functions depends on the degree of the restructuring 
of various functions of local telecoms centres. The local telecoms centres are embedded 
in the local community so that customers usually visit local telecoms centres for service 
orders, fault reports, enquiries, and payment of bills rather than call `100' CSCs. 
Another important reason for the slow rationalisation of front-desks into CSCs is the 
absence of new technologies such as customer information systems. Because of the 
inability of CSCs to answer billing enquires, customers have had to visit local telecoms 
centres. However, customer service functions are being incrementally transferred to 
CSCs. 
Each CSC is organised on a regional basis. The CTI system allocates calls to CSRs 
on a regional basis but not on a national basis. Thanks to this regional structure, 
occurrences of uneven or sudden call volumes among regions cannot be evenly 
distributed or rerouted among CSCs on a national basis. The average call volume which 
largely depends on the hour of the day or the day of the week, is not optimally matched 
by the total number of CSRs at the national level. Rationalisation of administrative 
work in local telecoms centres depends on the extent of the consolidation of local 
telecoms centres. Administrative work is being rationalised with the consolidation of 
local telecoms centres into bigger centres. 
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Work rationalisation on the clerical side has been made through computerisation 
and Taylorisation with the introduction of new computer systems. The extent of 
rationalisation in CSCs and fault reception centres is significant, while work at front- 
desks and administrative work has shown fairly limited rationalisation. The 
rationalisation of front-desk work and administrative work has been limited by the 
structure of local telecoms centres and the absence of customer information systems and 
its progress depends on the degree of corporate restructuring such as the rationalisation 
of local telecoms centres or the consolidation of customer service functions into CSCs 
as well as the deployment of a new customer database system. 
Table 8 -2 Work Rationalisation in KT 
On the access side On the clerical side 
virtual conveyor RIMS is being prepared (not Computer Telephone Integration 
belt launched) (CTI) in CSCs and fault reception 
centres but not front-desks in local 
telecoms centres 
standardisation/ Some standardisation of work PCA (% of calls taken within 9 
routinsation processes and procedures seconds), CHT 
scripts for various occasions 
computerisation TIMs (installations) Administrative or support work 
line testing, fault locations automatic order processing 
increase in some emphasis on 
effective time effective time 
proactive flexible match at local level matching in CSCs at regional 
matching but little matching beyond level but not at national level 
that level 
Overall, the extent of work rationalisation both on the access side and on the 
clerical side has remained limited and uneven among areas. KT management does not 
appear to have shown systematic efforts to rationalise work in the field and in customer 
service functions. The attention of KT management has been paid to realignments and 
rearrangements of cables and wires rather than work rationalisation in the field. Despite 
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Taylorisation in CSCs, the proportion of CSCs out of the whole customer service 
function has remained at about a third. The organisational structure is still based on 
local telecoms centres and KT has not been able to proactively match uneven work 
volume with the number of workers. In this regard the degree of work rationalisation is 
closely associated with corporate restructuring. This limited degree of work 
rationalisation and relatively loose control over performance has not caused great 
changes to employees' working life. However, KT management has recently initiated 
changes in local structure and with them rationalisation of work. 
B. S. Mass Customisation in KT 
KT's basic organisational structure has essentially remained functional on the basis 
of local telecoms centres, eclectically incorporating some customer-centred functions. 
The current ongoing consolidation of local telecoms centres is not designed to shift 
away from the functional, local structure to a customer-centred one. Organisational 
structures that can clearly address the specific demands of various segments of 
customers have not been well developed in KT. The functional, local structure has 
revealed a significant degree of inertia in spite of KT management commitments to shift 
towards a customer-centred organisation (KT Mar. 1997: 40; KT 1999c: 6). 
However, as discussed in chapter 7, the project FOCUS has been relatively 
successfully in addressing the need for culture changes among front-line employees, 
thereby bringing about a customer-care climate. In May 1999 KT announced `Customer 
Service Charter' in which it promised that it would enhance customer services by 
delivering services quickly and punctually and compensate for late installations or 
repairs (KT Seoul News. 10 May 1999). Most of these efforts to heighten 
210 
responsiveness to customers' demands are quite a recent phenomenon in KT. The 
degree of customisation in KT is constrained by slowly upgraded computer systems and 
gradual organisational changes in comparison to the much fast developments in 
markets. In the future KT has planned that customers will be divided into four segments 
according to the levels of their bills and each segment of customers will be dealt with by 
a separate group of CSRs. Yet how quickly KT will move in this direction remains to 
be seen. 
8.5.1. Customisation On the Access Side 
Until the early-1990s service provisions in KT remained producer-centred because 
demands greatly surpassed supplies. Customers could not raise complaints to 
technicians. As competition started among telephone operators, the supplier-centred 
situation has been overturned in favour of customers. However, KT employees 
including front-line workers have demonstrated some inertia in their producer-centred 
attitude towards customers. The project FOCUS has altered the supplier-centred ethos 
into customer-oriented ones among field technicians. 
Prioritisation and Shortened Lead Time 
KT has developed differentiated repair or maintenance services for separate 
segments of customers. There has been a separate group of technicians who are 
responsible for the whole processes of installations and fault repairs of both `private 
lines' and `dedicated data communications lines', both of which are used by business 
customers or government agencies. This group of technicians is organised as a separate 
entity and trained as a highly skilled workforce. They are even summoned at night if 
any important fault occurs at `private lines' or `dedicated data communications lines'. 
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KT also differentiates `main customers' from ordinary customers in terms of the amount 
of bills. When faults occur to main customers and ordinary customers at the same time, 
priorities are given to main customers. However there has been no attempt to 
differentiate business customers from residential customers. Many small and medium 
size business customers are treated in an equal way to residential customers. In the past 
the time set internally for fault repair was two working days in the early 1990s, and until 
1997 one day for main customers and residential customers alike. Faults affecting main 
customers are required to be cleared within 4 hours after they are reported, whereas 
those of ordinary customers within 12 hours after reports. If a fault affecting a main 
customer is not cleared within 4 hours after the fault report, a warning sign will turn up 
on the screen in the control and the control will call and urge the responsible technician 
to clear the fault of the main customer as quickly as possible. The committed time for 
repairs within 12 hours for residential customers is being kept at the estimated rate of 70 
per cent by field technicians (KT 1999c: 77). 
Punctuality and Convenience 
In the past field technicians did not make any arrangements for installations with 
customers. When CSRs take service orders, they make appointments with customers 
for installation, taking into account the situation of both customers and field technicians. 
At first, the appointments made were not always kept well by technicians because they 
were used to working on the basis of a geographical proximity between jobs. 
According to the two field managers interviewed, management emphasis on keeping the 
appointed time to customers increased the estimated rate of time-keeping from about 
30% to nearly 70-85%. Installations by appointments with customers have tended to 
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reduce field technicians' discretion in work scheduling and to increase their travelling 
distances because they have to work according to the order of appointment time for each 
job rather than the geographical proximity between jobs. Moreover, communications 
between field technicians and control centres are mostly dependent on the calls to 
controls from technicians. These do not flexibly meet customers' changing requirements 
but engender problems of responsiveness. Fault reception centres do not know when 
the fault affecting a particular customer is cleared and how any repair job is going on, 
and therefore cannot reply to questions of the customer regarding fault repair. Apart 
from job allocation in the morning, job allocation in the daytime is passive and takes 
time. The time taken to allocate faults to field technicians is estimated to average 2.5 
hours according to KT management calculations. 
The normal working hours of field technicians are fixed to 09: 00 am to 17: 30 on 
Mon. - Fri. and 09: 00 am to 13: 00 on Sat, apart from a group of technicians in charge of 
private lines and dedicated data communication lines. If any sub-group of technicians 
do not finish installations or repair jobs allocated within normal working hours, they 
have to work overtime to keep committed times. For customers' convenience, 3-4 
technicians stand by in each local telecoms centre just in case at the weekend, while 
they do repair some faults but not installation work. Instead they are given time-off in 
lieu on one of the weekdays. 
KT management has sought to customise field technicians' work in terms of 
prioritisation, punctuality, shortened lead time and a customer care attitude. 
Nevertheless, the degree of customisation in terms of differentiation among different 
segments of customers, punctual delivery of services, responsiveness to customers 
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changing requirements, seems to be relatively low due to technologies, organisational 
structure, and management strategies. Customisation, though its degree is low, has led 
field technicians' job to become demanding and their discretion to be less in their work 
scheduling. The project FOCUS has contributed to fostering customer-oriented 
attitudes among KT employees. 
8.5.2. Customisation On the Clerical Side 
Customisation requires responsiveness to customers' various enquiries and their 
diversified demands for a great deal of services. The degree of customisation in KT has 
been limited by the relatively slow deployment of new technologies such as integrated 
customer database system. Billing enquiries cannot deal with in CSCs because the 
billing computer system is not linked to the CTI. 
Working hours in CSCs were extended to night time and weekends. Customer 
services at night or weekends are dealt with in three CSCs nationally and faults are 
received at each fault reception centre. 24 hour services in CSCs and fault reception 
centres are aimed to meet customers demand for convenience. Improvements in PCA in 
CSCs are also one of the means of increasing responsiveness to customers' calls. 
FOCUS has strongly influenced the general climate of customisation at CSCs, front- 
desks and fault reception centres. 
For customers' convenience, CSCs are required to provide one-stop services for all 
customers' demands. CSRs at front-desks in local call centres can provide for visiting 
customers any service they want by using various sources of information in different 
systems. CSCs take orders and answer general enquiries into products and other but 
cannot deal with billing enquiries. As billing enquiries are only dealt with by CSRs at 
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front-desks of local telecoms centres, customers have to go to local telecoms centres 
when they have queries or problems with billing. CSCs have only basic information on 
customers such as their name, address and telephone number, but they do not have 
information on customers' billing and services being used on the screen. In the 
circumstances CSRs are less likely to provide customised services for customers when 
they take calls. Although KT has just begun to encourage CSRs to sell services 
especially to business customers, they do not have information necessary to judge 
whether or not there are any opportunities to sell services to customers. The practical 
absence of sale and functions in CSCs tends to make CSRs' jobs in CSCs less complex 
and less demanding. The inability of CSCs to provide one-stop services for customers 
is largely due to the absence of new technologies geared to customisation in CSCs. For 
example, the pilot to deploy an integrated customer database called ICIS (Integrated 
Customer Information System), which would allow CSCs to provide one-stop services 
for customers, failed in July 1999. Because of the absence of an automatic screen- 
popping function of the CTI CSRs in CSCs are not able to provide services quickly. It 
takes time for CSRs to have access to customers' basic information on the screen. 
The low publicity of `100' CSCs and `110' fault reception centres as well as the 
low degree of consolidation of CSCs stands in the way of customisation in KT. As 
many customers still do not know that there are dedicated CSCs which deal with 
various enquiries and service orders, they often call other numbers in order to ask 
queries or order services and are then informed of the number of CSCs or fault 
reception centres (KT 1999c: 76). Too many phone numbers (around 70) for reporting 
faults of different services make customers confusing about where they have to report 
faults. Other customers still think that they have to go to local telecoms centres when 
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they want to order services or to make enquiries. 
CSCs or fault reception centres show some signs of customisation in terms of the 
extension of working hours, improvement in PCA and CSRs' attitude towards 
customers. However, customisation has not developed far enough to meet customers' 
various demands for one-stop services, immediacy and differentiation among different 
customer segments. The low level of customisation in CSCs largely reflects the 
underdevelopment in applied computer systems. It also mirrors management strategies 
which have shown less interest in customers' demands for convenience and 
sophisticated services, and in their associated organisational reforms. The limited 
extent of customisation in CSCs is filled by more customised services at the front-desks 
of local telecoms centres. Front-desks are gradually being transferred to CSCs and an 
integrated customer database system, ICIS, which will change work at CSCs, is being 
piloted. 
Overall, customisation on the access side and on the clerical side in KT is in an 
early phase in the sense that KT management has focused on changes in employees' 
attitude or corporate culture towards customers. Although some customisation has been 
made in terms of prioritisation, shortened lead time, punctuality, convenience and 
differentiation, the extent of customisation has remained fairly limited because of 
limited corporate restructuring due to embedded local structures, the absence of relevant 
technologies and KT management who has not developed any consistent policies 
towards customisation. Customisation or customer-orientation as an ideology has 
usefully been deployed to promote culture changes by KT management. 
8.6. Conclusion 
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Work rationalisation and customisation are important ways of reforming working 
organisation so as to be suited to new competitive conditions. Work rationalisation is 
inspired by cost considerations, whereas customisation is driven by the emphasis on 
customer demands. The service delivery system in BT has been greatly rationalised and 
customised into what we can call, a `lean service' service system, whereas KT has 
shown limited rationalisation and the early phase of customisation. The reforms in 
service delivery systems proved to be closely linked to corporate restructuring in that 
the degree of work rationalisation and customisation in KT has been by limited 
corporate restructuring due to the embedded nature of local telecoms centres in the local 
community. 
These considerable differences do not simply reflect different phases of corporate 
restructuring between BT and KT but are also due to other important factors. For 
example, the different timing in the deployment of new technologies essential for 
rationalisation and customisation may partly explain the different phases of 
restructuring between the two companies. However, the differences in rationalisation 
and customisation between the two may have arisen from varying national 
arrangements, the existing structure or management policies. 
While BT management has stressed the need for work rationalisation and 
customisation in order to bring down costs and to provide quality of services, KT 
management has focused more upon realignment or renewal of local cable and drop 
wires and culture changes than rationalisation and other forms of customisation. The 
differences between the two are closely associated with management structure, which 
inherits previous structures or decisions made in the past. For instance, the local 
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structure in KT has been a big barrier to work rationalisation. Similar call centre 
technologies have been used very differently for the purposes of rationalisation and 
control between the two, depending on management strategies. The two unions' 
(NCU/CWU and KTTU) responses to corporate restructuring as a whole may partly 
explain the limited extent of rationalisation in KT. These differences in management 
policies or strategies, organisational structure, and the phases of corporate restructuring 
have in turn been influenced by discrepancies in telecoms governance regimes, the 
trajectories of the companies and eventually national contexts between the two. 
There are also certain differences, especially in work rationalisation between the 
access side and the clerical side. Work in CSCs has been subject to a high degree of 
rationalisation or Taylorisation, whereas work in the field has been less subject to 
rationalisation despite the deployment of Work Manager in BT. Jobs in the field 
normally have a long time cycle. Field technicians in BT are supposed to usually carry 
out two or three jobs in the morning and two or three jobs in the afternoon, although 
they could undertake more simple jobs. CSRs take 10 - 13 calls per hour and can be 
more closely monitored by the CTI, whilst it is difficult for BT management to closely 
supervise field technicians working geographically dispersed, whereas CSRs are 
working in an open space where managers can physically watch CSRs. These 
differences are linked to the nature of work and work environment. 
Customisation does not counter or contradict rationalisation but often goes hand in 
hand with it, especially within BT. What BT has sought through rationalisation and 
customisation seems to be a `lean service' service system. KT has undergone the 
limited extent of rationalisation and customisation and still retains substantial elements 
of the legacies inherited from the past. 
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CHAPTER 9. THE FLEXIBLE USE OF THE WORKFORCE 
9.1. Introduction 
The third aspect of work organisation is flexibility in labour deployment. 
Deregulation of the labour market or market regulation of labour management has been 
sought in the name of flexibility. Flexibility has been part of an agenda whereby 
management has sought to promote reform to existing working practices. Flexibility, in 
the face of increasing competition and pressures to reduce costs and improve quality, 
has been a catch phrase for work and employment reforms in Britain since the early 
1980s. In Korea flexibility has been a major means whereby management has sought 
the reform of so-called ' rigidities of the labour market since the mid-1990s. Despite 
management's apparent emphasis on flexibility, it seems that flexibility has been 
interpreted differently and different dimensions of flexibility are highlighted, depending 
on the context. Different management strategies are likely to seek to emphasise their 
related dimension of flexibility, while other dimensions of flexibility may be regarded 
as being unimportant. 
The discourse of flexibility is also heavily value-laden in the sense that flexibility is 
a good thing vis-ä-vis rigidities or `restrictive practices' (Hyman 1991: 281; Hyman and 
Elger: 1981). Flexibility is quite a slippery concept that is often vaguely defined and 
confusing, and each dimension of flexibility often stands in contradiction to one another 
(Hyman 1991: 280; Dastmalchian and Blyton 1998). It includes qualitatively 
heterogeneous dimensions of working or employment practices, which cannot be 
adequately fitted into a coherent whole. The implications of these different dimensions 
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have become clearer when we think of the opposite of each dimension of flexibility: 
task flexibility versus job control or job demarcations; numerical flexibility versus 
employment security; time flexibility versus normal working hours; and spatial 
flexibility versus stable working place or work basis. To avoid ambiguity and 
confusion around the slippery concept of flexibility, we need to differentiate between 
very qualitatively different dimensions of flexibility and to look at those separately. 
One of the much discussed thesis which revolves around the flexibility debate is 
Atkinson's `flexible firm' model (Atkinson 1984; Atkinson and Meager 1986). This 
model is relevant to changes to work and employment relations, which may take place 
in the process of corporate restructuring. This model identifies three main types of 
labour flexibility: functional flexibility of the core workforce; numerical flexibility 
related to the peripheral workforce; and financial flexibility. It is too simplified and 
often prescriptive to capture the complex and contradictory nature of flexibility that will 
be detailed later. 
There are largely three ways in which management can pursue the flexible use of 
the workforce. Internal flexibility, for example, task flexibility means that firms are 
seeking to more flexibly and productively utilise the existing workforce. External 
flexibility (numerical flexibility) refers to the use of outside workforce not directly 
employed by firms or part-timers. The third flexibility (e. g. spatial flexibility) is a form 
of flexibility which combines internal and external flexibility. There are two different 
kinds of internal flexibility: task flexibility involving multi-skilling and multi-tasking; 
and time flexibility covering longer and flexible working hours. Despite the managerial 
connotation of flexibility and its contradictory confusion, the four dimensions of 
flexibility may illuminate developments in qualitatively different aspects of work 
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organisation. Various changes in these four dimensions of flexibility will become clear 
when we compare task flexibility with job demarcations, numerical flexibility with 
employment security, time flexibility with normal working hours and spatial flexibility 
with stable workplace. Those changes revealed by the comparison of each aspect of 
flexibility with its opposite will enrich the substantive content of work reorganisation 
9.2. The Flexible Use of the Workforce in BT 
9.2.1. Task flexibility 
Task Flexibility On the Access Side 
Before we discuss how BT intended to reform work organisation in order to 
enhance task flexibility, there is a need to look at the legacy of job demarcations and 
grades among field technicians on BT. There were clear job demarcations among field 
technicians of different specialisms, called `Fitters', `Installers', `Faultman Jointers' and 
`Customer Apparatus and Linemen' until 1987. There were job descriptions in which 
BT specified what technicians of each specialism were supposed to do. For example, 
`Fitters' were supposed to install telephone lines or telecoms equipment inside 
customers' premises. `Faultman Jointers' jobs were to repair faults in overhead wire 
and underground cables outside customers' premises. Thus two separate field 
technicians, an `Installers' and a `Fitter' were needed to complete an installation job. 
There were also a number of grades for field technicians at the time. Technician IIBs 
(TIIBs) were semi-skilled technicians. Technician IIAs (TIIAs) have been fully-skilled 
field technicians. Technician Is (TIs) were in charge of training TIIBs and giving 
technical support to a group of TIIAs in the field. Senior Technicians (STs) were 
supposed to have the highest skills, to support field managers and to allocate tasks to, 
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and to supervise, other technicians (BT. May 1988). Career ladders for field technicians 
were TIIBs - TIIAs - TIs - STs. The largest grade has been TIIAs. Within this grade a 
hierarchy and an informal sub-structure of the hierarchy developed, depending on the 
complexity or cleanliness of work and the possibility of interaction. Among field 
technicians, especially TIIAs, work in customer premises had the highest status, 
overhead and underground fault repair work had middle status, while work for pole 
erection and the installation of main cables is more manual and labour work and 
regarded as the lowest status (Penn. 1990,139). Each family of field technicians formed 
their respective sub-work communities within larger work communities of field 
technicians. However, these rigid job boundaries between field technicians were 
regarded by BT management as restricting flexibility to meet peaks and troughs of 
demand, and incurring double handling (BT. Nov. 1990). 
The first major reform to enhance task flexibility in BT came via the `Job Re- 
patterning Agreement' which was concluded in Feb 1987 after 17 days' strike by 
technicians. BT's intension was to remove traditional job demarcations between 
different groups of field technicians with their respective specialisms and to redefine job 
descriptions in broad terms of knowledge and tasks in order for field technicians to 
carry out various job tasks at the same time. These reforms in job demarcations took 
the form of multi-skilling. Two groups of technicians who were called `Installers' and 
`Fitters' respectively were integrated into `One Man Installers' to deal with installation 
jobs at the same time. One Man Installers were required to do jobs of `Customer 
Apparatus and Linemen' who had been responsible for fault repairs at customer 
premises and overhead wire. Customer Apparatus and Linemen were supposed to 
undertake fault repair jobs in underground cables which had been done by Faultman 
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Jointers until 1987. This multi-skilling required field technicians to acquire skills other 
than their own specialisms. 
However, this first attempt to pursue task flexibility by multi-skilling field 
technicians proved not altogether successful. According to field technicians 
interviewed, the informal sub-structure of the hierarchy among different specialisms of 
technicians tended to make technicians having working at customer premises reluctant 
to undertake underground work, while technicians having undertaken underground work 
were not reluctant to work at customer premises. According to a senior national union 
officer responsible for field technicians, the Repatterning Agreement of 1987 was not 
appropriately implemented by local managers because many local managers thought 
such multi-skilling would not help improve productivity and quality. 
BT did not stop multi-skilling field technicians. In 1992 BT again established 
Personal Communications division's (PCD) national framework for the application of 
the terms of the 1987 Repatterning Agreement in order to gain flexibility by avoiding 
the double handing of work tasks (BT. 1992a). BT management continued to multi-skill 
all field technicians by the end of 1995 (BT. Sep. 1995). Thanks to these continuous 
efforts, a significant number of field technicians have been multi-skilled particularly in 
rural areas. Yet in large cities, especially in London job specialisms among field 
technicians remained strong. The major reason for the persistence of technicians' skill 
specialisms in big cities lay in the fact that there were many jobs demanding those 
specific skills. Many field managers in big cities even thought such skill specialisms 
could be more productive. Another important factor which prevented field technicians 
from being multi-skilled, was the significant costs (£4,400 - 9,000) involved in training 
technicians ("News Service. " June 1998). 
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Thus 51 percent of field technicians were revealed to be triple-skilled (installation, 
fault repair at customer premises, and fault repair of overhead and underground cables), 
21 percent were dual-skilled and 28 percent remained single-skilled in 1995. In one of 
the three zones which were responsible for the access network, the targets of multi- 
skilling were to have 60 percent of reactive field technicians triple-skilled as full 
Customer Service Engineers, 95 percent dual-skilled as Customer Apparatus and 
Linemen and One Man Installers by spring 1999 ("News Service. ". June 1998). 
According to field technicians and union officers interviewed, they suspect that the 
proportion of multi-skilled field technicians may be lower than the official statistics of 
BT suggest. 
More recently more momentum behind the skilling of field technicians has built up, 
given the need to provide high speed internet services. More than 4,000 technicians 
have been trained up to provide ISDN II on stand by for the `BT Highway' -a high 
speed internet service for residential and business users ("News Service. " Sep. 1998, 
Oct. 1998). The launch of ADSL (Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line) for high-speed 
internet services needs field technicians to have more sophisticated skills to install and 
repair ADSL lines. According to a document published by the union, over the next 5 
years, requirements for both operational and support skills will reduce by some 31 - 37 
percent, while requirements for systems integration skills increase by 29 percent over 
the same period (CWU. May 1997). 
Task Flexibility On the Clerical Side 
There used to be a separate sales office (for new service orders) and account office 
(for billing functions) in each district until 1990. The sales office only dealt with the 
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provision of services by taking service orders, while the account office performed 
billing functions. As Call Reception Units (the former organisation of CSCs) were 
established by integrating billing and sales functions scattered by district in the early 
1990s, CSRs in the two offices were trained in each other's skills so that CSRs could 
have dual billing and sales skills. Other functions would be transferred to a support 
function. Now `150' CSCs are supposed to represent one contact point where CSRs deal 
with every service that customers want. At the end of 1993, `Customer Service Selling 
Initiative' was introduced with the agreement with the union. At the time it started as 
an entirely voluntary scheme because CSRs had not been trained to sell anything. After 
BT trained CSRs about how to sell service products proactively, CSRs were required to 
sell but did not have selling targets. Proactive selling gradually became intense in 1994 
- 1995. The emphasis on proactive selling was technically supported by the screen- 
popping function of the CTI, which means that customers' information about their bills 
and services automatically turn up on the screen when CSRs take customers' call. This 
screen-popping function of the system enables CSRs to identify whether there is any 
opportunity to sell service products and how much to sell to the customers. CSRs are 
now dealing with new service orders, billing and proactive selling. They required 
significant knowledge of the proliferating number of service products and ever- 
changing prices to answer enquiries and to sell those products. They acquire navigating 
skills between different systems in CSS and social skills required to deal with various 
enquiries and to sell service products. CSRs have been triple-skilled in comparison to 
the late 1980s. Proactive selling can be another important skill but is also a main source 
of stress and pressure because it is being managed and incentives are provided 
according to the amount of selling. 
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With the deployment of computer technology, the boundaries between technical 
grades and clerical grades which had been clear have tended to be blurred in BY An 
increasing number of office-based clerical workers who work with technical staff have 
learned computing skills or working on the systems. According to the union clerical 
branch officers in N&S (Network and Systems), clerical people are increasingly 
beginning to do, or have been doing, what would have been traditionally technical 
work. It is now possible to train clerical people to perform some quite complex tasks 
that involve systems on the network. There are areas where technicians called 
Diagnostic Testing Officers were converted into CO grade in `151' CSCs and `154' 
CSCs. With the onset of a new testing technology some clerical workers in `151' CSCs 
or `154' CSCs are testing the lines reported to be faulty from customers because the 
workers no longer need to have the technical expertise to test lines or to diagnose 
particular faults. Some work that had been done by technical grades has slowly 
migrated to clerical grades. A lot of training has taken place in order for clerical grades 
to take the work. In this regard CSRs or clerical workers may be regarded as being 
upskilled. 
However, the impression of CSRs or clerical grades' upskilling is easily reversed, 
taking into account the fact that how management controls work and to what extent 
management rationalise, Taylorise work in CSCs and other clerical work. As already 
shown in Chapter 7 and 8, work in CSCs has been Taylorised with the introduction of 
call centre technologies. It has been under the surveillance of management by various 
statistics, visualised real time monitoring and short work cycles. Clerical work has also 
been rationalised and computerised. These deskilling tendencies have been very strong. 
In brief, CSRs are multi-skilled with functions of billing, service orders and proactive 
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selling. Some of the clerical work appears to be upskilled by taking over a certain 
technical work which was formerly done by technical grades with the help of computer 
technology. These positive aspects of multi-skilling and upskilling are overshadowed by 
strong deskilling initiatives of rationalization and Taylorisation. 
Overall, task flexibility in the field and CSCs has been sought by BT management 
in order to provide speedy and convenient services on a one-stop basis, remove 
duplicated visits and calls, increase efficiency and thereby reduce costs. Task flexibility, 
particularly in the field was achieved by getting rid of job demarcations among different 
specialisms of field technicians. This task flexibility has contributed to upskilling and 
reduction in worker monotony, especially in CSCs. However, a more complex picture 
in which conflicting tendencies of both multi-skilling and deskilling have occurred, has 
emerged. While task flexibility/multi-skilling has increased both in the field and in 
CSCs, deskilling has simultaneously taken place in the processes of management-driven 
work rationalisation and tightening work control, work scheduling by the WM and CTI. 
The existing literature which focus either on optimistic (upgrading) or pessimistic 
(downgrading) perspective cannot explain these contradictory tendencies found in 
changes in the contemporary workplace. We need to carefully look at automating and 
innovating role of new technologies (Zuboff 1988). There has also been a trend of skill 
polarisation especially, among CSRs, which will be discussed in the next section. Thus, 
we can find the complex picture of the simultaneous occurrence of upgrading, 
downgrading and skill polarisation in the workplace in BT. 
9.2.2. External Flexibility 
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Another important aspect in the flexible use of the workforce is what we call 
`external flexibility. It is also termed as `numerical flexibility in the `flexible firm' 
model. BT management has been under strong pressure to reduce the number of 
permanent workers in order to cut labour costs and to increase efficiency in terms of the 
number of exchange lines per employees, even though they have had to use a significant 
number of temporary workers instead. BT has not only outsourced so-called non-core 
activities such as cleaning, catering, security, building services and building facilities 
management but has also brought in many contractors or agency workers and part- 
timers in `core' activities such as work in the network and work in CSCs. BT had 
argued for the use of temporary workers (short-term/fixed-term contracts and 
contractors or agency workers) to cover short-term peak demands which would 
eventually decline. BT's justification of the use of temporary workers has changed 
from resourcing short-term demands in the late 1980s to containing costs in the 1990s. 
Moreover the increase in the number of temporary workers, particularly agency staff 
took place whereas BT cut a great deal of permanent people by redundancies. BT has 
now reached even the point of talking about the need to balance `direct' and `indirect 
labour' in its resourcing plan. The changing levels of BT's indirect employment are 
shown as in the table below. The seriousness of the use of agency workers in CSCs and 
contractors in the field or at CSCs was evidenced by London technicians' strike of 1997 
and the strike of CSRs in Nov. 1999, both of which centred, inter alia, on the excessive 
use of contractors or agency workers. 
Table 9 -1 BT's Indirect Emalovment 
1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Outsourced jobs 0 6,330 5,915 6,720 5,961 
Agency staff 3,250 7,647 7,235 7,583 17,600 
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Contractors 6,760 7,900 7,373 7,422 9,000 
(field technicians 
Source: CWU Feb. 1999 Roger Darlington; BT 1999. Group Personnel Manager 
The Increasing use of Contractors and Agency workers 
On the Access side: BT has used contractors and short-term/fixed-term contracts in 
the field. Subcontracting has traditionally been used in civil engineering work for 
cabling and jointing work on the access network (MacKenzie 1998,156-61). In the 
latter half of 1980s BT faced the task of upgrading the external network, requiring a 
short-term demand for technicians for about 2 years. This would be followed by a sharp 
decline in the number of technicians according to the Manpower Projections (NCU. 9 
April 1987 LTB; IRRA. 1987 No. 402). Moreover, BT was keen on using external 
contractors in resourcing these short-term demands. Taking into account the Manpower 
Projections and the risk of BT's more widespread use of external contractors without 
any agreement, the union (NCU) concluded agreements with BT management, which 
allowed BT to introduce short-term contracts and external contractors in 1987 -8 
(NCU. 8`h Nov. 1988 LTB; NCU/BT. 21st Feb. 1989). 
BT has shifted the legitimisation of the use of contractors from short-term cover in 
the late 1980s to cost control in the 1990s (BT 22nd May 1992). In 1993, BT secured 
the union's reluctant agreement to allow the continued use of contractors in activities 
where the long term requirement was already established, while it committed itself to 
information provisions, consultations and review of the arrangements with the union. 
Many field technicians (TIIAs) left BT by taking redundancies from 1992 onwards with 
the number of TIIAs reducing from 48,091 in 1990 to 21,236 in 1998. BT instead 
brought in many contractors in the field. The union strongly resisted the increasing use 
of contractors because they tended to replace the existing permanent technicians' jobs. 
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Despite the transfer of more than 600 contractors into permanent employees following 
the union's constant pressure, BT had to rely on a significant number of contractors and 
excessive overtime in 1997 because of the lack of field technicians. BT's decision to 
bring in more contractors in London, together with understaffing and macho 
management style, instigated 2,400 London field technicians' to go on a one day strike 
in August 1997 (BT. Aug. 1997; "Crosstalk. " Oct. 1997). As a result, BT had to recruit 
more 389 technicians, to remove contractors from the field in London and to improve 
management's arbitrary performance targets and aggressive style. Similar technicians' 
dispute on the use of contractors happened in North West of England in autumn 1997. 
However, BT has begun to realise the problems with the under-resourcing and the 
widespread use of contractors and short-term contracts by replacing permanent field 
technicians, especially in the late 1990s when demands for telecoms services, 
particularly internet services were significantly growing. The number of TIIAs (field 
technicians) in BT Network and Systems Division increased from 17,286 at the end of 
March 1998 to 19,316 at the end of August 1998. Despite increased recruitment, many 
customers in some areas have had to wait up to 2 weeks for fault repairs because of the 
lack of field technicians (Fr. 05 Nov. 1999). Although the union's opposition has 
blocked BT from using contractors on the access side, both the massive redundancies of 
field technicians in the 1990s and newly growing demands for field technicians tend to 
increase the use of contractors in laying large underground cables and laying cables in 
new building sites. 
On The Clerical Sides: The situation at CSCs is more complex than that in the field 
because many agency staff have been used together with full-time CSRs at the same 
230 
time. What underpins the growing use of agency workers is cost considerations and less 
importantly, the nature of work and attendance patterns. Agency staff were working on 
contracts with a pay differential of between 80% and 120% with BT permanent workers 
who were carrying out exactly the same work (CWU Dec. 1995. Voice). COs (Clerical 
Officers), the grade of CSRs who take call in CSCs decreased from 16,915 in 1990 to 
12,564 in 1995 to 10,747 in 1998 through successive redundancies, while the number of 
calls which COs had to take greatly increased during the same period. BT had to 
introduce more and more agency or part-time staff to replace the permanent CSRs and 
to cover the increase in call volume, even though BT has increased the productivity in 
CSCs. 
BT had increasingly used agency staff in CSCs despite the union's opposition in 
about 1993 onwards. The introduction of agency workers in CSCs was at first justified 
to cover peak-time work or short-term cover such as maternity or sick leaves of 
permanent CSRs, or marketing campaigns on a short-term basis. However, more agency 
staff were then used in `0800' in order to deal with simple billing enquiries (0800) and 
to promote other discount products in CSCs. Agency workers were used to cover night 
time work or weekend work. The position of BT management was made clear by PCD 
Personnel Director as follows (BT PCD. 27`h Sep. 1996). 
"... the use of agency staff was and would continue to be a fundamental part of the 
Division's resourcing plan because of the need for a high degree of flexibility as 
PC moved into new area of activity. " 
While BT froze recruitment of permanent full-time CSRs or sometimes even part- 
time CSRs, more and more agency workers continued to be taken on in `150' and `151' 
CSCs. The number of agency workers used in `150' and `151' CSCs has rapidly 
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increased from 575 in March 1996 to 2,727 in October 1998 ("CWU Voice. " Feb. 
1999). The union tried to stop and control the situation either by the threat of national 
one-day strike in 1996 or by the agreements which contained commitment to reduce the 
number of agency workers in CSCs (`London Link'. 1996. No. 26; 'CSC Newsletter'. 
1996. No. 2). 
Table 9 -2 Staffing in 150.151 CSCs sites in 1998 
`150' CSCs `151' CSCs Subtotal 
full-time 1,892 423 2,316 
new full-time 298 298 
part-time 2,380 684 3,064 
agency 1,945 728 2,673 
total 6,515 1,635 8,350 
Source: BT. Oct. 1998. Statistics. 
In NI (Number Information) and OA (Operator Assistance), agency staff have been 
brought in since 1991. Some 5,500 out of the total 8,700 operators in NI and OA were 
agency staff in 1997, many of whom were former BT operators (IDS. Oct. 1997. ). Few 
agency operators have been offered BT full-time jobs. Agency staff have accounted for 
70 - 80 percent of the total 8,000 staff at BT's six telemarketing centres in which 
workers make outbound calls to sell service products. The proportion of agency staff at 
BT call centres as a whole including CSCs, NI, OA and telemarketing centres is over 50 
percent of the total staff. This ratio of agency staff out of the total staff in BT call 
centres is a much higher than average ratio at other call centres in the UK where an 
average 71 percent of employees are on full-time permanent contracts in 1999 (IDS. 
June 1999; IDS. Feb. 1998; CWU. May 1999). 
The deployment of too many agency workers at CSCs, NI, OA, Telemarketing 
centres has had quite a negative impact on job security and terms and conditions of the 
existing CSRs. Agency workers are denied any appeal through internal grievance 
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procedures and are usually taken off contracts for minor or trivial reasons (CWU Voice, 
July 1998). The annual turnover rate of agency workers of over 100% in CSCs and 
telemarketing centres can be seen as a passive expression of their exhaustion and 
complaints (CWU. 1998). Although many managers are frustrated at the increasing use 
of agency staff, BT management is sensitive to the views of the City that want to see 
continuing reduction in BT staff numbers. The use of too many agency staff was met 
with a one-day strike by CSRs in November 1999. BT has to increase permanent full- 
time staff and reduce the proportion of agency staffing to 13% of the workforce in `150' 
CSCs, along with other significant improvements (CWU. Dec. 1999). 
Part-time workers 
Another form of flexibility in employment is the use of part-time workers. The 
increasing use of part-timers especially in CSCs is aimed at controlling costs and 
covering evening time and Saturday in order to render services available for longer 
time. There were some `fixed hours' part-time contracts for 18-30 hours a week before 
1991. In April 1991 an agreement that extended normal opening hours in CSCs to 
Saturday was reached between BT and the union. Saturday work was to be covered by 
the use of part-time staff (BT/NCU April 1991). Full-time CSRs who volunteered for 
Saturday over and above their normal hours would get overtime rates. Part-time staff in 
CSCs, at first, were used in order to maintain flexibility for full-time staff, to meet peak- 
time traffic and to cover attendance at the beginning and end of each working day. In 
1994 part-timers were further brought in to resource the extended opening hours from 6 
pm to 8 pm in CSCs ("London Link. " April 1994). Part-time CSRs introduced from 
1991 to 1994 worked on 18 - 30 hours `flexible contract in which additional hours were 
233 
paid at the basic rate up to a total 37 hours per week. As the existing CSRs did not want 
to work for those unsocial hours, the union allowed BT to use part-timers in CSCs for 
Saturday and evening work on the 18 - 30 hours. Once the gate for part-timers was 
opened, they flooded into CSCs because BT only recruited part-timers from 1991 
onwards (CWU Thames Valley Clerical Branch. 1997). The proportion of part-timers 
in CSCs was already well over 50 percent of the total CSRs in 1997. As shown in Table 
9-3 below, the number of part-time workers in clerical grades increased significantly 
from 1988 onwards with part-time operators shrinking to 1/5 of their 1991 total by 
1996.9 The number of part-time operators was greatly reduced by redundancies which 
in turn were due to new technologies. As of 1998, the proportion of part-timers in 
`150', and `151' CSCs represented 54 percentage of the total permanent CSRs. 
Table 9 -3 Part-time workers by grade in BT 
1988 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Operators 3,753 5,533 3,882 2,193 1,966 874 1,103 
Clerical 758 1,583 2,738 3,182 3,338 3,576 4,408 
Others 3,449 2,234 1,228 654 687 964 1,239 
Total 8,031 9,526 8,069 6,232 6,213 5,620 6,971 
Source: BT Employee Statistics in each year. 
Part-time CSRs were supposed to cover Saturday and evening time (6: 00 pm - 8.00 
pm). They then began to be deployed to cover day time alongside full-time CSRs. More 
than half of agency workers in CSCs, NI, OA and Telemarketing centres have been part- 
time agency workers. Part-time staff on `flexible hours" contracts at CSCs had to work 
different hours with a range of 18 - 30 hours each week. Their work hours were 
flexible, depending on the work volume each week, their attendance patterns were not 
9. The number of part-time workers in clerical grades in Table 9-3 did not only include part- 
timers at CSCs but also those at other clerical functions. 
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certain. In 1995 these `flexible hours' part-time contracts changed to part-time 
contracts involving more or less fixed hours between 18 - 30 hours (BT. 10 Sep. 1995). 
The continuous pressures from the union to reduce part-timers in CSCs, NI, and OA, 
together with the complexities involved in allocating time slots to part-timers, have led 
to upgrading the status of some part-timers to new flexible full-time contracts as 
detailed later in this section. 
Outsourcing 
Outsourcing may be different from sub-contracting in that outsourcing involves 
contracting out previous in-house activities to outside firms for a long period of time, 
whilst sub-contracting involves, often repetitive, one-off work being given to outside 
firms. The massive increase in the outsourced jobs has resulted from BT's repositioning 
strategy, which focused on hiving off "non-core" activities such as cleaning, catering, 
security and building maintenance. BT reduced cleaning and catering jobs from 5,600 
in 1987 to zero in the mid-1990s through oursourcing. Various services such as security, 
lift maintenance and motor transport work were outsourced (CWU Voice, 1995; 1998). 
Building facilities maintenance of over 8,000 buildings across the UK has also been 
contracted out to a small number of firms (BT. July 1999). Driving work was put up for 
in-house bids to compete against outside firms, which made drivers concede on the 
introduction of agency drivers, statutory breaks and flexible attendance (CWU Voice, 
April/June 1996). The effects of outsourcing has been considerable job cuts and a 
worsening of working conditions in the functions concerned. 
BT's pursuit of external flexibility through the widespread use of agency staff and 
part-timers as well as the outsourcing of non-core activities mirror BT's consistent cost- 
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reduction strategies, having important implications for work and employment relations 
within BT. Preoccupied with `headcount', the overriding, if crude, criteria of the City of 
London for assessing the efficiency of BT, BT management was able to further cut 
permanent employees not only through massive redundancies but also by relying on 
external flexibility. The massive job cuts in the 1990s thus obscure the fact that a 
significant number of permanent employees (about at least 20,000 jobs) have been 
simply replaced by agency workers, part-timers, or outsourced jobs. Viewed in the 
British context, however, the increased use of non-standard employment in BT is to 
align itself with the general trend reported in 1998 WERS (Cully et al. 1999.32 - 38). 
Employment in BT which was characterised by internal labour markets, relative 
homogeneity and employment security, has been externalised, casualised and more 
heterogeneous. The precarious workforce has not just been used for simple tasks or 
during peak time and unsocial hours, but also for core tasks in daytime which 
permanent full-time employees had previously undertaken. This does not support the 
argument for numerical flexibility related to non-core work in the `flexible firm' model. 
Employment within BT has been fragmented into full-time permanent employees, new 
flexible full-time employees (only at CSCs), part-time permanent employees, agency 
staff and contractors. There has emerged a new status hierarchy, a stratification 
especially among workers at CSCs, NI, OA and Telemarketing: full-time permanent 
employees at the top; new flexible full-time employees next; part-time permanent 
employees in the third place; and agency staff at the bottom. This stratification partially 
matches skill polarisation among these workers with different status. Agency workers 
are supposed to take simple, repetitive calls such as 0800, directory enquiries, while 
full-time CSRs are required to take more complex calls or to sell services proactively in 
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CAS or less complex calls in HelpDesk. The differentiation of status among workers 
indicates how BT recruits employees from agency workers as the port of entry to 
eventually full-time permanent employee status. 
The union has unsuccessfully made various efforts to prevent BT from increasing 
these temporary workers. Despite the successes of the strikes by London technicians in 
1997 and by CSRs in Nov. 1999, the union was not able to rely on strikes because the 
union fear that they might have undermined cooperative relationships with the company, 
and that any failure would have been a disaster to the union. As a consequence of the 
big increase in atypical employment, the influence and bargaining power of the union in 
CSCs, NI, OA and Telemarketing centres seem to have significantly declined. However 
the recent strike at CSCs may be a turnaround in the hitherto declining union influence. 
Agency workers and part-timers under the conditions of under-staffing have often had 
little choice but to work regularly beyond their contractual hours. These workers 
vulnerable to management whim often bear the brunt of `hard control' in CSCs, NI, and 
OA. 
9.2.3. Time Flexibility 
The third dimension of labour flexibility that BT management has pursued is `time 
flexibility'. Time flexibility means using the existing workers more flexibly in order to 
cover extended working hours. BT sought the extension of working hours including 
weekends and evenings to meet customer demands and to compete with new telecoms 
operators who were already providing such services. The issue was how to extend the 
working hours of the existing workers with few more costs or no premium rates. BT 
initiated the comprehensive CSIP (Customer Service Improvement Programme) from 
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1993, which introduced the new attendance patterns in the field including weekends and 
evening hours and overhauled field management structure including the creation of 
FMs. BT, faced by the existing CSRs' objection to the introduction of evening hours or 
weekend work, brought in more part-timers, agency staff and transferred some 
permanent part-time workers to the new full-time contracts in order to cover weekends 
and evening time without any premium. 
Time Flexibility On the Access side 
The existing attendance patterns in the field were to work 37.5 hours per week on 
Monday - Friday either 5 days between 8 am -5 pm, or 9 days fortnight or 14 days in 3 
weeks between 7.15 am and 6.15 pm. The new attendance pattern proposed by BT 
provoked anger and strong resistance among field technicians. Although BT revised the 
original proposal in the face of field technicians' strong opposition, the union was 
reluctant to accept the revised proposal. However, BT indicated that it would 
unilaterally implement the new attendance patterns without any agreement with the 
union, if the union continued to refuse the proposal. After protracted negotiations over 
one and half years, BT and the NCU reached an agreement called 'CSIP Attendance 
Patterns Agreement' in Oct. 1994. 
According to the new attendance patterns, there were four options that 24,000 field 
technicians could choose between 7 am and 7.30 pm (except Option D) working weekly 
37.5 hours: Option A- 10 hours work for 4 days a week out of Mon. - Sun.; Option B- 
10 hours for 4 days a week out of on Mon. - Sat.; Option C-5 days for 8 hours 10 
minutes a week on Mon. - Fri. ; and Option D-3 days for 12 hours 40 minutes a week 
out of Fri. - Tues. between 7 am and 9 pm. Although the move into the new attendance 
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pattern was supposed to be voluntary, there was much pressure from management to 
take one of the options. Those who had opted for one of the four options were given 
one-off payments of £1000 for option A and B and of £400 for option C and D. Those 
who opted for option A and B were given priority in overtime or Saturday or Sunday 
extra work with double rates. Saturday and Sunday have become normal working days 
without premium rates. Field technicians who choose option A and B will not have to 
work more than 25 Sundays and Saturdays a year and £17.50 for every Saturday or 
Sunday work was given to the field technician. 
In addition to that, `flexible attendance' involving up to 1 hour before or after 
scheduled attendance hours on a given day was attached, which was designed for 
finishing jobs to target time or completing tasks which would otherwise require another 
visit the next day. These extra hours were limited up to 4 hours either in credit or debit 
and the field technician can then take credited hours off all at one time (BT/CWU Oct. 
1994). Field technicians who had signed CSIP were allocated to increased number of 
late duties on the roster, while those who had refused to sign CSIP were under the 
constant threat of being disadvantaged as a punishment (CWU Peterborough Branch. 
1997; 'CWU Voice' June 1997). Subsequently all technicians could not help accepting 
CSIP. 
The other issue connected to CSIP attendance patterns was evening work in the 
field called `WITHOD' (Working In The Hours Of Darkness). As WITHOD tends to 
involve risks, the union asked more protection for these affected technicians. When the 
company turned down the call of the union, the long dispute started. The union drew up 
a list of activities which are deemed too "dangerous and unacceptable" to perform in the 
poor light, and above all, insisted that no 'overhead' or ladder work should be carried out 
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in the dark and that any outdoor work should involve at least two people ("CWU 
Voice"April 1995, Oct. 1995). After a one and half year long-running dispute over the 
WITHOD, modified proposals on safety of WITHOD were accepted in July 1997 in a 
CWU ballot. Evening work in the field has become available. 
However, 9,500 business engineers working at Business Division were able to 
defend 5 days working attendance patterns on Mon. - Fri. between 7.15 am and 6.15 pm 
with 9 days fortnight working. BT wanted to change the attendance patterns but 9 days 
fortnights remained unchanged after 12 month talk because the degree of the unity 
among field technicians working for business customers ("CWU Voice. " Aug/Sep. 
1995, Dec. 1995). 
The important consequence of CSIP attendance patterns was a productivity drop 
because many technicians had a mindset of fixing a certain number of faults a day 
regardless of day length (BT. Sep. 1995; "Crosstalk. ' April 1997). With the help of 
CSIP BT was able to use the workforce for extended hours with less cost but the cost- 
saving elements of CSIP was offset by the increased levels of field engineers' overtime 
because there were not enough staff to do work. 
Time Flexibility On the Clerical Side 
The traditional attendance patterns were weekly 37 hours between 8 am to 6 pm on 
Mon - Fri. CSRs normally worked on Mon. - Fri. between 8.30 am and 5.30 pm, 
excluding breaks. When there were still gaps and shortages of people at certain times, 
for example, Friday afternoon, CSRs had to work voluntarily or on a rota, once every 
six weeks. The attendance patterns were flexible, varied locally and lacked very clear 
rules until CSCs were set up. When BT created CSCs in the early 1990s, it wanted more 
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rigid and scheduled attendance patterns, taking into account the match of call volume 
with human resources. To work out time slots for CSRs to match call volume patterns, 
Resource Management teams were set up for each zone covering a number of CSC 
sites. 
In January 1995 `Extended Hours' agreements in `150' CSCs extended opening 
hours in `150' CSCs from 8 am -6 pm on Mon. - Fri. to 8 am -8 pm on Mon. - Sat. 
(CWU. 23 Jan. 1995. LTB). To cover extended opening hours, the existing CSRs were 
required to work after 6 pm on a voluntary overtime basis. The existing CSRs had to 
work after 5 pm in two or three times a week, often late nights, and covering different 
working hours in different time slots each day. When new marketing campaigns were 
initiated, the level of late night attendance for the existing CSRs became higher. At the 
same time the number of part-timers to cover 4 pm -8 pm slots continued to grow 
enormously. 
In spite of much of extended hours covered by part-timers or agency workers, BT 
had to pay for the existing CSRs' evening work or Saturday work at premium rates. 
The union felt a need to block the influx of part-timers into CSCs and to increase full- 
time CSRs. Thus, BT and the union came up with the new flexible full-time contracts 
which were offered to some existing part-time staff in CSCs who had good performance 
records (BT/CWU 1997). Compared with the existing full-time CSRs' attendance 
patterns of weekly 37 hours between 8 am and 6 pm on Mon. to Friday, the new flexible 
full-time staff are scheduled to work their shift between 8am and 8pm on Monday to 
Saturday as their normal working hours. Depending upon the need to meet customer 
and work profiles, each employee attends work for 5- 11 hours duration and the number 
of their attendances per week will be determined by local or national requirements. 
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Attendance may change up to one hour in either direction with a minimum 24 hours 
notice to meet short-term requirements. The attendance patterns of the new flexible 
full-time CSRs and part-time CSRs have been used to cover peaks in working patterns, 
and early morning, evening and Saturday work. The CWU has had chances to create 
some permanent full-time jobs for existing part-timers and to improve the ratio of full- 
time jobs in CSCs. 10 The new full-time contracts also provide more flexible attendance 
arrangements for the existing full-time and reduce the requirement for their attendance 
at the beginning and end of the working day. Significant differences in attendance 
patterns have resulted between the existing full-time CSRs and the new flexible full- 
time contracts in a way which is more favourable way to the existing staff. 
Opening hours of `150' and `151 CSCs are between 8 am and 6 pm at 30 sites, 
between 8 am and 8 pm at 19 CSCs, and 24 hours at Leicester CSC. The different 
opening hours among CSCs reflect variations in call volume depending on the time of 
the day. The extended opening hours and Saturday opening were covered initially by 
agency staff, part-timers and overtime of the existing staff but which are now covered 
by agency staff, part-timers and the flexible full-time CSRs and sometimes the existing 
staff. 
In short, time flexibility basically involves the extension of working hours 
including evening time and weekends in order to meet customer demands at any time. 
Time flexibility in the field has been achieved by making the existing field technicians 
work on Saturday, Sunday or evening hours. Time flexibility in CSCs has been made 
10 
. With the agreement of the new flexible full-time contracts 400 part-time staff were 
temporarily given full- time contract and 722 part-time staff who accepted the offer were on a 
waiting list. (IDS. Oct. 1997. `IRS Report' No. 747) 
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possible by recruiting more agency staff and part-timers, and through the new flexible 
full-time contracts. Time flexibility that BT has pursued without incurring more costs 
has led to unsocial hours of work for field technicians and a casualisation of 
employment in CSCs. 
9.2.4. Spatial Flexibility 
Another dimension of flexibility in BT which has recently developed, is spatial 
flexibility. Spatial flexibility is a shift away from office-based or fixed workplaces 
towards homes or mobile vehicles, or means a share of a space/desk by a number of 
people. There are three forms of spatial flexibility found in BT: `garaging at home'; 
`hotdesking'; and `homeworking'. The motive behind spatial flexibility has been in the 
need to increase effective working time and how to utilise office or building space from 
the view of property portfolio. Developments in spatial flexibility have been greatly 
facilitated by new technologies. 
Spatial Flexibility On the Access Side 
Before 1992, field technicians had to go to their depot at the Telephone Exchange 
Centres (TECs) every morning to collect their vehicles, jobs allocated for the day and 
parts needed for installations or repairs. At the end of work they had to bring back the 
vehicle to the depot and to fill in their log about what they did that day. Their base and 
contact points were the depot at the TEC. Field technicians could meet their colleagues 
and managers, and exchange information at the depot, which provided the union with 
good contact and communication opportunities. 
From around 1992 onwards BT encouraged field technicians to take their van 
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straight back to their home from the field, to `garage the van at home' and to go straight 
to the work from home. The allocation of the first job directly to field technicians' 
homes via the hand-held terminal, facilitated field technicians to garage their van at 
home. Although the union asked field technicians not to garage at home, field 
technicians found that `garaging at home' was very convenient. Field technicians have 
been able to save travelling time and money from their home to the depot through 
`garaging at home'. BT can also increase effective time by saving time for field 
technicians to go from the TEC to the first job and to come from the last job to the TEC. 
It does not need places for garaging depots for vans any more. BT has been able to 
rationalise TECs by sales, using them for other purposes, or leasing them. Field 
technicians now garage at home and drop by their TEC from time to time when they 
have business with their manager. They can collect parts from the Dead Drop Centres 
which they order directly. BT no longer has stores in which there are spare parts. 
Instead field technicians should carry enough of what they need on their van and they 
would have to order them as they are required. 
As a result field technicians have lost regular contact with their colleagues and have 
become isolated and individualised. In the past they worked closely as a team and often 
had football or cricket matches with other teams. There was some team spirit, although 
work was basically done individually. Even after garaging at home, BT still hollowly 
talks about work team members (WTM) or team spirit but it is cynically received by 
field technicians. Field technicians are said to have lost the `physical base' concerning 
their contacts and their work centre. Their feeling of the psychological loss is expressed 
by one field technician as follows. 
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"We miss the contact of how things are generally going and general feedback 
between people. That's sadly missing. In the old days you could go down to 
telephone exchange centres in the morning at 7: 30. You were guaranteed to see all 
the staff there by 8: 30. You could have a general chat. If you go down the 
telephone exchange centre now, there are still some people there, but it is like a 
ghost town. You can wonder around looking for people without finding them. " 
Garaging at home weakens the `work community' among field technicians. 
Consequently the union has had difficulty in contacting its members. The union has thus 
had to rely on regular mailings of leaflets to its members and mobile phones to contact 
them. 
Spatial Flexibility On the Clerical Side 
The average accommodation costs including information systems costs in 1999 
were £4,200 per person. BT is looking to reduce these costs to £3,100 per person under 
the 'UK Office Plan' programmes. Both hotdesking and homeworking are being 
pursued as a way of reducing costs through increases in the extent of utilisation of space 
and facilities and changes in location and reduction in space volume. 
Hotdesking: The increasing number of part-timers and agency staff used in CSCs has 
also led the number of desks and space to increase proportionately as well. The overall 
provision level of desks to people has been greater than 1: 1. In a survey of 300 
buildings 59,631 of 80,458 desks were found to be occupied with 11,118 desks being 
vacant, of which 9,709 had unused equipment standing on it as a cost of £129 million 
per year. In another survey of the existing `Workstyle' buildings, the rate of daily 
utilisation of the desks remained 40 per cent (CWU Briefing 2/July/1999). From 
management's point of view, the allocation of a desk to each part-timer or each agency 
staff in the same way as for the permanent full-timers appears to be wasteful. BT 
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estimates that a simple reduction in the average ratio of desks to people from 1: 1 to 1: 
1.2 would lead to a reduction in the annual running costs by £ 28.5 million. So the lay- 
outs BT has brought in are based on an open-plan style with many desks crammed in. A 
new practice called `Hotdesking' means that a number of people share a desk at 
different times. Hotdesking in BT had its roots in telemarketing centres where the 
majority are part-time agency staff and they do not have to have their own desk. 
Workstations at CSCs are set up to be used by anybody. They can go wherever there is a 
desk and a workstation set up for them. Instead, a locker is provided for each staff in 
which personal documents and things can be stored. For example, 30 - 40 computers 
and chairs in one CSC were removed in 1998/9 so that staff now have to share desks. 
Hotdesking has not been fully implemented so far but some of it is being brought in to 
CSCs across the country. The similar practice is being introduced for sales people in 
BT who are constantly on the move from one place to another and stay little at office. 
For those mobile staff, with the assurance of booking in advance, another form of 
Hotdesking called `Flexidesks' offers a workstation in an office with local area 
network(LAN), access to printing and a telephone ("BT Today. " July 1999). BT plans 
to achieve a ratio of at least one work-station to 1.2 office-based people across the 
country by March 2000 (BT. May 1999. `BT Today'). Hotdesking is also being brought 
in with homeworking in CSCs. BT wants to introduce Hotdesking as an established 
way of working. 
Homeworking: Alongside Hotdesking, BT has initiated homeworking (often called 
teleworking) as a new working practice. BT has already produced guidelines for its 
managers which recognise that homeworking has a number of advantages (IDS. April 
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1994). Yet the launch of homeworking has emerged as part of the programme `Option 
2000'. Above all, the aims of homeworking are driven by BT's efforts to cut estate costs 
over the next years. There were already 3,500 staff working from home in BT. The 
current initiative, launched at the beginning of 1999, is designed to regularise what were 
ad hoc arrangements. The number of homeworkers is projected to rise to 7,500 by April 
2000 following the implementation of `Option 2000'. BT hopes to persuade at least 
10,000 of its office staff, especially CSRs in CSCs, NI, and OA and, secretaries, and 
data processing staff to work from home, communicating with customers and managers 
by fax machine, telephone and internet. Homeworking is likely to be used alongside 
hotdesking because homeworkers work for the majority of their time at home. Exactly 
how many people in BT would volunteer to work from home has yet to be seen. The 
programme is being run by Facilities Management (FM) solutions, focusing upon how 
to better use BT office space scattered around the country. The principal reason behind 
the new initiative for homeworking is BT's need to dispose of hundreds of surplus 
properties across the countries (FT 12`'' May 1999). BT could save £6,000 per desk a 
year by saving its accommodation costs through homeworking ("BT Today. " Aug. 
1999). 
Spatial flexibility has led to the individualisation and isolation of workers with such 
benefits as convenience and cost savings returning to them. This has raised significant 
problems with the union. As seen in the field, spatial flexibility may lead to the loss of 
the physical basis on which the psychological attachment of individual employees to the 
company has been laid and socialisation among employees has taken place. 
Overall, these four dimensions of flexibility sought by BT management have 
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resulted in a number of outcomes. Whilst they have helped BT save costs, customise 
services and therefore create a `lean service' work system, employment is fragmented 
and stratified, and working conditions have become divergent. There are some benefits 
to workers such as multi-skilling, small convenience and cost savings. However, there 
are more negative consequences such as weakened employment security through the 
externalisation of traditional internal labour market, unsocial working hours, 
individualisation, and the loss of physical attachment. 
9.3. The Flexible Use of the Workforce in KT 
9.3.1. Task Flexibility 
Task Flexibility On the Access Side 
There has been a clear job demarcation between overhead field technicians and 
underground ones, though there was no tradition of job control at the workplace. 
Overhead field technicians are responsible for installations and repairs from pole to 
customer premises and within customer premises, while underground field technicians 
are in charge of maintenance, repairs and renewals of underground cables from 
exchanges to poles. Overhead field technicians are supposed to have both installation 
skills and repair skills in overhead wires and within customer premises. Underground 
field technicians are supposed to have both maintenance and repair skills such as fault 
findings and cable jointing as well as renewal skills. Overhead technicians are divided 
into two groups: one group installing lines and repairing faults; and the other group 
doing renewal work or proactive work. Field technicians in the first group are flexibly 
divided to undertake installations or repairs, depending on work volume at their local 
patch. However when it comes to a rainy season in summer and a good deal of faults 
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occur, both all technicians in the first group undertake repairs, often joined by the 
second group of technicians. When it comes to spring, there are demands for plenty of 
installations because many people move their homes. Nearly all technicians in the first 
group and the second group join installation work. 
Overhead field technicians are multi-skilled enough to carry out installations and 
repairs in overhead cables and within customer premises. In this way field technicians, 
though they are divided into underground and overhead as well as into groups along the 
line of specific job tasks, have been used flexibly. Field technicians either overhead or 
underground possess task flexibility in the sense that they are skilled to install lines and 
repair faults. However, overhead technicians are not able to do underground work and 
underground technicians cannot carry out overhead work. KT tried to make efforts to 
multi-skill field technicians in both overhead and underground work in the first half of 
the 1990s but the efforts were only partly successful. Field technicians tend to be multi- 
skilled in both overhead and underground work in the countryside and small towns 
because of work requirements due to the geographical dispersion of the network. By 
contrast, they are still divided into overhead and underground technicians in big cities 
despite the company's emphasis on multi-skilling in the first half of the 1990s, since 
they are busy enough to do only their own overhead work or underground work. There 
have not been further systematic attempts to multi-skill overhead work and underground 
work from KT management afterwards. 
What is more significant in terms of skilling is the need to have new skills to install 
ISDN II, internet and, more recently, ADSL. Since 1998, the demands for them have 
increased and some overhead field technicians are required to have those skills. 
Although a number of overhead technicians in local telecoms centres have been trained 
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to install, they do not still have enough skills to install those services and to deal with 
personal computers. Another important but unsuccessful attempt was to add selling 
function to overhead field technicians who have opportunities to meet customers. So 
`field operations were integrated into marketing function at each local telecoms centre 
in 1996 (KT. March 1997). Overhead field technicians were required to use meeting 
opportunities with their customers in order to sell service products. However, the 
attempt was short-lived with a return to the former situation in 1998 because field 
technicians were trained little and were not prepared to sell service products. 
Task Flexibility On the Clerical Side 
There are two channels of customer services in KT. One is through CSCs which 
were newly created and have shown an increase in its numbers and size over the years. 
The other is through front-desks in local telecoms centres which account for two thirds 
of customer services, though they are doomed to disappear in the future. CSRs' skilling 
depends on the range of services provided through each channel. Although each CSR on 
the front-desk is supposed to undertake one or two specialised tasks, his/her jobs may 
change from one task to another at front-desks or back office over time. Moreover, if it 
comes to a busy time for a specific job, CSRs are flexibly deployed to deal with busy 
tasks. Or, if any CSR who has a certain position on front-desks and is on sick leave or 
annual leave, one of the remaining CSRs should take on the task. CSRs at front-desks 
are supposed to be multi-skilled enough to carry out any task required at front-desks. 
Although CSRs at front-desks have been recommended to actively sell service products 
whenever there is an opportunity, they are not normally selling service products. Only 
28.6 percent of CSRs in the Seoul Regional Division are said to have tried to sell 
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service products on top of the services wanted by customers (KT Seoul Regional News. 
3rd Aug. 1998). There has been no consistent effort from management to ask CSRs at 
front-desks to actively sell service products. There were around 300 service products of 
which some 30 products were normally available at local telecoms centres in 1999. 
Since CSRs at front-desks lacked training, they did not have the deep knowledge of 
those 30 products required to explain things to customers. There is no clear 
demarcation between customer services work and administrative work. Clerical grades 
can be more flexibly deployed to work as CSRs at front-desks or to undertake 
administrative work in the back office. Clerical grades have been circulated among a 
number of jobs over the years. There are also a lot of CSRs on front-desk duties who 
were redeployed from operators' jobs when many of the former operators were not 
needed. They still keep their grade as operators but work as CSRs. 
By comparison, CSRs in CSCs are required take service orders and to answer 
various enquiries except billing enquiries. The customer information system that CSRs 
use is so simple that they cannot answer billing enquires. CSRs in CSCs are not 
required to actively sell service products but take service order reactively. They 
undertake a narrow range of tasks, while their work is Talyorised with the introduction 
of call centre technologies. There is a significant difference in the range of skills used 
by CSRs between front-desks and CSCs. The extent of CSRs' task flexibility in CSCs 
is more limited than that on front-desk duties. 
In short, there has been neither any consistent effort to multi-skill workers in the 
field nor at front-desks or at CSCs on the part of KT management. There has been no 
job control tradition at the workplace. Instead there has been relatively flexible labour 
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deployment in neighbouring jobs, depending on circumstances or based on job 
circulation. Thus there is some built-in task flexibility in the field and at front-desks. 
Task flexibility in KT has something to do with grading. Not only are grades broadly 
defined, but employees in the same grade can be flexibly deployed to a number of jobs, 
for example, in the field or at front-desks and back office. Employees in KT are 
required to circulate a number of different neighbouring jobs over the years. However, 
CSRs in CSCs are constrained to use a narrow range of skills such as general enquiries 
and reactive sales because of limited technological capabilities. 
9.3.2. External Flexibility 
External Flexibility On the Access Side 
Up to the end of the 1980s when the network expanded rapidly in KT, many 
contractors were brought in to carry out civil engineering work, to lay underground 
cables and to install telephone lines at homes and offices. Almost all installations on 
the access side and cabling work were subcontracted to outside contractors because KT 
management did not have to recruit many permanent field technicians in order to meet 
big demands for installations and cabling work, which would eventually be followed by 
a sharp drop in demands for such work. Installations contracted out were paid according 
to the number of telephone lines. At the same time temporary field technicians were 
used on fixed-term contracts alongside permanent field technicians. After experience 
for a number of years as contractors or temporary workers on fixed-term contracts, these 
workers were given places as permanent field technicians as long as they satisfied 
certain conditions such as the acquisition of official qualifications and some experience. 
Contractors or temporary workers on fixed-term contracts have become an essential 
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route for recruiting new permanent field technicians ("Korea Telecom News. " 201h July 
1996). 
When high demands for installations declined in the early 1990s, KT management 
initiated the two cost-conscious or rationalising measures with regard to subcontracts. 
Most installations were taken back to in-house work from sub-contracting because the 
number of installations declined substantially and partly because work undertaken by 
contractors revealed many problems such as shoddy or careless installations which 
would be likely to engender faults later. The existing permanent field technicians were 
able to carry out installations and fault repairs at the same time. Instead KT 
management has begun to increase temporary workers on fixed-term contracts on the 
access side. They work alongside permanent field technicians or often under the 
supervision of permanent field technicians. In 1996 1,111 contractors (12% of all 
8,638 access jobs) such as cabling or cable renewal were used and 1,920 temporary 
workers (21%) were used for installations and repair jobs on the access side (KT 
Marketing Team. Nov. 1996: 188). In 1999 the number of contractors for cabling or 
cable renewals reduced significantly and the number of temporary workers used for 
installations and repair jobs on the access network was 1,997 (KT 1999d). According to 
field technicians, the number of temporary workers on fixed term contracts has more or 
less stabilised over the years, though KT has reduced the number of permanent field 
technician as part of the downsizing effort of the company since 1997. 
External Flexibility On the Clerical Side 
Apart from directory enquiries centres, temporary workers in CSCs and front-desks 
have remained small. The number of temporary workers at `100' CSCs (equivalent to 
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`150' CSCs in BT) increased from 42 in 1997 to 420 in April 1999 and temporary 
workers at front-desks numbered 146 in April 1999. The relatively small number of 
temporary workers at front-desks is due to the internal transfer of the technically 
redundant workforce, especially operators. This internal transfer was encouraged as a 
means of employment adjustments under the strong employment security which 
continued until 1997. While KT has reduced the number of technically redundant jobs 
as operators and telegraph delivery, those workers have now been redeployed into 
clerical jobs at front-desks or back office where jobs have expanded. In 1997 there 
were 788 redeployees out of the total 4,483 workers at front-desk. The grade, which is 
supposed to be deployed at front-desks and in CSCs, is `Clerical Grade'. However, 
clerical grade workers accounted for 40.8% out of the total number of workers at front- 
desks, thanks to the redeployment exercises. 1,051 workers in manual grades were 
deployed into front-desk jobs (KT. June 1997). As these redeployed workers have kept 
their grades, there have been increasing mismatches between jobs and grades. Any 
attempt to regrade to realign jobs to grades would be potentially explosive as many 
workers have their interests in the current grading structure in terms of pay level and 
promotion opportunities. 
The increase in the number of temporary workers including agency workers has 
recently been conspicuous at `114' directory enquiries centres. Temporary workers 
including agency workers at `114' directory enquiries centres have greatly increased 
from 1,003 (22.7%) to 2,883 (61% of the total operators used) between 1997 and April 
1999 (KT. June 1997; KT. April 1999). In Feb. 1997 2,771 temporary workers employed 
at `114' directory enquiries centres were composed of 1,234 workers on the fixed-term 
contracts, 1,280 part-time workers and 257 home-workers (KTTU Women's 
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Department. Feb. 1999). Part-time or home-workers are not given permanent positions 
but temporary ones. 
The number of both temporary workers and subcontracted jobs shows significant 
increases from 4,694 workers in 1995 through 5,755 in 1997 to 7,419 in April 1999 (KT 
1996: 458; KT June 1997; KT April 1999). The proportion of temporary workers is 
scheduled to increased to 80 percent at `114' directory enquiry centres, at least 60 
percent at CSCs, fault reception centres, and Main Distribution Frame and at least 30 
percent at front-desks and support functions (KT, Dec. 1998). 1,800 jobs were 
outsourced during 1999 in construction, building maintenance, power operations and 
fault reception centres. Thus KT plans to increase the ratio of temporary workers from 
around 8 percent in 1997 to 15 percent in 2000, while cutting the number permanent 
jobs from 59,919 in 1997 to 51,241 in 2000 (KT. July 1998). 
These increases are largely indebted to the rise in the number of temporary workers 
in directory enquiries centres and in the field. The main drivers of this casualisation are 
big differences in labour costs between permanent workers and temporary workers and 
the deregulation of labour markets in Korea. For example, permanent operators at 
directory enquiry centres earn four times as much as temporary operators and permanent 
field technicians earn two and half times as much as temporary field technicians in the 
field (KT. June 1997: 62-4). As long as the gaps in labour costs between permanent 
workers and temporary workers remain large, KT management would increase 
temporary workers. Big increases in temporary workers since 1997 also reflect the 
deregulation of labour markets following the financial crisis. Moreover, the union, the 
KTTU, has opposed any plan to outsource in-house work but it has made little efforts to 
stop KT management from recruiting temporary workers. 
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The increasing use of temporary workers, together with the widespread use of 
lower grades for jobs at front-desks, has given rise to a couple of outcomes. 
Employment is fragmented between permanent workers, manual grade workers, 
contractors, temporary workers and part-time workers. Temporary workers have 
increasingly replaced permanent workers in directory enquiry centres and in the field 
and begun to threaten employment security. These workers are used not only for 
peripheral activities but for core businesses such as in CSCs or in the field. These 
temporary workers are screened about their performance and used as a route for 
recruiting permanent workers. 
9.3.3. Time Flexibility and Spatial Flexibility 
Working hours are 44 hours in Korea with Saturday being a normal working day 
until lunchtime. KT has had an old working arrangement with regard to overtime 
working, which pays for 45 minutes overtime pay per day to all employees in return for 
overtime work whenever necessary. The arrangement has given KT management much 
time flexibility. For example, KT management has been able to ask employees to work 
for 1 hour overtime if there are many jobs to do. Many workers in the field, front-desks 
and CSCs normally work one hour or so overtime. KT management has only employed 
around 75 - 80 percent of the workforce required as a whole, assuming that 10 percent 
would be filled by temporary workers and overtime worked by the existing workforce 
would account for the other 10 - 15 percent. 
Three or four field technicians in local telecoms centres carry out mostly repair jobs 
on Sundays or holidays on the basis of time-off in lieu in the field. A couple of field 
technicians wait and repair faults until 9 pm which would occur to the installations or 
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repairs just done on the day. CSRs who work at front-desks often perform 
administrative work after 6 pm. Working hours in CSCs was from 9 am to 6 pm up to 
1997 and was extended from 8 am to 7 pm from 1998. A quarter of CSRs in each CSC 
start to work at 8 am and end at 5 pm and another quarter of CSRs start work at 10 am 
and end at 7 pm on a rotating basis. Furthermore a number of employees in three CSCs 
take calls from customers for 24 hours 365 days a year (KT Marketing CS Team. May 
1999). At directory enquiry centres permanent operators work for normal working hours 
(9 am -6 pm), while temporary workers, temporary part-timers or home workers work 
at night, Saturday afternoon or on Sunday. Time flexibility has been a long-standing 
practice to a certain extent in KT. In the latter half of the 1990s working hours at CSCs 
have been extended to meet customers' demands. 
There was an attempt to introduce a kind of spatial flexibility in KT. On the access 
side there was a pilot to introduce `Garaging at Home' in 1996 in order to reduce 
travelling time and to increase effective time in the field. Field technicians arrive at the 
local telecoms centre by 8 am. After their `Good Morning meetings' lasting for 30 
minutes, they leave the centre for the first job at 8.30 am, come back to the centre at 12 
am for lunch, go back to the field at 1 pm and come back again to the centre at 6 pm. 
KT estimates it takes 1.5 hours for field technicians to move back and forth between the 
centre and the field twice a day and thereby reducing actual working hours. The 
`Garaging at Home' trial was met with strong resistance from field technicians. The 
main reason for field technicians' resistance was largely cultural. In Korea there has 
been a considerable bias against manual work vis-a-vis clerical work. Manual work 
tends to be looked down upon. According to the field technicians interviewed and the 
manager responsible for the trial, KT employees who work in the field, pretend to work 
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as clerical workers at the office environment to their relatives and neighbours. If the 
field technician garages at home and leaves his home for the field with his working 
clothes, his neighbours would easily notice that he works in the field. The fact that he 
works in the field could influence his relationship with other families and his children's 
eventual marriage. Field technicians fear that their relatives and neighbours would 
notice their jobs are manual. Apart from the cultural obstacle, KT was not well 
prepared for the introduction of `Garaging at Home' in terms of equipment essentials 
such as handheld terminals and small cars (KT Marketing Team. Nov. 1996). So the 
attempt of KT management to extend garaging at home failed. 
Apart from its pursuit of increasing external flexibility and some long-standing 
built-in flexibility in time and tasks, KT has not made much effort to seek flexibility in 
the use of the workforce. To cut costs as part of its restructuring of the workforce KT 
management has increased the number of temporary workers, especially in directory 
enquiries since the mid-1990s, while it has reduced the number of permanent workers. 
KT management has used more temporary field technicians in the field, whereas 
reducing contractors for cabling and installations. Task flexibility in CSCs has been 
limited by the lack of the appropriate computer system, while CSRs at front-desks are 
required to be flexible enough to undertake various kinds of tasks. As there is no 
tradition of job control in Korea, workers and the union have shown little resistance to a 
more flexible deployment of their work in terms of tasks, time and grades except 
cultural resistance to a specific working practices such as garaging at home. 
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9.4. Conclusion 
The evidence suggests that there are some common developments in the flexible 
use of the workforce between BT and KT but there are more differences. These 
developments have basically been driven by cost reduction strategies in both 
companies, though the degree of emphasis and rigorousness is very different. BT 
management's pursuit of various forms of flexibility has been greatly facilitated by 
management's legitimation of customisation and efficiency-enhancements. KT 
management has not formulated flexibility as its consistent agenda. 
There have been significant increases in external flexibility in both cases over the 
years, though the extent to which BT uses the non-standard employees has been greater 
than that of KT. BT has extensively used atypical workers at CSCs, NI, OA and 
Telemarketing centres as well as cabling and cable renewal work but not on the access 
side, whereas KT has widely used temporary workers on the access side and at directory 
enquiry centres. BT has successfully removed job demarcations in the field to help 
achieve task flexibility through multi-skilling. By contrast, KT has shown some built-in 
task flexibility in the field. It has multi-skilled field technicians for overhead and 
underground work in the rural or town areas. BT has also attained task flexibility 
through multi-skilling in its CSCs. CSRs at front-desks are supposed to carry out 
various tasks, whereas task flexibility in KT's CSCs has been limited by the delayed 
deployment of new technologies. BT had to buy out time flexibility from field 
technicians or employ part-timers at CSCs to cover evening work or weekend work both 
in the field and at CSCs. KT has had a long-standing arrangement of flexible overtime 
work and weekend work, which has enabled KT management to use the workforce more 
flexibly timewise. Although both BT and KT have extended the coverage of working 
259 
hours to serve customers, how to use their workforce flexibly in terms of time still 
shows considerable discrepancies between the two cases. BT has shown a significant 
progress in spatial flexibility in the field, whereas KT unsuccessfully piloted the similar 
practice for spatial flexibility. BT has gone to some way to, if still in initial stage of, 
spatial flexibility in CSCs and others, while KT introduced one occasion of 
homeworking. 
How can we explain these significant differences between the two cases in terms of 
various dimensions of flexibility? Some built-in practices in KT such as task flexibility 
and time flexibility are due to the absence of job demarcations and to relatively flexible 
labour deployment in Korea. By contrast, task flexibility and time flexibility in BT are 
outcomes of management's continuous efforts to reform job control and fixed 
attendance patterns. This tells us that similar kinds of practices may originate from 
different contexts. The lack of new technologies has resulted in narrower range of task 
flexibility in KT's CSCs than that in BT's CSCs. Although external flexibility has been 
sought by management in both companies, differences in the extent of using atypical 
workers and in areas where they are used between the two arise from the existing 
practices and management strategies. For example, past contractors who installed new 
telephone lines were replaced by temporary technicians on fixed-term contracts in KT, 
while BT had no similar practices in the past. The small number of temporary workers 
at front-desks and in KT's CSCs reflects the internal transfer of technically redundant 
grades such as operators and telegram grade to CSRs' jobs under the strong 
employment security before 1997. The differences in the extent of external flexibility 
between the two may result from divergent management strategies. The role of trade 
unions is important in explaining external flexibility. For example, BT's attempt to 
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introduce contractors in the field was blocked by the union, whereas KTTU has shown 
little interest in the increasing use of temporary workers because temporary workers at 
first were not seen as threatening the employment security or working conditions of 
existing workers. Paradoxically, the continued refusals of the existing CSRs to work 
extended hours opened the way for bringing in part-timers and agency workers in BT's 
CSCs. Spatial flexibility in BT shows us that BT management has explored every 
possibility to reduce costs in managing labour and space, while KT management falls 
short of that. 
The two cases also suggest that the flexibility firms seek may be more complex 
than suggested by the `flexible firm' model. For example, although task flexibility 
sought in the field and CSCs in BT appear to lead to multi-skilling, intensified control 
via by the WM in the field and via CTI in CSCs has also resulted in deskilling or 
degrading of work. This results in multi-skilling in the general deskilling trends. 
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CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION 
We started with the research question of whether or not globalisation has led to a 
convergence of work organization in the telecommunications services industry. By 
looking at the relationships between variables and the mechanisms whereby global 
forces can be transmitted into work reorganisation, this study aims to test whether work 
organization is context-bound or context-free through a comparative case study, thereby 
contributing to the existing debate concerning convergence vs divergence. Work 
reorganisation in the two companies was evidenced through three major issues: work 
control systems; work rationalisation and customisation; and the flexible use of the 
workforce. 
The next section will briefly summarise the key findings from the two case studies, 
including similarities and differences in work organisation in the field and CSCs or 
front-desks between the two cases. This is followed by a section that discusses how 
commonalities are interpreted in different contexts and seeks to explain how and by 
what mechanisms work organisation diverge between the two cases by diagramatically 
representing the interactive processes of work restructuring. The third section goes on to 
consider the theoretical implications of the findings and to suggest that we need a new 
theoretical model which integrates dynamic interactions between variables. The last 
section sets out the limits of this research and suggests the direction of any future 
research. 
10.1. Key Findings - Similarities and Differences 
Since 1990 BT and KT have not only reorganised their management structures but 
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also their work structure in terms of work control, work rationalisation and 
customisation, and the flexible use of the workforce. By looking at work restructuring 
as well as corporate restructuring, we are able to examine the ways and processes in 
which work is reorganised. The key findings from the current research can be 
summarised as follows. 
First of all, BT has transformed work control systems. Its former bureaucratic 
control systems with a strong element of self-direction have developed into a form of 
`hard control'. This means that BT management has intensified control over work 
volume, work quality and service quality by using various means such as performance 
measurement, surveillance, comparisons, threats, rewards, and new technologies. To 
reduce the negative consequences of `hard control', BT management has also 
introduced a form of `soft control' by means of coaching and empowerment, both of 
which loosen the effects of tight monitoring, giving employees some room to breathe. 
Thus BT has in place work control systems which combine `hard control' and `soft 
control' in quite a sophisticated way. These control systems, especially `hard control', 
coupled with work rationalisation and the introduction of new technologies, have 
contributed to improvements in efficiency in the field and CSCs. 
In KT the old bureaucratic control systems and self-direction have persisted in the 
field and at front-desks, though they have weakened, especially in CSCs. As part of 
management initiatives for changing corporate culture a `hard control' system has 
emerged for improvement in quality of service. Thus hybrid control systems which mix 
the old self-direction and bureaucratic control with emerging `hard control' have 
developed in KT. 
Secondly, BT has, to a great extent, rationalised work processes and procedures 
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through standardisation, computerisation, routinisation, the separating core from non- 
core work, the proactive matching of work volume with human resources and the use of 
virtual conveyor belts in order to save costs and to increase efficiency. These processes 
of work rationalisation have resulted in significant reductions in self-direction and craft 
control, increased labour savings, the realisation of JIT principles, productivity 
improvements and work intensification. At the same time BT has implemented 
customisation of service delivery through control via customers, shortened lead-time, 
prioritisation, differentiation, punctuality, and provision of convenient services. 
Customisation in BT has contributed to JIT and, coupled with work rationalisation, has 
led to a `lean service' system. 
By contrast, work rationalisation in KT has occurred within the existing structure 
and has remained limited, though significant standardisation has been introduced in 
CSCs. KT has pursued customisation in similar ways to BT but the degree of 
customisation has remained fairly limited. However its main intent has been part of a 
managerial agenda to promote culture change. As a consequence the service delivery 
system in KT has retained important features of the existing one in the midst of gradual 
rationalisation and customisation. It has, to some extent, remained an unrationalised 
semi-autonomous system. 
Thirdly, BT has achieved an increase in the flexible use of the workforce in the 
following dimensions - task flexibility through multi-skilling, external flexibility 
through the extensive use of non-standard workers and outsourcing, time flexibility 
through the extension of working hours to unsocial hours and spatial flexibility through 
sharing or saving office spaces. Increased flexibility provides BT with the ability to 
deliver services at low cost on a one-stop basis at the time when customers want to have 
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them, despite negative consequences for employees. By comparison, KT had already 
possessed a certain degree of built-in task flexibility or time flexibility in the existing 
work systems. External flexibility has been used widely but there has been little 
evidence to make consistent efforts to further task flexibility or to introduce spatial 
flexibility. Although there have been some developments in external flexibility, KT's 
workforce has been used less flexibly than that of BT. 
Fourthly, there have been contradictory tendencies of deskilling and multi-skilling 
as well as a trend of skill polarisation in BT. Field technicians and CSRs are required 
to be multi-skilled on the one hand. However, they are not only subject to tighter 
performance control and automatic job scheduling but there have also been the 
systematic separation of core from supporting work, and of conceptual work from 
execution on the other hand. These conflicting tendencies tell us a more complex 
picture of recent changes in the workplace than is normally assumed. The stratification 
of CSRs into full-time, flexible full-time, part-time and agency workers, and 
differentiation between CAS, HelpDesk and Transaction Services have led to a trend of 
skill polarisation. Agency workers and CSRs at HelpDesk and Transaction Services are 
required to deal with short, simple, repetitive calls and experience deskilling, whereas 
CSRs at CAS are supposed to take calls demanding more complex enquires and services 
and are upskilled. There have not been systematic efforts to multi-skill workers from 
KT management. Following the slow consolidation of front-desks in local telecom 
centres into CSCs, tasks in CSCs tend to be more simplified than those at front-desks 
and therefore, CSRs in CSCs are deskilled in KT. 
Lastly, related to these three dimensions of work restructuring, the respective 
management structures have been altered. On the one hand BT's management structure, 
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under its cost minimisation strategies as well as customer focus ones, has transformed 
an old supplier-centred one into a customer-oriented one, from a regionally-based one 
through a divisional one to one consisting in thinly sliced national business units and 
trading units. On the other hand, BT management has aggressively sought to reduce 
costs and to make operations more efficient and leaner by re-engineering business 
processes, consolidating and rationalising various functions and operations, 
rationalising and relocating offices and buildings, and downsizing. New technologies 
have been instrumental in providing economies of scale and scope for BT to introduce 
these processes. These structural transformations of the organisation have considerably 
impacted on work restructuring in terms of work control, work volume, work 
scheduling, external flexibility and matching of work volume with the number of 
workers. 
By comparison, although KT's organisational structure has seemingly undergone 
some important changes, this has not affected its basic structure of local telecoms 
centres. Significant efforts from KT management to focus on differing customer 
segments and to rationalise various functions and operations has been hampered by the 
embeddedness of KT's local centres in the local community and centralised control over 
the organisation. Despite the recent endeavours of KT management to downsize the 
workforce and rationalise local telecoms centres, the degree to which KT has 
rationalised and consolidated its organisation has remained limited. The limited extent 
of the rationalisation and consolidation of KT management structure has affected the 
degree of work reorganisation in the areas of automating, measuring scheduling, 
rationalising, resourcing or controlling work. 
From the summary, it can be deduced that there are similar developments in some 
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areas but more considerable discrepancies in relation to the major dimensions of work 
organisation between the two companies. The common patterns are found in BT's `hard 
control' and KT's emerging `hard control', work rationalisation in Customer Service 
Centres (CSCs), the increasing use of temporary workers, task and time flexibility and 
the significant size of downsizing, though the extent to which these work practices have 
been adopted varies between the two. Apart from these similarities, the two cases have 
revealed different tendencies in most aspects of work organisation. These are summed 
up in Table 10 below. 
There is also another way of comparison: a comparison of work organisation in the 
field with that in CSCs or front-desks within each company. Very similar developments 
are to be found in most aspects of work organisation between the access side and 
clerical side in BT. The two areas of activities within BT have deployed work control 
systems which combine `hard' and `soft control' in performance management alike. 
Management has introduced similar types of job allocation and scheduling technologies 
(Work Manager and CTI) in both the field and CSCs and used those for similar 
purposes. Work rationalisation has been made in more or less similar ways, that is, via 
standardisations of work methods or script, work pace (QTT, CHT), the use of work 
scheduling methods and virtual conveyor belts, and JIT resourcing. Customisation in the 
field and CSCs has displayed equivalent tendencies, for example, short lead times, 
punctuality and prioritisation in the field and high PCA, one-stop service provisions and 
differentiation in CSCs. Flexibilities in task, time and space are commonly found in 
both the field and CSCs. 
Although both the access and clerical side display similar developments in small 
aspects of work organisation, there are significant differences in other aspects of work 
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organisation in BT. The density of control is much higher in CSCs than in the field, and 
control of work quality is emphasised in the field, while behavioural control is stressed 
in CSCs. Work in CSCs is highly rationalised and concentrated, whilst work in the field 
still remains substantial craft elements, despite automatic work scheduling and 
significant standardisation. There is a significant difference in external flexibility 
between the two. 
Both the access and clerical side in KT have also demonstrated somewhat parallel 
developments in work organisation. Above all, work in the field and at front-desks in 
KT is compartmentalised by the local structure, although CSCs have begun to take over 
customer services functions from local telecoms centres whilst being integrated into a 
more centralised structure. Work in the field and at front-desks is not tightly controlled 
but largely left to self-directed employees. Work volume and therefore work pace in KT 
is not controlled by management but depends on the local situation. Work scheduling is 
not automated but is manually done in the field and at front-desks. The degree of work 
rationalisation is very low in both functions because of the local structure and the 
absence of work allocation technologies. However, work in CSCs is very rationalised 
because of the integration of the customer service function into big centres equipped 
with new technologies. Customisation in CSCs and in the field has remained similarly 
limited. Flexibility in task and time has been built in to the existing work system in 
both the field and CSCs. The use of temporary workers in the field is more widespread 
than in CSCs or at front-desks because many contractors became temporary workers 
with the internalisation of outsourced work. Apart from that, there are not big 
differences between in the field and at front-desks or in CSCs. 
Similar developments in work organisation in field operations and CSCs in BT and 
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KT result from the same context and management strategies. Most differences in work 
organisation between the two functions in BT are largely due to the nature of work or 
technologies deployed, as discussed in chapter 8. For example, as work in the field is 
undertaken geographically dispersed and individually, there are inherent limitations to 
the density of work control and the degree of work rationalisation, compared with those 
in CSCs. The differences in external flexibility between the two functions in BT are due 
to a combination of such factors as gender composition, the disposability of the 
workforce and the relative strength of the clerical or engineering constituency of the 
union. Differences in work between CSCs, front-desks and the access side in KT are 
large due to whether new technologies have been introduced or not. 
In brief, broadly similar developments in work organisation are observed in field 
operations and customer service functions in each company, reflecting `company 
effects' which arise from the same contexts and management approach. There are some 
significant differences between the access and clerical side in each company but these 
differences are largely the outcomes of the different nature of work, differing work 
environments or the varying degree of deployment of new technologies between the two 
functions. This indicates that work organisation is likely to be influenced by social 
factors such as social contexts and management strategies at least as much as by 
technical ones including the nature of work and new technologies. 
Overall, work systems in BT have been fundamentally restructured since 1990, 
whereas those in KT have shown a gradual evolution in the midst of maintaining the old 
ones. According to Noon and Blyton's (1997: 118-9) framework, work organisation in 
BT has been transformed from `specialist work' (high discretion over a narrow range of 
work) into `generalised work' (a wide range of prescribed tasks), while the direction of 
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change in work organisation in KT is not clear. Those differences may be 
conceptualised as distinct work systems: a `lean service work system' in BT and a 
`modestly rationalised semi-autonomous work system' in KT. Work systems in BT 
have been transformed from an inflexible, supplier-centred bureaucratic model based on 
self-direction and craft work into a lean service model flexible enough to provide 
customised services on the basis of JIT principles at least costs. Work systems in KT 
have evolved from a bureaucratic model towards a modestly rationalised semi- 
autonomous system with some commercial orientation. 
Table 10 Emergine service work systems in BT and KT 
lean service work system in BT modestly rationalised semi- 
autonomous work system in KT 
Work control a combination of `hard' and `soft self-direction and craft control 
control' over quantity & quality `hard control' over quality of service 
decreased workers' discretion 
Rationalization significantly rationalised work, low degree of rationalisation 
the use of CTI and Work Manager partial introduction of CTI 
service delivery one-stop, JIT services provision separate provision of services/ 
based on integrated automatic job separate manual job scheduling 
scheduling systems systems 
proactively matching management reactively matching management 
structure structure 
Flexibility high task, time, spatial flexibility some task, time flexibility 
high external flexibility external flexibility 
staffing low staffing levels low staffing levels 
Now we have the major task of having to explain why the two companies have 
shown small similarities and more systematic divergences in work organisation in the 
face of the similar global pressures. The explanations will be sought by looking at the 
relationships between work organisation, national systems and other variables, and how 
they interact each other. 
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10.2. Explanations of Similarities and Divergences of Work 
Organisation 
10.2.1. Explanations of Commonalities of Work Organisation 
In attempting to explain some of the common trends identified in the above section 
some of the similarities found, may arise from increasingly competitive markets in both 
countries. Although competitive pressures may be different from each other, depending 
on national governance regimes, the multilateral WTO telecoms agreements concluded 
in February 1997 have forced each country to open its markets within certain time 
limits. The growing exposure of telecoms markets to competition has, even if the 
degrees vary between the countries, pressured both companies to seek cost reductions 
and improvements in service quality. In response to the changed external environments, 
the two companies have restructured and rationalised their management structure and 
operations to varying degrees. `Hard control' over quality of services in both firms may 
reflect the imperatives of providing quality of services. The wide use of the non- 
standard workforce and downsizing are common responses deployed by the two 
companies in order to help minimise costs. Common packaged call centre technologies 
(e. g. CTI) have helped to bring in similar work rationalisation in CSCs in both BT and 
KT. As Katz (1997: 4-5) argued, differing from other manufacturing industries, 
particularly the car industry, this sector has not seen a `best practice' model to be 
emulated by other firms. New technologies and increasing competitive pressures 
following globalisation and market opening are the two major forces of having led the 
two companies to converge in terms of work organisation. 
However, seemingly common patterns of developments between the two companies 
may have resulted from different backgrounds and have varying significances for each 
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case. For example, `hard control' commonly found in the two companies comes from 
different contexts. `Hard control' in BT has arisen from tight performance management 
in order to reduce costs and boost productivity as well as the need to provide quality of 
services. By comparison `hard control' in KT does not appear to stem from performance 
management but rather from KT management's efforts to change corporate culture. 
Task flexibility and time flexibility common in the two can also be said to result from 
disparate contexts. Task flexibility in BT has been pursued as a means of removing job 
demarcations between different groups of workers in order to cut costs and provide 
convenient services, and time flexibility has been brought in to cover services for 
extended hours. Task flexibility and time flexibility in KT have been in existence for a 
long time being part of built-in practices of the existing work system as a result of 
management prerogatives. Downsizing in BT is the results of the systematic efforts to 
modernise the network, to deploy cheap labour in simple tasks, to rationalise the 
corporate structure and work processes and to increase productivity under cost 
minimisation strategies. KT's effort to downsize was prompted by the financial crisis in 
1997 without much rationalisation of business processes or work. The significance of 
redundancies for workers in Korea is very different from that for British workers. Since 
there have been few social security benefits as opposed to the various corporate welfare 
arrangements are linked to firms in Korea, the losing of employment would mean losing 
everything. Therefore, Korean unions tend to be strongly resistant to redundancies and 
employers are often cautious about making their employees redundant. BT, however, 
made their employees redundant much easier and with less resistance while it was 
making considerable profits. 
What these apparently similar work or employment practices that actually arise from 
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different contexts or paths suggest is that similar phenomena may have different 
significances or implications for firms and workers, depending on contexts from which 
the practices come. This awakens us about the importance of the process-centred 
approach to industrial relations research. It illustrates the potential dangers for the 
outcome-oriented, often survey-based, approach which may lose sight of important 
differences in contexts of similar phenomena. Cully et al. (1999: 42 - 4) echo these 
dangers by showing how diversely and confusingly the concept of teamworking is used 
when 65 percent of workplaces where most employees worked in team drops down to 
just 3 percent of workplaces where teams corresponded in full to the model of 
autonomous teamworking. This insight into research methodology suggests that there is 
a great need to look in the `black box' where independent variables are leading to 
dependent variables and to know exactly the internal working or processes of the black 
box. It also flags up the necessity to look at not only outcomes but also processes and 
contexts in the course of industrial relations research. Thus industrial relations research 
should be designed to grasp the whole of work structure as continuously evolving 
processes rather than to catch certain snapshot outcomes of work organisation in a 
certain moment. In this regard ostensibly similar patterns of work organisation between 
countries can be explained and dissimilar work organisation issues between countries 
can be analytically compared in their contexts. This supports Locke and Thelen's (1995) 
argument for contextualised cross-country comparisons by looking at changing 
processes and how intermediate variables work in those processes. 
10.2.2. Explanations of Divergent Work Organisation 
While each dimension of work organisation was examined in chapter 7-9, it has 
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become clear that work organisation issues are not purely technical or free from 
contexts. The systematic differences in patterns of work reorganisation between the two 
cases cannot be properly explained by linking a couple of direct or indirect variables 
because they are found to be closely associated with other contextual factors, such as 
national institutions, sectoral governance regimes, the existing structure of the 
companies or major actors' strategies. There is a need to contextualise reforms in work 
systems in order to explain divergent outcomes of work organisation. Drawing on the 
discussion on national institutions in chapter 4 and changing telecoms governance 
regimes in chapter 5, we can simplify the relationships between variables in the 
telecoms industry and draw a diagram showing how global forces lead to changes in 
work organisation. Relying on this diagram below, we can identify why divergent 
consequences have come into existence, and by what mechanisms. The direction of 
arrows points to the direction of influences or forces and the thickness of arrow denotes 
the degree of strength of influences or forces. 
Divergence in work organisation between the two companies can be traced back to a 
number of causes which are themselves linked to, but can be analytically separated 
from, each other. We can easily point out the differences in phases of transformation in 
national telecoms governance regimes between the two countries and their subsequent 
corporate restructuring between the two cases in accounting for divergence of work 
organisation. The timing of privatisation, market opening, and deregulation tends to 
determine the speed and degree of development in competition in domestic markets 
which in turn directly or indirectly affect the degree or direction of corporate 
restructuring and work restructuring. 
274 
Figure 10. Interactive processes of work restructuring 
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Note: The three arrows from global forces to national telecoms governance regimes and from 
the latter to management strategies and from management strategies to work systems have no 
labelling because those arrows are already assumed to exist. 
For example, the early privatisation of BT and market deregulation have led BT to be a 
market leader or pattern-setter in corporate restructuring and work reorganisation. The 
timing of the introduction of new technologies has significant impacts on corporate 
restructuring and work organisation. The introduction of CSS (Customer Services 
System) speeded up computerisation of service work and customisation of services in 
BT, while the failure to introduce ICIS (KT's equivalent of CSS) has further dampened 
275 
KT's efforts to computerise and rationalise clerical work and to customise services. 
Some divergence of work organisation may be explained by these gaps in phases. This 
explanation assumes that the laggard-like KT will eventually follow a similar path taken 
by leaders or pattern-setters such as BT and that work organisation may converge on 
that of leaders. 
However, there are important caveats to relatively simple phase-difference 
explanations. Differences in phases may be not only dependent on timing but also due 
to political, social or organisational factors. For example, the timing of privatisation 
and market deregulation is not a simple time matter but related to political or other 
national factors. When and how to privatise public telecoms monopolies and deregulate 
the telecoms market, may depend upon the responses of national institutions such as 
political systems to global structural forces. The privatisation of BT was politically 
motivated by the Thatcher government in order to reduce the role of the state and the 
power of trade unions. The underdevelopment of the stock market in Korea prevented 
the Korean government from privatising KT as early as 1993-4. The speed and ways of 
corporate restructuring may also be influenced by national industrial relations 
arrangements and organisational factors. The constant pressures from the City of 
London have driven BT to radically restructure and rationalise its management structure 
and operations to reduce costs and to improve efficiency, whereas the restrictive labour 
law and life-time employment in Korea barred KT from undertaking radical corporate 
restructuring. Thus, our search for the sources of many differences in work organisation 
should move to an analysis of the influences of national institutions on work 
organisation. The influence of national institutions on work organisation may be 
exercised through the following three mechanisms. 
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Firstly, divergent outcomes in work organisation between the two cases may be 
explained by the influence of national systems through mediation in the processes of 
changes in telecoms governance regimes, as discussed in chapter 5. Four global forces 
are underlying sources that have driven changes in work organisation, although they 
themselves are partly the outcomes of the deregulation of the telecoms industry in 
various countries (arrow `g' in the diagram), especially in the USA and the UK. The 
global forces are similarly pressing on each country to adopt new technologies, to 
deregulate markets, to compete with others and to comply with international regulation. 
These pressures are not directly transmitted to domestic telecoms operators. The global 
pressures are mediated by, and interact with, national political systems, financial 
systems or industrial relations system (arrow `a' in the diagram). The outcomes of these 
interactions or mediations are the transformation of the former public monopoly model 
into new national telecoms governance regimes. Thus Britain adopted more market- 
oriented regimes by privatising BT earlier, deregulating markets, introducing 
competition and establishing regulatory framework. Korea took the state-led slow 
reform of the existing public monopoly regime. How national institutions in Britain and 
Korea have led to differing governance regimes and what the governance regimes of the 
two countries are like, were discussed in chapter 4-5. These differences in telecoms 
governance regimes between the two countries have put competitive pressures on 
managements in the two companies to reform work organisation in varying ways or 
degrees. Managements in the two cases have been constrained or encouraged to do or 
not to do things in various directions or ways. For example, earlier market opening and 
high competitive pressures in the UK forced BT management to undertake more radical 
corporate restructuring and to reform work organisation in order to significantly reduce 
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costs and provide quality of service. Gradual developments in competition in Korea 
have left KT management to respond in incremental ways of reforming management 
structure and work organisation. 
Secondly, another source of differences may be found in the mechanism of influence 
of national systems on work organisation through their role in shaping management 
strategies, corporate structure, management values and norms and labour-management 
relations (arrow `b' in the diagram). As discussed earlier in chapter 4, the financial 
system in the UK has strongly influenced BT management in that BT management is 
forced to be very sensitive to share prices and the demands of the City of London. 
Strong shareholders' expectation of high short-term profitability has been an important 
factor in BT management's pursuit of aggressive cost reductions. BT management has 
been less constrained in undertaking radical corporate restructuring because labour 
relations are lightly regulated in legal terms. Embedded liberalism, and developed 
market mechanisms, combined with the Conservative government and declining union 
influence, aided BT management in gradually getting rid of the legacies of public 
enterprise. BT management's cost minimisation strategies have focused on reductions in 
labour costs and their related rationalisation from the early 1990s onwards. 
The leading role of the state in economic growth and management in Korea has 
greatly affected management in strategy formulation or implementation as a whole. KT 
management had largely done what the state had wanted it to do until the early 1990s. 
Rapid economic growth in Korea since the mid-1960s gave birth to growth-oriented 
business strategies, which made management pay little attention to corporate 
restructuring or cost minimisation, although the pursuit of those strategies was one of 
the main causes of the financial crisis in 1997. The domination of authoritarian military 
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government for more than 30 years had led to the militarisation of the society and the 
centralisation of decision-making structure in firms. Development in organisation-based 
employment systems and the poor social security system helped firms retain skilled 
labour and foster internal labour markets but has made it difficult for firms to restructure 
themselves in the face of recession or crisis. Moreover, the status of KT as a public 
enterprise has further shackled KT management in its pursuit of more rigorous 
commercial strategies. Thanks to these institutional arrangements, KT management 
have significantly been limited in its strategies, corporate restructuring and 
consequently work restructuring. With the development of market competition, the 
financial crisis in 1997, the ongoing privatisation and the government imposition on KT 
to reform, KT management has increasingly been forced to pursue a more commercial 
approach to its businesses. 
Thirdly, work is reorganised differently in the two companies because of 
management's varying relations with unions (arrows `h' and `i' in the diagram). Unions 
may play a part in forming management strategy and corporate restructuring. When the 
union recognised by BT faced radical corporate restructuring, it did not have strong 
means of constraining BT management or strategically intervening in corporate 
restructuring, apart from direct industrial action or pragmatic acceptance of corporate 
restructuring. Moreover, the union based on occupational unionism has shown its 
interest in distribution and job control issues, but has not formulated any proactive 
proposal on work organisation issues. The union's strategy of `negotiated change' does 
not appear to have influenced management strategies but sometimes slowed down the 
speed of corporate restructuring or modified some aspects of work restructuring in 
workers' favour. In contrast, high levels of legal regulation and repression of union 
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activities in Korea have brought about independent militant unionism with the 
democratisation of the society since 1987. The leadership of the KTTU which was 
newly elected in 1993, was imbued with this unionism which tends to oppose any form 
of corporate restructuring. KT management's unilateral decision-making style has 
merely made things worse. The KTTU has opposed most corporate restructuring in KT 
but surprisingly shown little interest in work organisation. In brief, the CWU's 
cooperation with BT has facilitated a smoother corporate restructuring once the union 
agreed, while the KTTU's conflictual relationship with KT management has often 
blocked, or slowed down, corporate restructuring. 
Apart from the influences of national institutions on work organisation between the 
two countries, there are other explanatory factors for differing ways of reorganising 
work. One broad and organisational factor is the disparate trajectories of the two 
companies as organisational factors. It includes a number of elements, such as the 
existing management structure, decisions made in the past, personnel arrangements, 
working practices and institutional inertia or legacies. These elements inherited from the 
past have tended to limit the range of options for management to take or to make it 
difficult for management to restructure its organisation or work. The structure of local 
telecoms centres upon which KT is based, is so embedded in the local community that 
KT management has had difficulty in rationalising and restructuring business processes 
and subsequently in restructuring work. It took BT more than seven years after 
privatisation to transform traditionally regionally-based structure into divisional one. 
The hierarchical structure of centralised authority and bureaucratic culture which was 
firmly established with the militarisation of the society after the 1960s onwards, has 
remained strong within KT and has been a major obstacle to the reforms of management 
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structure and practices. 
The grading structure in BT as a legacy of the public sector which is associated with 
job control or responsibility of each grade, has demonstrated great persistence. 
Although traditional job control has been eased through the implementation of task 
flexibility in BT, the existing grading arrangements have shown a considerable inertia. 
As the grading arrangements have remained the stickiest or most explosive issues in the 
two firms, managements have not been able to reform them easily. These issues often 
have blocked or delayed the introduction of the more flexible use of labour in BT. As 
the grading structure in KT is not associated with job responsibility but linked to status 
in the organisational hierarchy, it has not barred KT management from deploying labour 
flexibly but has raised another problem with the heavy hierarchy of management 
structure. BT is about to overhaul decades-old grading structure through protracted 
negotiations with the union, reflecting skill requirements and rewards. Even if KT has 
been caught up with the heavy hierarchical grading structure, KT management was not 
able to reform its grading structure but has taken a passive and incremental approach 
such as the freezing of the recruitment of unnecessary grades and waiting for them to 
die away over time. The persistence of grading arrangements and their different 
relationships with job control or responsibility may lead to the different reorganisation 
of work in the two companies. 
The late modernisation of the BT network, especially exchanges as a result of 
management investment strategy led BT management to keep high staffing levels until 
the early 1990s. Apart from competitive pressures, this high staffing level, the high 
proportion of labour costs out of operating costs and the completion of network 
upgrading provided BT management with strong motives to lower costs through large- 
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scale downsizing and radical work rationalisation. Low price policies imposed on KT 
by the military government to curb inflation in the 1980s led KT management to keep 
staffing levels low. The low staffing level, coupled with the expansion of the modern 
network in the 1980s requiring less maintenance and repair work, has provided KT 
management with little incentive to make efforts to cut costs through downsizing and 
work rationalisation. 
The existing industrial relations plays a part in accounting for differences in work 
organisation between the two cases. The long tradition of cooperative industrial 
relations and the strong presence of the unions in BT (well over 80% of employees are 
union members) have influenced BT management in certain ways. Although BT 
management has taken time in negotiating with, or met opposition from, the union over 
reforming organisational structure or introducing new working practices, it has been 
able to secure legitimacy for its plans and cooperation among workers once agreements 
are reached. This may have facilitated BT management to implement corporate 
restructuring and work reorganisation more smoothly than otherwise. However, 
frequent interventions of the state in labour-management relations in enterprises 
including KT, and employers' hostile attitude towards unions in Korea have tended to 
drive labour-management relations in enterprises to become antagonistic. As the new 
union leadership of KTTU from 1993 onwards challenged the authoritarian attitude of 
KT management and the guidelines in pay negotiation in the public sector which were 
designed to keep wage increases low by the government, labour relations in KT became 
confrontational. This confrontational atmosphere has stood in the way of corporate 
restructuring and work reorganisation. In brief, as corporate restructuring and the 
reorganisation of work are significantly path-dependent, work organisation between BT 
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and KT diverges. 
Another important factor, management may make differences in work organisation 
between the two operators. Management in the two has not remained passive actors 
merely following the logic or directions imposed or dictated by national institutions or 
competitive pressures but may actually have been more or less proactive in pursuing its 
objectives or strategies. Although bounded or constrained to a significant extent, 
management may have some strategic choices to make within certain limits. Room for 
management to manoeuvre might gradually increase as globalisation is claimed to 
reduce the influence of national institutions. However, the degree to which management 
possess autonomy should be balanced by the extent to which management is 
constrained by the various influences of national systems or imperatives of global 
forces, which is not an easy task. 
BT management has taken full advantage of the economies of scale available in 
corporate restructuring and work restructuring, while KT management has not made 
much effort to utilise such economies of scale. Although BT and KT introduced similar 
call centre technologies such as CTI, BT management has used them for control 
purposes, whilst KT management has not. This discrepancy may significantly reflect the 
fact that BT management has been under strong pressure to transform the former public 
monopoly into more efficient operation able to generate short-term profits, whereas the 
pressures on KT management have not been so strong. However, this kind of 
explanation of the differences in work organisation is not sufficient. For example, BT 
management has taken initiatives to invent and upgrade the Work Manager (WM) 
technologies in the processes of work rationalisation by asking its research centre to 
come up with an automatic work scheduling system. Differing from call centre 
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technologies which were imported from outside, the WM is BT management's own 
work, initiated by BT management. Likewise, Customer Services System (CSS) was 
also created under the initiatives of BT management. CSS has significantly contributed 
to work rationalisation and customisation in CSCs in BT. There have been unsuccessful 
but ongoing initiatives of developing more or less similar systems such as ICIS 
(Integrated Customer Information System) and RIMS (Repair and Installation 
Management System) in KT. These management initiatives, which are not dictated by 
contextual factors, may be one of the important causes for different work organisation 
between BT and KT. 
Overall, systematic differences found in work organisation between BT and KT seem 
to originate from variant influences of national institutions on telecoms governance 
regimes, management and unions and on trajectories that the two companies have 
trodden and the inertia from them, or disparate management strategies or initiatives 
towards corporate restructuring and new technologies. Small similarities observed 
arise from structural forces with a global nature. Apparently similar trends actually may 
arise from quite different contexts for different purposes. In this regard how work is 
reorganised is largely dependent upon contexts such as national systems and their 
related intermediate variables in the telecoms services industry. Empirical evidence 
gives little support to convergence of work organisation between the two cases in the 
telecommunications services industry. Work organisation diverges cross-nationally. 
10.3. Theoretical Implications 
The findings that work organisation in the telecommunications services industry 
diverges cross-nationally may have important theoretical implications for convergence 
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debate. Womack et al's (1990) argument for the convergence on `lean production' 
systems is rejected by this study. Even if lean production principles are associated with 
efficiency in production, work is reorganised according to the requirements of national 
systems, the path each company has trodden (structure, decisions, and practices) and 
management or union strategies as well as the imperatives of global competitive 
pressures. There is no inexorable force driving work organisation to converge on the 
terms of the lean production or best practice model. The transferability of working 
practices across borders is also questioned because work organisation issues are closely 
influenced by contextual factors. When work practices are imported to foreign 
environments, they are more likely to be modified or adjusted so as to accommodate the 
requirements of new settings. If work practices are successfully transferred, it would be 
limited to transplants of the same multinationals in foreign countries, probably in the car 
industry. Although BT is a leader in the telecommunications services industry in terms 
of its successful transformation from a former public monopoly into a blue-chip private 
company and KT management wanted to learn from BT's experience, there is no 
significant example of work organisation or management practices in KT which 
emulated those in BT. BT management has picked and chosen some lean production 
principles such as elements of JIT, minimal slack, the maximum use of the workforce 
and work rationalisation but deserted others such as teamworking, employee 
involvement, and supporting human resource management practices. What BT 
management has achieved is a rationalised `lean service' system, very different from 
Womack et al's `lean production' model. 
This line of reasoning might lead to the similar conclusion to institutionalism about 
convergence versus divergence. However, the ways in which national systems affect 
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the processes of reorganising work are more complex than conventional institutionalism 
suggests. The processes of mediation by a number of intermediate variables are not 
straightforward but involve multi-level `dynamic interactions' between intermediate 
variables. For instance, management strategies which have driven work organisation, 
are not only influenced by national institutions but also constrained by national 
telecoms governance regimes. Corporate restructuring which directly or indirectly 
affects the reorganisation of work, is guided by management strategies but subject to the 
inertia of old management structures or decisions made in the past. Various dimensions 
of corporate restructuring affect each other and together contribute to the reorganisation 
of work. That is, rationalisation and consolidation lead to downsizing and relocation, 
and vice versa, all of which have resulted in work reorganisation in a more profound 
way. Union policies towards work reorganisation are not only moulded by national 
industrial relations systems but also influenced by the history of labour management 
relations at the firm level and management strategies. Even different aspects of work 
organisation impinge on each other. These processes of complex and dynamic 
intermediation processes are not well addressed by conventional institutionalism. In 
order to capture these processes, we examined the processes of how intermediate 
variables work and interact with other variables in each process through in-depth 
qualitative researches. 
Another aspect of `dynamic interactions' may make the current discussion distinct 
from conventional institutionalism. Although the `societal effects' school underscores 
interdependence among various sub-systems or elements of national systems, influences 
of national systems on firms' behaviour including work organisation is unidirectional. 
National institutions are supposed to remain persistent despite significant changes in 
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external environments. This static model of institutionalism may not reflect the reality, 
especially in the period of significant changes in external environments. As we can see, 
interactions between different variables in the figure 10, their relationships are not 
unilateral or unidirectional. The directions of influences of those intermediate variables 
are both ways, though asymmetrical. 
Now we will look at how and by what mechanisms the relationships between 
variables may bring about dynamic interactions. National institutions have mediated 
global structural forces and have remoulded national telecoms governance regimes from 
protected public monopolies towards (partly) privatised companies under competitive 
conditions. National telecoms governance frameworks are an important interface 
between national institutions and global/structural forces based on sectoral/ 
technological conditions. These governance regimes may be a compromise between 
national systems and sectoral and technological imperatives. These regimes also 
constitute an element of national institutional arrangements. National systems which 
were established many years ago, are implicitly based on a balance between the 
competitive and protected sector, and between the private and public sector. These new 
telecoms governance regimes have contributed to an alteration in the proportional 
balance between the competitive private sector and the protected public sector towards 
the former. Moreover, as global forces grow, telecoms governance regimes in countries, 
though the degree and speed of move varies between countries, tend to move to 
privatisation, competition and the establishment of similar regulatory framework in the 
telecoms industry so as to accommodate the spread of technological innovation within 
the sectors, the establishment of common rules across countries and competitive 
conditions. Similar changes in other sectors such as electricity and gas may give birth 
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to significant changes in the balance, which may in turns result in some institutional 
reconfiguration. Thus new telecoms governance regimes may influence national 
systems in a reverse way (arrow `d' in the diagram in Figure 10), which may become an 
important conduit for institutional dynamism. 
Another source of dynamic interactions between variables may be found in 
substantive changes in the workplace that often lie hidden under ostensibly strong and 
formal institutions. There may be many occasions where there have been substantive 
changes, for example, in production systems, whereas formal procedures of industrial 
relations have remained relatively intact. The changes may have been achieved through 
stable plant-level structures of union representation and negotiation. BT may be one of 
these cases. While corporate industrial relations arrangements such as collective 
bargaining and consultation, although they are also subject to changes in favour of 
management, have remained relatively stable, work organisation has undergone a 
transformation from an old system based on public monopoly to a rationalised `lean 
service' system. Institutionalist perspectives may often be unable to recognise these 
qualitative structural changes behind the surface of institutional continuities (Terry 
1989). The discrepancies between the apparent continuity of procedural institutions and 
increasing substantive flexibility underneath `will pose long-term threats to the 
robustness of institutions' (Ferner and Hyman 1998, xxiv). These mismatches are 
compared to "shells being made hollow". These substantive changes underneath 
apparently robust institutional continuities may provide an important source of changes 
in national industrial relations systems. That is, work reorganisation may eventually 
affect national institutions in a dynamic way (the arrow `f in the diagram in Figure 10). 
It acts as a reverse way of influence on national institutions. These reverse influences 
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may make the processes of changes rather more interactive between variables. These 
dynamic interactions between variables may differ from the existing institutionalism 
which explains convergence between countries by unidirectional influences of national 
systems on industrial relations outcomes. 
The identification of those dynamic interactions between variables marks a 
theoretical development from the book, Telecommunications edited by Katz (1997), as 
well as the existing national institution theory, by recognising the ways in which 
national institutions may undergo changes or be influenced by other variables. Critically 
reviewing the limitations of simplified dichotomy in management industrial relations 
strategies between `direct control' and `responsible autonomy', between high and low 
trust, or between high commitment and work intensification, the thesis identifies 
variations within a low trust strategy, and conceptualises them into hard control and soft 
control. By identifying management sub-strategies (hard control and soft control) within 
low trust strategies in relations to work control, it addresses fundamental inconsistencies 
in the telecoms sector, raised by Katz (1997: 5), which arise from the incompatibility 
between cost-cutting and employee participation strategies. We have thus made two 
advances. First, we have given a more dynamic and interactive account than that 
offered by Katz. Second, we have shown that cost-cutting and participation need not 
be, as Katz argued, alternatives. 
Millward et al (2000: 234) argues for a transformation in the British industrial 
relations systems based on 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Surveys (WERS). It is 
a different verdict from the conclusions from the earlier WIRS (Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys). The sources of the transformation in British industrial relations 
systems are sought in changes in procedural arrangements such as collective bargaining 
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but not in substantive issues. However, the answer to seeking the sources of the 
transformation is not only in procedural issues but also in substantive matters. These 
two reverse influences, especially of work reorganisation on national institutions 
discussed above, may partly be an important source of a transformation in the British 
industrial relations systems. This reminds us of the necessity to simultaneously look at 
procedural arrangements and substantive matters in examining national industrial 
relations systems. The need for a perspective integrating procedural and substantive 
matters in investigating industrial relations, has to be underlined in order to correct the 
procedural biases of the existing institutional industrial relations theories. 
Apart from a need to focus on substantive issues in industrial relations research, the 
thesis finds two further needs with methodological implications. When we make cross- 
country studies, we need to make contextualised comparisons because apparently 
similar phenomena or issues have different meanings or backgrounds, which is detailed 
in the previous section. We should also look at social processes involved in work 
restructuring rather than just to focus on outcomes in industrial relations research in 
order to uncover how and why work is reorganised. These findings which require 
industrial relations researchers to stress substantive issues, processes and contextualised 
comparisons, will make qualitative industrial relations research more fruitful than 
otherwise. 
This thesis has captured these processes by looking at possible intermediate 
variables and examining how they mediate and structure the processes of changes and 
transmission of competitive forces by these intermediate variables from global level to 
workplace level. This revealed how similar global forces eventually lead to different 
ways of reorganising work between countries in the processes of dynamic interactions 
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between variables. This process-led approach provides an important analytical insight 
into an explanation of convergence versus divergence in a new way. 
10.4. Research Limitations and the Direction of Future 
Research 
The current research has been conducted within a definite time scale and is subject 
to some limitations in research methodology and scope. As we selected the two cases in 
the two countries, it is very difficult to disentangle `company effects', `industry effects' 
from `country effects'. The research is focused on developments in the field and CSCs, 
both of which are more service-led labour-intensive parts of the organizations. If we had 
looked at more technology-intensive parts, business-customers serving parts, or sales 
parts of the organisations, we might have got somewhat different pictures. The issues 
we seek to address here are limited to certain aspects of work organisation. If the 
research had encompassed other industrial relations issues or human resource 
management issues, the outcomes of the research would have been richer and complete. 
In relation to the direction of future research, most research, including the current 
study, have explicitly or implicitly assumed that national institutions or systems remain 
stable over the years, once they are established. National institutionalists in their cross- 
national research have been largely interested in how national institutions structure or 
shape country-specific features in organisation and work relations. The assumption 
could be well applied in the period of relative stability from 1945 into the 1970s in the 
western world. However, the assumption may go wrong when the period of relative 
stability ended and important changes in external environments started in the 1980s and 
1990s. Although some scholars (Mayer and Whittington 1999) argue for `loose' 
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national systems against `tight' ones that are flexible enough to accommodate various 
organisational changes and industrial relations changes and to endure inconsistent or 
sometimes contradictory phenomena, some parts of national systems are unravelling or 
have altered over the years. What will happen to work and employment relations if 
national institutions themselves are subject to changes? This question is rarely 
considered in theoretical frameworks in industrial relations research. Taking into 
account profound changes in external environments, we need to integrate the dynamics 
arising from these changes into theoretical frameworks and develop a view which 
incorporates institutional dynamics which would replace the current 'static' 
institutionalism. 
We are able to identify the two sources of dynamic interactions between variables in 
the previous section. These two can be the sources of institutional dynamism. Future 
research needs to examine not only how national systems affect and shape work and 
employment relations but also how national systems are subject to changes or affected 
by other variables in fast changing environments. These interactive dynamics may 
constitute institutional dynamism, distinct from `static institutionalism'. Apart from 
these, there may be two main sources of institutional dynamism - exogenous and 
endogenous. Addressing this dynamism, we can deal with the debate on convergence 
versus divergence in a more complete way and within a globalising context. 
Institutional dynamism may arise from a number of exogenous sources. Firstly, the 
rise of the so-called `new economy' related to information technology may shake the 
existing national systems associated with the `old economy' by outpacing the speed of 
growth and inducing huge investment in the new economy. Their activities are much 
less likely to be influenced by the existing institutional framework because they are 
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mostly entrepreneurial and have few legacies of the past. The telecommunications 
services industry is an important part of the new economy. Secondly, another 
institutional change may stem from the globalisation and mobility of financial capital. 
The changes in national financial systems may prompt the fabric of national business 
systems to unravel by changing the relationships between banks and industry and 
altering corporate governance regimes. Thirdly, the identification of distinct national 
models by institutionalists and subsequent `regime competition' (Streeck 1992b; 
Whitley 1992: 250-1), may lead to various attempts to adopt superior models but may 
eventually result in an institutional evolution through adaptations or hybridisation. This 
is an important way in which dynamism operates around national institutions. Fourthly, 
as an endogenous source of institutional dynamism one important development in 
national industrial relations institutions is the decentralisation of collective bargaining 
and the decline in macro-national concertation in many countries in the 1980s and 1990 
(Hassel 1999; Katz and Darbishire 1999). This decentralised bargaining has also 
brought an enterprise-focus of IR decision-making or strategy into focus (Locke 1995a, 
12: Regini 1995,71-84). The secular decline in union density and influence during the 
1980s and 1990s has helped management gain the upper hand in bargaining power. 
Lastly, existing national institutions may function differently in a new global 
environment. For example, enterprise unions in Korea that had been a conduit for 
management control over workers under the military governments have become an 
effective means for workers to promote their objectives in a newly democratised society. 
The Japanese financial systems which were thought of as providing Japan with 
industrial competitiveness, are now regarded as becoming a culprit of the Japanese 
economic troubles in the latter half of the 1990s. 
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In the existing institutionalist literature, national institutions are regarded as 
functioning like catalysts in chemistry. However, the social world is different from the 
natural world in that society itself changes and is also formed in the processes of 
interaction between its various forces. Institutional dynamism may make interactions 
between global forces, national institutions, management, unions and work/employment 
relations more dynamic and complex. Institutional dynamism which integrates social 
structuring of industrial relations by national systems with these institutional changes, 
may provide us with a tool whereby we can adopt an approach to comparative analyses 
which differs from static institutional approaches. It will make it possible for IR 
researchers to draw a more complete picture of the interaction in a world undergoing 
significant environmental changes. This task is left to future research. 
294 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
1. Magazines and Briefings 
BT. The Manager (1997) 
BT. BT Today. (monthly magazine), various issues in 1997 -1999. 
NetworkBT. News Services, various editions. 1998 - 99. 
BT Customer Service Management. News Service. 1998; 
CWU. "Letters to Branches (LTB) in 1995 - 9. 
CWU. `CWU Voice'(monthly magazine), various issues in 1995 - 1999. 
CWU/NCU London Clerical. `London Link' (monthly). various issues in 1991 - 1999. 
CWU. 'CWU Briefings. ' (biweekly internal circulations), various issues in 1997 - 1999 
CWU Bristol Clerical and Associated Computer Branch. `CSC Newsletter' in 1996 -7. 
CWU Central London Engineering Branch. `Crosstalk' various issues in 1997- 1999. 
(April 1997 No. 2. ) 
CWU London North West Branch. `The Line', various issues in 1997. 
NCU. "Letters to Branches (LTB) in 1988 - 94. 
NCU. 'NCU Journal' (monthly magazine), various issues in 1988 - 1994. 
KT. `Korea Telecom News. ' various issues in 1996 - 99. 
KT Seoul Regional Division. `KT Seoul News. ' 1997-1999. 
2. Internal Documents 
BT. Annual Reports and Accounts. each year 
BT. May 1988. "Customer Lines and Equipment: Job Descriptions. " 
BT/NCU. 21S` Feb. 1989. "Contractors Working in the Local Network. " (an agreement) 
BT. 1990a. "Personal Communications Division Field Operation Future Organisation. " 
BT. Nov. 1990. "PCD Field Operations Future Organisation. " 
BT/NCU. April 1991. "Agreement on Attendance Arrangement at CRU. " 
BT. 1992. "Work Management System: PC Midland Pilot. " 
BT. 22°d May 1992. `BT plc - Use of Contractors' (correspondence to the NCU) 
BT. 1993a. "Field Effectiveness and Continuous Improvement Programme: Awareness 
Briefing - Questions and Answer. " 
BT. 1993b. `Team Briefing: Field Effectiveness and Continuous Improvement 
Programme' 
BT. 1994a. A Correspondence sent to newly appointed Field Managers by Andy Green, 
Director of UK Customer Field Services. 
BT. 1994b. `Field Quality Standard for Overhead Repair. ' 
BT. 1994c. `Field Quality Standard for Provision Work/Overhead Work. ' 
BT. 1994d. "Field Quality Standard for PCP/SCP Work. " 
BT. 1994e. `Field Support Office: Clerical Tasks & Duty Notes' 
BT/CWU. Oct. 1994. "CSIP Attendance Patterns Agreement. " 
BT. 1995a. "CSNO Battleplan" 
BT. 1995b. "Battle Plan. " 
BT. 1995c. "Moments of Truth. " 
BT. Aug. 1995. Internal correspondence (02 August. 1995). 
295 
BT. Sep. 1995. "CSNO Battleplan. " 
BT. Sep. 1995. "BT- Ten Years of Change. " Employment Seminar, Brussels. 
BT. 10 Sep. 1995. A Letter to the NCU. 
BT. 1995. "Break-In. " 
BT. 1996a. `Task Notes - Field Performance Office Clerical Support', ISIS directive 
BT. 1996b. "Work Manager" - http: //innovate. bt. com/high_achieversfbt-gold_medal/ 
1996. htm 
BT. June 1996. "Notes of the meeting with the unions to discuss the Midlands Access 
Controls Rationalisation. " 
BT. Nov. 1996. "Nationally Agreed Code of Practice for Call Monitoring in PCD. " 
BT. 1996. Self-Assessment Report. London: BT. 
BT PCD. 27"' Sep. 1996. "Notes of a Meeting with CWU. " 
BT 1997a. "The Network Operation Unit Consolidation Project - Phase I- Midlands, 
Wales and West. " 
BT. 1997b. "Midlands, Wales & West Zone Consolidation Project Phase II. " 
BT. 1997c. "Framework 2000. " N&SO Briefing. 
BT. 1997d. "Internal audit report on provision process and repair process. " 
BT. 1997e. "Project First Choice. " 
BT. May 1997. "PCD Customer Accounts". 
BT. 8`" Aug. 1997. "A Letter to London N&SO Co-ord Committee of CWU from 
Acting Director Network & Service Operations London & International. " 
BT. Nov. 1997. "Management Style: The Case for Change. " 
BT. Dec. 1997. "Project First Choice: Presentation Slide. " 
BT/CWU. 1997. "Agreement for the Introduction of New Flexible Full-Time Contract 
for 150 CSCs. " 
BT PCD CSC. Nov. 1997. Internal document. 
BT. March 1998. "Project 1S" Choice: the Management Briefing. " 
BT. 1999a. "BT World Communications Report 1998/9. " http: /www. bt. com /global 
reports/ 1998-99/exec. htm. (chap. 1) 
BT. 1999b. "Dynamic Scheduler. " http: //innovate. bt. com/showcase/work_schedule/ 
Whiteeaper/detail-2. htm. 
BT. July 1999. "Audio Briefing On Project Jaguar. " 
BT. July 1999. "Project Jaguar. " 
CWU. 1995. "Communications 1 Industrial Executive Report. " 
CWU. 1997. "Working in a Customer Service Centre - CWU Survey. " 
CWU. May 1997. "T&FSE Strategy Document. " 
CWU Thames Valley Clerical Branch. 1997. "Secretary's Report to the Branch A. QM. " 
CWU Peterborough Branch. 1997. "1996 Annual Report. " 
CWU. Feb. 1998. "Letter to National Resource Manager: CSCs in BT Consumer 
Division. " 
CWU Midlands Clerical Regional Committee. 1998. "Stress Survey Results. " 
CWU Home Counties Clerical Regional Committee. 1998. "CD CSC members' Stress 
Survey. " 
296 
CWU Glasgow Clerical. 1998. "CSC members' Stress Survey. " (cited from CWU. June 
1999 Voice) 
CWU. 1998. "A letter to national resource manager' of CSCs in BT Consumer 
Division. " 
CWU Birmingham External Branch. 1998. "1997 Annual Report. " 
CWU. May 1999. "Telecoms & Financial Services Executive Report', CWU 
Conference. " 
CWU. Dec. 1999. `BT Call Centre strikes called off as `best practice' deal is agreed. " 
http: //www. cwu. org/Btcentres49. htm 
Darlington, Roger. 1996. "British Telecom: Staffing Problems and Processes. " CWVU 
Research. 
KT. Annual Reports and Annual Accounts. each year. 
KT. 1992. Ten Years' History of KT Seoul: Korea Telecom. 
KT. Feb. 1992. Report on the Results of the Review of the Workforce. Seoul: Korea 
Telecom 
KT Management Diagnosis Commission. 1994. A Comprehensive Report on KT 
Management Diagnosis. Seoul: Korea Telecom. 
KT. 1996. KT Statistics. Seoul: KT. 
KT. March 1996. Report on 1995 Management Performance. Seoul: Korea Telecom. 
KT. March 1996. "The 2°d Launch of Korea Telecom toward 215" Century: around 
Organisational Innovation. " 
KT. Oct. 1996. "Report on the Extent of the Implementation of Corporate Internal 
Reform for Enhancing KT Competitiveness. " 
KT. Nov. 1996. "Job Analysis at Local Telecom Centres. " 
KT Marketing Team. Nov. 1996. Report on the Result of BPR Implementation of 
Marketing Areas. Seoul: KT. 
KT. 1997. "The Analysis of 1996 Integrated Management Performance. " 
KT. 1997b. "PIN TO KT. " 
KT. March 1997. Report on 1996 Management Performance. Seoul: KT. 
KT. March 1997a. The Analysis of 1996 Overall Management Performance. Seoul: KT. 
KT. June 1997. Report on the Corporate Review of the Workforce at Local Telecom 
Centres. Seoul: KT 
KT. 1998a. internal document on FOCUS. 
KT. 1998b. Plan for the Rationalisation of Local Telecom centres. Sungnam, Korea: KT. 
KT. June 1998. "The Restructuring Plan of KT for the Restoration of Competitiveness 
and the Maximisation of Corporate Value. " 
KT. July 1998. "Plan for Upgrading the Organisational and Workforce Structure. " 
KT. August 1998. "Plans to Restructure Korea Telecom for the Restoration of 
Competitiveness and the Maximisation of its values. " 
KT. Dec. 1998. The Rationalisation of Local Telecom Centres. Sungnam, Korea: KT. 
KT Marketing Division. 1998. "CS Academy. " 
KT Reorganisation Team. Jan. 1998. "Report on the Results of the Reorganisation. " 
KT. 1999a. "The Questions FOCUS agents ask of customers in new provisions of 
services, fault repairs, and removals. " 
297 
KT. 1999b. "Quality Improvements and Upgrading of the Local Network. " 
KT. 1999c. Report on Diagnosis of Core Processes and Improvement Plan for Them. 
Sungnam, Korea: KT. 
KT. 1999d. "The Current Number of Installation and Repair Technicians. " 
KT. Feb. 1999. Report on 1998 Management Performance. Sungnam, Korea: KT. 
KT. April 1999. "The Current Situation of the Use of Temporary Workers. " 
KT. June 1999. The 2"d Implementation Plan for The Rationalisation of Local Telecom 
Centres. Sungnam: KT. 
KT. June 1999. "Reform of Corporate Rules on Organisational Arrangements. " 
KT. August 1999. Plan for the Diagnosis Report of, and Improvements in Core 
Processes. Sungnam: KT. 
KT CSCs. 1999. "Inbound Script Worksheets for Service Order and Enquiries. " 
KT CSCs. May 1999. "ACD Performance Report. ". 
KT Directory Enquiry Centres. 1999. "How to Respond Customers for their 
convenience. " 
KT Directory Enquiry Centres. 1999. "Tables for examining operators. " 
KT Marketing CS Team. Jan. 1999. "Implementation Plan for Customer Services in 
1999. " 
KT Marketing CS Team. May 1999. "Basic Plan for Great Improvement in Customer 
Service Centres. " 
KT Management Rationalisation Team. June 1999. "Implementation Plan for the 2"d 
Rationalisation of local telecom centres. " 
KT Management Rationalisation Team. Aug. 1999. "Plan for Improvement for, and 
Report on, Core Process Diagnosis. " 
KT Network Division Subscriber Transmission Team. March 1999. "Improvement Plan 
and Comprehensive Diagnosis of the Local Loop. " 
KT Network Division. March 1999. "Comprehensive Diagnosis of Local Loops and 
Plan for the Improvements. " 
KT Seoul Regional Division. April 1999. "Management Contract. " 
KT Seoul Directory Inquiry Centre. May 1999. "A Guide to Directory Inquiry Centre. " 
KTTU. Annual Reports. each year in 1995-1998 
KTTU. 1998. "A Collection of Reports on Problems with FOCUS from Local 
Branches. " 
KTTU. July 1999. "Electronic Board News for members. " 
KTTU Women's Departiment. Feb. 1999. "The Current Number of `114' Operators. " 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE). 1993 - 5. Yearly Reports on the 
Government Invested Enterprise Management Performance Evaluation. 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFE). 1999. "The Road to Recovery: Korea's 
Ongoing Economic Reform. " Economic Bulletin May. 1999.30 - 47. 
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). 1996. Information and 
Communications White Paper. Seoul: MIC. 
298 
MIC. Dec. 1999. "Telecommunication in Korea 1999. " http: //webdb. mic. go. kr: 8080/ 
mic-english/news/main5. htm. 
MIC. 1999. "Promoting Competition and Ensuring a Level Playing Field. " 
National Assembly. 1996,1997,1998. "Report on Korea Telecom. " 
Oftel. 1997.1996 Annual Report. London: HMSO 
Oftel. 1999.1998 Annual Report. London: HMSO 
Oftel. Feb. 1999. "Quality of Service in Telecommunications: Comparable Performance 
Indicators. " 
Oftel. June 1999. "Market Information. " 
Oftel. July 1999. "Future developments in the competitiveness of UK communication 
market. " http: //www. oftel. gov. uk/pricing/prc799. htm. 
Oftel. March 2000. "Price Control Review: A consultative document issued by the 
Director General of Telecommunications on possible approaches for future retail 
price and network charge controls. " 
299 
Secondary Sources 
Beattie, Pat. 1991. Inside British Telecom: A Management Report on a Leading World 
Player in Telecommunications and Information Technology. 2"d edition. Alexandria, 
VA.: Telecom Publishing Group. 
Carrel, H., J. Miezejeski, K. Sara and S. Wittering. June 1993. BT: A Strategic Analysis. 
Northern Business Information. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Espicom Businesss Communications. 1997. `BT. ' 
Financial Times. FT Telecom Market. 13 Feb. 1997,13 March 1997,19 June 1997. 
Financial Times. Various articles in 1988 - 1999. 
IDS. April 1994. `IDS Study' No. 551. 
IDS. March 1995. "Customer service drive brings new working time patterns to BT. " 
IDS. Oct. 1997. `IRS Report' No. 747 
IDS. Feb. 1998. `Call centres 1: salaries and reward strategies'. Pay and Benefits 
Bulletin. No. 442. 
IDS. June 1999. `Call centres 1: just rewards? ' Pay and Benefits Bulletin. No. 474. 
IDS. 1999. Call centres 2: it's about positioning', Pay and Benefits Bulletin. No. 478. 
IRRR. Oct. 1987. `Facing up to flexibility at BT - agreement on temporary workers'. 
No. 402. 
IRS Employment Trends 579: 
Phemonte, Philip. 1994. Inside BT- A Management Report on a Leading World Player 
in Telecommunications and Information Technology. 5`" edition. Alexandria VA.: 
Telecom Publishing Group. 
TURU. 1989. "United Kingdom: Nation Study", in Employment Structure and Trends in 
Telecoms. Brussels. 
300 
Books and Journal Articles 
Adler, P., T. Kochan, J. MacDuffie, and R. Pil. 1997. "United States: Variations on a 
Theme. " in After Lean Production: Evolving Employment Practices in the World 
Auto Industry, edited by T. Kochan, R. Lansbury and J. P. MacDuffie, 61-83. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Alder, Johannes. 1997. "Data Warehousing Devours Customer Market Research: The 
Telecomunications Industry as an Example. ' a paper presented in 211`h ESOMAR 
Seminar. Business to Business Marketing: Recent Developments, 20-2 April 1997.. 
Vienna, Austria: 20-2 April 1997. 
Amsden, Alice. 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Amsden, Alice. 1990. "Third World Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New 
Model? " New Left Review No. 182: 5- 31. 
Appelbaum, Eileen and Rosemary Batt. 1994. The New American Workplace: 
Transforming Work Systems in the United States. Ithaca, New York: ILR Press. 
Atkinson, J. 1984. "Manpower strategies for flexible organisation. " Personnel 
Management August: 28-31 
Atkinson, J. and N. Meager. 1986. "New Forms of Work Organisation. " IMS Report No. 
121. Brighton: Institute of Manpower Studies 
Bamber, Greg J. and Russel D Lansbury. 1993. International and Comparative 
Industrial Relations: A Study of Industrialised Market Economies. London: 
Routledge. 
Batstone, E., A. Ferner and M. Terry. 1984. Consent and Efciency: Labour Relations 
and Management Strategy in the State Enterprise. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher. 
Batt, Rosemary. 1995. "Performance and Welfare Effects of Work Restructuring: 
Evidence from Telecommunications Services. " Ph. D. dissertation, Sloan School of 
Management, MIT. 
Berry, L., A. Parasuraman, V. Zeithaml, and D. Adsit. 1994. "Improving service quality 
in America: Lessons learned. " The Academy of Management Executive 8(2): 32 - 
Bowen, David and William Youngdahl. 1998. "`Lean' service in a defence of 
production-line approach. " International Journal of Service Industry Management 
9(3): 207-225. 
Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in 
the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Cappelli, P., B. Laurie, H. Katz, D. Knoke, P. Osterman and M. Useem. 1997. Change 
301 
at Work. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chandler, Alfred D. Jr. 1962. Structure and Structure: Chapters in the History of the 
Industrial Enterprise. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Chang, Ha-Joon and Richard Kozul-Wright. 1994. "Organising Development: 
Comparing the National Systems of Entrepreneurship in Sweden and South Korea. " 
The Journal of Development Studies 30(3): 859-91. 
Choi, Jang-Jip. 1988. Labour Movement in Korea and the State. Seoul, Korea: 
Yeolumsa (in Korean). 
Choi, Jang-Jip. 1994. "South Korean Labour Unions under the New Democacy. ", a 
paper presented at the Conference on Korean Society, Capitalism and Corporatism in 
Korea: Comparative Perspective, May 15 - 18. Georgetown University, USA. 
Cho, Dong-Sung. 1992. "From Subsidiser to Regulator - The Changing Role of Korean 
Government. " Long Range Planning 25(6): 48-55. 
Cho, Shin, B. Choi and S. Choi. 1996. "Restructuring the Korean telecommunications 
market: Evolution and challenge ahead. " Telecommunications Policy 20(5): 357-73. 
Clarke, Thomas. 1993. "The Political Economy of the UK Privatisation Programme: A 
Blueprint for other countries. " In The Political Economy of Privatisation, edited by 
Thomas Clarke and Christos Pitelis, 205- 33. London: Routledge. 
Clark, J, I. McLoughlin, H. Rose, and R. King. 1988. The process of technological 
change: New technology and social choice in the workplace. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Colling, Trevor and Anthony Ferner. 1995. "Privatization and Marketization. " In 
Industrial Relations: Theory & Practices in Britain, edited by Paul Edwardd, 491 - 
514. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Cook, Paul. 1998. "Privatisation in the UK: Policy and performance. " In Privatisation 
in the European Union: Theory and Policy Perspectives, edited by David Parker, 218 
-41. London: Routledge. 
Cully, Mark, S. Woodland, A. O'Reilly and G. Dix. 1999. Britain at Work: As depicted 
by the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. London: Routledge. 
Dastmatchian, Ali and P. Byton. 1998. "Organisational Flexibility in Cross-National 
Perspective: an Introduction. " The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management 9(3): 437-44. 
Delbridge, R., P. Turnbull, and B. Wilkinson. 1992. "Pushing back the frontier: 
management control and work intensification under JITI TQM factory regimes. " New 
Technology, Work and Employment 7(2): 97-106. 
Delbridge, Rick. 1995. "JIT: Control and Resistance in a Japanese Transplant. " Journal 
302 
of Management Studies 32(6): 803-17. 
Deyo, Fredrik. 1989. Beneath the Miracle: Labour Subordination in the New Asian 
Industrialism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Dickens, Linda and Mark Hall. 1995. "The State: Labour Law and Industrial Relations", 
in Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in Britain, edited by Paul Edwards, 255- 
303. Oxford: Blackwell. 
DiMaggio, Paul and Walter W Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organisational Fields. " American 
Sociological Review 48: 147-60. 
Djelic, Marie-Laure. 1998. Exporting the American Model: The Postwar 
Transformation of European Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dore, Ronald. 1998. "Asian crisis and the future of the Japanese model. " Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 22: 773-87. 
DTI. 1998. Regulating Communications: approaching convergence in the information 
Age. London: The Stationery Office. 
Edwards, P., M. Hall, R. Hyman, P. Marginson, K. Sisson, J. Waddington, and D. 
Winchester. 1998. "Great Britain: From Partial Collectrivism to Neo-liberalism to 
Where? " in Changing Industrial Relations in Europe (2"d), edited by Anthony Ferner 
and Richard Hyman, 1- 54. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Elger, Tony. 1990. "Technical Innovation and Work Reorganisation in British 
Manufacturing in the 1980s: Continuity, Intensification or Transformation. " Work 
Employment and Society special issue: 67- 101. 
Elger, Tony and Paul Edwards. 1999. "National States and the Regulation of Labour in 
the Global Economy: An Introduction" In The Global Economy, National States and 
the Regulations of Labour, edited by Paul Edwards and Tony Elger, 1-41. London: 
Mansel Publishing. 
Feitzinger, Edward and Hau Lee. 1997. "Mass Customisation at Hewlett-Packard: The 
Power of Postponement. " Harvard Business Review 75(1): 116 - 121. 
Ferner, Anthony and Trevor Colling. 1993. "Privatisation of the British Utilities: 
Regulation, Decentralisation and Industrial Relations. " In The Political Economy of 
Privatisation, edited by Thomas Clarke and Christos Pitelis, 125-41. London: 
Routledge. 
Ferner, Anthony and Mike Terry. 1997. "United Kingdom. " In Telecommunications: 
Restructuring Work and Employment Relations Worldwide, edited by Harry C Katz, 
89-121. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Ferner, Anthony and J. Quintanilla. 1998. "Multinationals, national business systems 
303 
and HRM: the enduring influence of national identity or a process of `Anglo- 
Saxonisation. " The International Journal of Human Resource Management 9(4): 
710- 31. 
Ferner, Anthony and R. Hyman. 1998. "Introduction: Towards European Industrial 
Relations", in Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, edited by Anthony Ferner 
and Richard Hyman, 2°d ed. xi - xxiv. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
Fernie, Sue and David Metcalf. 1998. "Hanging on the Telephone: pay systems in the 
new sweatshops. " Centre for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper No. 390. 
Financial Times. Spring 2000. Understanding CRM. FT Surveys. 
Finney, Heather M. 1996. "Big Brother is Watching: employees response to 
technological surveillance. " MA dissertation. Coventry: The University of Warwick. 
Florida, Richard and Martin Kennedy. 1991. "Transplanted Organisations: the transfer 
of Japanese industrial organisation to the US. " American Sociological Review 56: 
381-98. 
Florida, Richard and Martin Kenny. 1996. "Japanese Automotive Transplants. " In 
Social Reconstructions of the World Automobile Industry: Competition, Power and 
Industrial Flexibility, edited by Frederic C. Deyo, 51 - 83. London: MacMillan 
Press. 
Fox, Alan. 1974. Beyond Contract: Work, Power, and Trust Relations. Faber and 
Faber. 
Fox, Alan. 1985. Man Mismanagement. Coventry: Hutchinson. 
Frenkel, S., M. Tam, M. Korczynski and K. Shire. 1998. "Beyond bureaucracy? Work 
organisation in call centres. " The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management 9(6): 957-79. 
Frenkel, Steve, M. Korczynski, K. Shire, and M. Tam. 1999. One the Front Line: 
Organisation of Work in the Information Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Gallie, Duncan. 1991. "Patterns of Skill Change: Upskilling, Deskilling or the 
Polarisation of Skills. " Work, Employment and Society 5(3): 317- 351. 
Gill, Roger and Alphonsus Wong. 1998. "The cross-cultural transfer of management 
practice: The case of Japanese human resource management practices in Singapore. " 
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 9(1), 116-35. 
Gilmore, James H. and Joseph Pine II. 1997. "The Four Faces of Mass Customisation. " 
Harvard Business Review 75(1): 91 - 101. 
Graham, Laurie. 1994. "How does the Japanese Model Transfer to the United States?: 
A view from the line. " In Global Japanisation? The transformation of the labour 
process, edited by Tony Eiger and Chris Smith, 123-5 1. London: Routledge. 
304 
Hall, Peter. 1986. Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain 
and France. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hall, Peter. 1993. "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of 
Economic Policymaking in Britain. " Comparative Politics 25: 275-96. 
Hammer, Michael and James Champy 1993. Re-engineering The Coorperation: A 
Manifesto for Business Revolution. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing. 
Hart, Christopher. 1995. "Mass customisation: conceptual underpinnings, opportunities 
and limits. " International Journal of Service Industry Management 6(2): 36-45. 
Hassel, Anke. 1999. "The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations. " 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 37(3): 483-505. 
Hollingsworth, J. R., P. Schmitter, and W. Streeck. 1994. "Capitalism, Sectors, 
Institutions and Performance. " In Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and 
Control of Economic Sector, edited by J. R. Hollingsworth, P. Schmitter and W. 
Streeck, 3-16. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hollingsworth, J. R. and W. Streeck. 1994. "Countries and Sectors. " In Governing 
Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of Economic Sector, edited by J. R. 
Hollingsworth, P. Schmitter and W. Streeck, 270-300. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hulsink, W. 1999. Privatisation and Liberalisation in European Telecommunications: 
Comparing Britain the Netherlands and France. London: Routledge. 
Hyman, Richard. 1988. "Flexible Specialisation: Miracle or Myth? " in New Technology 
and Industrial Relations, edited by Richard Hyman and Wolfgang Streeck, 48- 60. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hyman, Richard. 1989. The Political Economy of Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in a 
Cold Climate. London: MacMillan. 
Hyman, Richard. 1991. "Plus ca change? The Theory of Production and the Production 
of Theory. " In Farewell to Flexibility, edited by Anna Poltert, 259-83. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Hyman, Richard. 1995. "The Historical Evolution of British Industrial Relations. ", in 
Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in Britain, edited by Paul E. Edwards. 27- 
49. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hyman, Richard. 1998. "Industrial Relations in Europe: Crisis or Reconstruction? " In 
Advancing Theory in Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a Global Context, 
edited by Ton Wilthagen, 181- 94. Oxford: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Science. 
Hyman, Richard. 1998. "Trade Union Research and Cross-national Comparison. " 
305 
Sociologie et Societes. 
Hyun, Daiwon and John A. Lent. 1999. "Korean telecom policy in global competition. " 
Telecommunication Policy 23(5): 389-401. 
Ishida, Mitsuo. 1997. "Japan: Beyond the Model for Lean Production. " in After Lean 
Production: Evolving Employment Practices in the World Auto Industry, edited by T. 
Kochan, R. Lansbury and J. P. MacDuffie, 45-60. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Janelli, Roger L. 1993. Making Capitalism: The Social and Cultural Construction of a 
South Korean Conglomerate. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Johnson, Tom and Mark Jakeman. 1997. The Customer Challenge: The Inside story of 
a remarkable transformation in customer service. London: Financial Times Pitman 
Publishing. 
Jones, Bryn. 1991. "Technological Convergence and Limits to Managerial Control: 
Flexible Manufacturing Systems in Britain, the USA and Japan. " In The Power to 
Manage? Employers and Industrial Relations in Comparative-historical 
Perspective, edited by Steve Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, 231-55. London: 
Routledge. 
Jürgens, Ulrich, T. March, and K. Dohse. 1993. Breaking From Taylorism: Changing 
Forms of Work in the Automobile Industry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Katz, H. C. 1997. "Introduction and Comparative Overview. " In Telecommunications: 
Restructuring Work and Employment Relations Worldwide, edited by Harry C Katz, 
1-28. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Katz, Harry C and Owen Darbishire. 2000. Converging Divergence: Worldwide 
Changes in Employment Systems. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Kawakita, Takashi. 1997. "Corporate strategy and human resource management. " In 
Japanese Labour and Management in Transition: Diversity, flexibility and 
participation, edited by Mari Sako and Hiroki Sato, 79-103. London: Routledge. 
Katzenstein, Peter. 1989. "Stability and Change in the Emerging Third Republic. " In 
Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic, edited by Peter 
Katzenstein, 307 -53. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Keefe, Jeffrey and Rosemary Batt. 1997. "United States. " In Telecommunications: 
Restructuring Work and Employment Relations Worldwide, edited by Harry C Katz, 
31-88. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Kerr, Clark, J. Dunlop, F. Harbison and C. Myers 1960. Industrialism and Industrial 
Man. Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
Kinnie, Nick, S. Hutchison and J. Purcell. 1999. "Fun and Surveillance: The Paradox of 
High Commitment Management in Call Centres. " A paper presented at BUIRA IIRAI 
306 
Study Group Conference. Cardiff Business School. Jan. 6-7,1999. 
Kitay, Jim and R. Callus. 1998. "The Role and Challenge of Case Study Design in 
Industrial Relations Research. " In Research the World of Work: Strategies and 
Methods in Studying Industrial Relations, edited by Keith Whitfield and George 
Strauss, 101 - 12. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Knight, D., F. Noble and H. Willmott. 1999. "Constituting the CSR: Consumption, 
Production and the Labour Process in Call Centres. " 17`h Annual International 
Labour Process Conference. Royal Holloway, University of London. 
Korea Management Research Institute. Dec. 1997. Research on Strategic Options for 
the Structure of Organisation and the Workforce Following the Repositioning into a 
Government Invested Enterprise. Seoul: Research Institute for Telecom Economy 
Research Institute. 
Kuruvilla, Sarosh. 1996. "Linkages between Industrialization Strategies and Industrial 
Relations/HR Policies: Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines and India. " Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 49(4): 635 - 57. 
Lane, Christel. 1989. Management and Labour In Europe: The Industrial Enterprise in 
Germany, Britain and France. Aldershop, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Lane, Christel. 1995. "Industrial Order and the Transformation of Industrial Relations: 
Britain, Germany and France Compared. " In New Frontiers in European Industrial 
Relations. edited by Richard Hyman and Anthony Ferner, 167 -95. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd. 
Lane, Christel. 1995. Industrial and Society in Europe: Stability and Change in Britain, 
Germany and France. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. (chap. 4) 
Lane, Christel. 1997. "The Governance of Interfirm Relations in Britain and Germany: 
Societal or Dominance Effects? ", in Governance at Work, edited by Richard Whitley, 
Peer H. Kristensen, 62-85. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lane, Christel. 1999. "Globalisation and the German Model of Capitalism. " Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge. 
Lazonick, William. 1997. "The Anglo-Saxon Corporate System. " In The Corporate 
Triangle: The Structure and Performance of Corporate Systems in a Global System, 
edited by P. H. Admiraal, 1-34. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Lee, Yeon-ho. 1996. "Political aspects of South Korean state autonomy: regulating the 
chaebol, 1980 - 1993. " The Pacific Review 9(2): 149 - 179. 
Legge, Karen. 1995. `HRM: rhetoric, reality and hidden agendas', in John Storey (ed. ). 
Human Resource Management: A Critical Text. London: Routledge. 33 -59. 
Leidner, Robin. 1996. "Rethinking Questions of Control: Lessons from McDonalds. " In 
307 
Working in the Service Society, edited by Cameron L. Macdonald and Carmen 
Sirianni, 29-49. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Levitt, Theodore. 1972. "Production- line approach to service. " Harvard Business 
Review 50(5): 41 - 52. 
Levitt, Theodore. 1976. "The industrialisation of service. " Harvard Business Review 
54(5): 63 - 74. 
Locke, Richard M. 1992. "The Demise of the National Union in Italy: Lessons for 
Comparative Industrial Relations Theory. " Industrial and Labour Relations Review 
45(2). 229 -249. 
Locke, Richard. 1995a. "The Transformation of Industrial Relations? A Cross-National 
Review. " In The Comparative Political Economy of Industrial Relations, edited by 
Kirsten Weber and Lowell Turner, 9-3 1. Madison: IRRA. 
Locke, Richard M. 1995b. Remaking the Italian Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Locke, Richard, M. Piore and T. Kochan. 1995. `Conclusion: The Transformation of 
Industrial Relations? A Cross-National Review of the Evidence. ' In Employment 
Relations in a Changing World Economy, edited by R. Locke, M. Piore and T. 
Kochan, 359 - 84. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press 
Locke, Richard and K. Thelen. 1995. "Apples and Organses Revisited: Contextualised 
Comparisons and the Study of Comparative Labor Politics. " Politics and Society. 23: 
337 - 67. 
Macdonald, C. Lynne and Carmen Sirianni. 1996. ""The Service Society and the 
Changing Experience of Work. " In Working in the Service Society, edited by C. L. 
Macdonald and Carmen Sirianni, 1- 26. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
MacDuffie, John P and J. Krafcik. 1992. "Integrating Technology and Human Resource 
for High-Performnace Manufacturing: Evidence from the International Auto 
Industry. " In Transforming Organisation, edited by Thoman Kochan and M. Useem, 
209-26. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MacDuffie, John P. 1995. "International Trends in Work Organisation in the Auto 
Industry: National-level vs. Company-level Perspective. " In The Comparative 
Political Economy of Industrial Relations, edited by K. Wever and L. Turner, 71- 
113. Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association. 
MacKenzie, Robert. 1998. "Deregulation and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Telecommunications Industry. " Ph D. thesis, Leeds: The University of Leeds. 
Maurice, Marc and F. Sellier. 1979. "Societal Analysis of Industrial Relations: A 
Comparison between France and West Germany. " British Journal of Industrial 
308 
Relations 17(3): 322-36. 
Maurice, Marc, F. Sellier and J. Silvestre. 1986. The Social Foundations of Industrial 
Power: A Comparison of France and Germany. London: The MIT Press. 
Mayer, Michael C. J. and Richard Whittington. 1999. "Strategy, Structure and 
`Systemness': National Institutions and Corporate Change in France, Germany and 
the UK, 1950 - 1993. " Organization Studies 20(6): 933 -59. 
McLoughlin, Ian and Jon Clark. 1994. Technological Change at Work. 2°d edition. 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Millward, N., M. Stevens, D. Smart and W. R. Hawes. 1992. Workplace Industrial 
Relations in Transition: The ED/ESRC/PSUACAS Surveys, Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Millward, N., A. Bryson and J. Forth. 2000. All Change at Work?: British employment 
relations 1980-1998, as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
series. London: Routledge. 
Morris, Jonathan and Barry Wilkinson. 1995. "The Transfer of Japanese Management 
to Alien Institutional Environments. " Journal of Management Studies 32(6): 719-30. 
Newell, H. and S. Dobson. 1996. "Muddle in the middle: organisational restructuring 
and middle management careers. " Personnel Review 25(4): 4-20. 
Noon, Mike and Paul Blyton. 1997. The Realities of Work. London: MacMillan. 
Osterman, Paul. 1996. "Introduction. " In Broken Ladders: Managerial Careers in the 
New Economy, edited by Paul Osterman, 1- 22. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Park, Duk-Je. 1992. "Industrial Relations in Korea. " The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management 3(1): 105-23. 
Parker, David. 1994. "A Dacade of Privatization: The Effect of Ownership Change and 
Competition on British Telecom. " British Review of Economic Issues, No. 40: 87 - 
113. 
Pendleton, Andrew and Jonathan Witerton. 1993. "Introduction. " In Public enterprise in 
transition: industrial relations in state and privatised corporations, edited by 
Andrew Pendleton and Jonathan Winterton, 1- 21. London: Routledge. 
Penn, Roger. 1990. "Skilled Maintenance Work at British Telecom: Finding From the 
Social Change and Economic Life Research Initiative. " New Technology, Work and 
Employment 5(2): 135-144. 
Pine, B. Joseph II. 1993. Mass Customisation: The New Frontier in Business 
Competition, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Regini, Marino. 1995. Uncertain boundaries: The social and political construction of 
European economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rodgers, R. A. and J. Wong. 1996. "Human Factor in the Transfer of the `Japanese Best 
309 
Practice' Manufacturing systems to Singapore. " The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management. 7(2): 455 - 88. 
Schuler, R S. and S. Jackson. 1987. "Linking competitive strategies with human 
resource management practices. " Academy of Management Executive 1(3): 209-13. 
Smith, Chris and Tony Eiger. 1997. "International Competition, Inward Investment and 
the Restructuring of European Work and Industrial Relations. " European Journal of 
Industrial Relations 3(3): 279-304. 
Smith, Chris and Peter Meiksins. 1995. "System, Society and Dominance Effects in 
Cross-National Organisation Analysis. " Work, Employment and Society 9(2): 241-67. 
Sorge, Arndt. 1995. "Cross-national differences in personnel and organisation. " In 
International Human Resource Management, edited by A. Harzing and J. 
Ruyseeveldt, 99 - 143. London: SAGE publication. 
Storey, John. 1992. Developments in the Management of Human Resources. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Strauss, George. 1998. "Comparative International Industrial Relations. " In Research 
the World of Work: Strategies and Methods in Studying Industrial Relations, edited 
by Keith Whitfield and George Strauss, 175 - 92. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1992a. Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of 
Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalist Economies. London: SAGE Publications. 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1992b. "National Diversity, Regime Competition and Institutional 
Deadlock. " Journal of Public Policy 12(4): 301-30. 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1996. "Lean Production in the Germany Automobile Industry: A 
Test Case for Convergence Theory. " In National Diversity and Global 
Capitalism, edited by Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, 138-70. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1997. "German Capitalism: Does It Exist? Can It Survive? " In 
Political Economy of Modem Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, 
edited by Colin Crounch and Wolfgang Streeck, 33-54. London: SAGE Publications. 
Talplin, Ian M. 1995. "Flexble Production, Rigid Jobs: Lessons From the Clothing 
Industry. " Work and Occupations 22(4): 412-38. 
Taylor, Phil and Peter Bain. 1999a. "Working in the call centre: entrapped by an 
"eletronic Panopticon? " Paper presented to the B. S. A Conference. 6- 9 April 1999. 
University of Glasgow. 
Taylor, Phil and Peter Bain. 1999b. "An Assembly Line in the Head": work and 
employment relations in the call centre. " Industrial Relations Journal 30(2): 101-17. 
Terry, Mike. 1989. "Recontextualising Shopfloor Industrial Relations: Some Case 
310 
Study Evidence. " In Manufacturing Change: Industrial Relations and 
Restructuring, edited by Stephanie Tailby and Colin Whitson, 192-216. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Terry, Mike. 1994. "Workplace Unionism: Redefining Structures and Objectives. " In 
New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations, edited by Richard Hyman and 
Anthony Ferner, 223-49. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Thelen, Katheleen and S. Steinmo. 1992. "Historical institutionalism in comparative 
politics. " In Structuring Politics: Historical institutionalism in comparative analysis, 
edited by S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, 1-32. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Truss, C., L. Gratton, V. Hope-Hailey, P. McGovern, and P. Stiles. 1997. "Soft and 
Hard Models of Human Resource Management: A Reappraisal. ", Journal of 
Management Studies 34(1): 53 -73. 
Turner, Lowell and Petee Auer. 1994. "A Diversity of New Work Organisation: Human- 
centred, Lean and In-between. " Industrielle Beziehungen 1(1): 39-61. 
Valenzuela, J. S. 1992. "Labour Movements and Political Systems: Some Variations. " In 
The Future of Labour Movements, edited by Marino Regini, 53-101. London: SAGE 
Publications. 
Valla, Steven Peter. 1993. Power in the Workplace: The Politics of Production at 
AT&T. New York: State University of New York Press. 
Vickers, John and George Yarrow. 1988. Privatization: An Economic Analysis. 
London: The MIT Press. 
Waddington, Jeremy. and C. Whitston. 1996. "Empowerment versus Intensification: 
Union Perspectives of Change at the Workplace. " in The New Workplace and Trade 
Unionism: Critical Perspectives on Work and Organisation, edited by P. Acker; C. 
Smith and P. Smith, 149 - 177. London: Routledge. 
Whitehead, David. 1999. `Data Warehousing: Winning the Loyalty Game'. 
Telecommunications. 568 - 74 
Whitley, Richard D. 1991. "The Social Construction of Business Systems in East Asia. " 
Organization Studies 12(1). 1-18. 
Whitley, Richard. 1992a. "The Comparative Study of Business Systems in Europe: 
Issues and Choices. " In European Business System: Firms and Markets in their 
National Contexts, edited by Richard Whitley, 267- 83. London: SAGE publications. 
Whitley, Richard. 1992b Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets and Societies. 
London: SAGE Publications. (chap 2.1992 - 1992b) 
Whitley, Richard D. 1999. Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Changes 
311 
of Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wilkinson, Barry. 1994. "The Korean Labour Problems. " British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 32(3): 339-58. 
De Witte, Marco and Bram Steijn. 2000. "Automation, Job Content and 
Underemployment. " Work, Employment and Society 14(2): 245-64. 
Womack, James P., D. Jones, and Daniel Roos. 1990. The Machine that Changed the 
World. New York: Rawson Associates. 
Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2"d ed. London: 
SAGE Publications. 
Zuboff, Shoshana. 1988. In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and 
Power. New York: Basic Books. 
312 
